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ABSTRACT
For mainland China, Taiwan is a very sensitive issue which not only involves its core
interest but also impacts its domestic and foreign policy making. Furthermore, with
the convergence of US China interests in Asian and world affairs in recent years, it is
believed that the most significant difference in their bilateral relations centers on
issues related to Taiwan. Last but not least, considering its close relations with Taiwan
and its rising tension with mainland China, Japan’s role in the Taiwan Issue should not
be ignored. This indicates the Taiwan Issue is more than cross-strait relations. But
there are few studies about the Taiwan Issue that included China, the US and Japan,
and very limited researches about such topic usually did not pay enough attention to
internal factors inside all these actors. For that reason, this study uses the foreign
policy theory of neoclassical realism to analyze the Taiwan Issue, interpreting each
actor’s policy evolution in past decades and examining their internal factors’ effect on
their external behavior, in order to give a clear and persuasive answer to the question:
under what circumstance that mainland China may be able to realize its national
unification with Taiwan.
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1Introduction
Since the mid-19th century, Japan has largely increased its military and technological strength
through its “Meiji Restoration”, transforming itself from an undeveloped feudal country into a
member of then imperialist powers. This growing power and the fact it lacked resources stirred up
a strong ambition of invasion, which finally led to the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-18951. The
defeated Qing government was forced to sign the Treaty of Shimonoseki with the Japanese
invaders in 1895, ceding Taiwan and the Penghu Islands to Japan, and paying an indemnity of 200
million tael of silver. Since then, Taiwan became a Japanese colony until the end of the Second
World War. Half a century’s colonial rule made several foreign countries believe that whether
Taiwan should be regarded as a part of China’s territory was undetermined, which constituted a
potential obstacle to Taiwan’s reunification with China.
The fifty years’ separation from China’s sovereignty has created huge negative impact on Taiwan’s
return to China’s sovereignty, but the real beginning of the Taiwan Issue discussed in this study
occurred in the end of the Chinese Civil War, when the Kuomintang (KMT) retreated to Taiwan
and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) was actively preparing a military attack for achieving
nationwide liberation. However, the outbreak of the Korean War interrupted the reunification
process. The United States abandoned its previous policy of “waiting for the dust falling
down”and started to take tough measures, such as sending the Seventh Fleet into the Taiwan Strait,
to block Beijing’s pursuit of cross-strait unification2. Since then, Taiwan is ruled by the authorities
in Taipei while the mainland is controlled by the CCP, and the two sides have maintained military
confrontation for decades. This separation of Chinese sovereignty and territory which remains
unsolved today is the essence of the so called Taiwan Issue.
The Research Question and Its Significance
Because of the “One-China” principle, （which means there is only one China in the world, and
both the mainland and Taiwan are parts of China3）, the Taiwan Issue has involved China's national
sovereignty and territorial integrity, and thus Beijing is bound to take various necessary actions to
achieve national unification. This will pose significant influence on Taiwan in the political,
economic, cultural, and especially security fields, while the responses from Taiwan, which are
reflected in its mainland policy, will also influence Beijing’s policy making process. This kind of
interaction between Beijing and Taipei constitutes the core of the Taiwan Issue and has obtained
much attention from politicians and scholars from both sides across the strait. However, it is
noteworthy that the Taiwan Issue also involves other actors. Since sending its Seventh Fleet into
the Taiwan Strait, the United States has maintained its intervention in the cross-strait situation to
prevent the realization of Chinese reunification, ensuring Taiwan’s de facto political independence.
This is why it is necessary to incorporate the US into the framework of this analysis. In contrast,
1 Paine S C M. The Sino-Japanese War of 1894–1895: Perception, Power, and Primacy, 2003[J].
2 Lin C. The legacy of the Korean War: Impact on US-Taiwan relations[J]. Journal of Northeast
Asian Studies, 1992, 11(4): 40-57.
3 The Evolution of the KMT's Stance on the One-China Principle: National Identity in Flux[J].
Taiwanese Identity in the 21st Century: Domestic, Regional and Global Perspectives (London:
Routledge), 2011.
2the role played by Japan in the Taiwan Issue usually received less attention because of its
ambiguous stance. However, as the colonist that has ruled Taiwan for nearly fifty years, Japan did
leave its mark in Taiwan’s society and culture which are difficult to be eliminated. Meanwhile, the
long term colonization also made Japanese people have a strong and complicated emotion of
Taiwan. This historical link between Japan and Taiwan has offered Japan not only the ability to
intervene in the Taiwan Issue, but also the willingness to realize such intervention, although these
willingness and ability do not seem very obvious in the shadow of the US policies and behaviors.
For the position of each actor involved in the Taiwan Issue, mainland China clearly pursues its
reunification with Taiwan, and the United States prefers to pay more attention to keeping peace
and stability across the Taiwan Straits, while Japanese own aspirations are hidden behind the US
strategy. Compared to these three actors, Taiwan’s position has been dramatically changed in past
decades by shifting from admitting One China principle and pursuing unification to publicly
declaring that the mainland and Taiwan are one country on each side. Consequently, these
different positions between mainland China and other three actors made the Taiwan Issue become
very difficult to be resolved. Precisely, from Beijing’s perspective, all three other actors can be
regarded more or less as opponents in its pursuit of reunification. The first is Taiwan. As the target
of national unification, it is able to directly impact on the development of Taiwan Issue. The
second is the US. As the only superpower with the strength that the mainland cannot match, its
intervention in the Taiwan Strait may decide whether Beijing can achieve unification. Last but not
least is Japan. Considering its ambiguous attitude towards One China principle, the uncertainty of
Japanese behavior in the potential cross-strait conflict is supposed to be taken into account by the
Chinese leadership. In such a case, the interaction between mainland China and these three actors
has increased the complexity of the Taiwan Issue, and through analyzing such complexity, the
propose of this study is to find out under what conditions mainland China may be able to realize
its national unification with Taiwan.
Two Taiwan Strait Crisis happened in the 1950s have proven that if Taiwan Issue is not properly
resolved, peace and stability across the straits will be seriously damaged by actors’ confrontational
interactions. After the Korean War, the CCP reconsidered its previous plan of liberating Taiwan by
force. In 1954, Mao Zedong declared it was inappropriate that China did not finish its task of
liberating Taiwan after the Korean War, requiring that the country should start to make necessary
preparations4. Within this context, the PLA deployed in Fujian province bombarded the KMT
military bases in Kinmen in September of the same year, causing heavy loss of the KMT and even
killing two American military advisers5. Although the scale of shelling was not large, it shocked
Taiwan, the United States, and the whole international community, and then was described as the
“Taiwan Strait Crisis” by the west. The initial cause of this crisis was that mainland China wished
to show its ability and determination to safeguard national unity and liberate Taiwan by force,
which can be regarded as a retaliation against the KMT previous military harassment on the
mainland’s coastal areas during the period of the Korean War. In essence, what Beijing pursued at
that time was to make its own position clear rather than obtaining a military victory, that was why
4 Wang Bingnan (1985). Reviewing Sino-US Negotiations of Nine Years. Beijing: World Affairs
Press. p41-42.
5 Gu Weiwei. (2012). The 1954 Taiwan Strait Crisis and the US Policy towards China. Theory
Research. 24 (8), p17-18.
3there was no large scale landing operations with the shelling. However, the interaction among
different actors can lead the situation to deviate from the initial target anticipated by any actor who
makes the first move. The shelling soon sparked a strong reaction from both Taiwan and the
United States, and led to a rapid escalation of this crisis. The KMT Air Force took immediately
retaliatory actions, striking the mainland’s coastal areas such as Fujian Province, which then
triggered fierce counterattack from the PLA. Meanwhile, the Eisenhower Administration insisted
that Taiwan’s political independence should not be threatened, discussing whether the US should
send its troops to defend Taiwan6. Washington’s final decision was to seek a cease-fire through the
intervention from the United Nations, requesting the KMT to withdraw its army from islands near
the mainland and to abandon the Kinmen and Matsu. This could eventually isolate Taiwan from
the mainland, and ultimately create “Two Chinas” in the international community7. In a word,
Beijing’s retaliation against the KMT aggravated military conflict across the strait, and its
response to the US intervention finally prompted the US to create Two Chinas, which indicated
that the mainland’s policy raised resistance for its own pursuit of national unification because it
failed to predict its opponents’ reaction.
After this First Taiwan Strait Crisis, the US stepped up its efforts to intervene in the situation
across the strait. The Chinese leaders were unsure that whether the US was prepared to attack the
mainland, so they decided to test the real target of the US through limited military actions against
the KMT. In August 1958, there was another round of massive bombardment in Kinmen, causing
the outbreak of the Second Taiwan Strait Crisis8. The mainland’s behavior was perceived by Taipei
as a signal of occupying Taiwan and getting rid of the US forces in the area, and made the KMT
authorities believe that Taiwan and the US should work together to curb such threat. Meanwhile,
the US reaction to China’s attack was also very strong. Then Secretary of State Dulles believed if
the mainland capturing the Kinmen and Matsu, Taipei would suffer a severe blow and there might
be a change in Taiwan’s public opinion regarding cross-strait relations, which could generate a
new government that accepted unification, and therefore damage the entire US strategy of
weakening the power and influence of the Soviet Union in the Asia-Pacific region9. So
Washington not only ordered the Seventh Fleet to take defensive measures, but also provided
missiles and other weapons to Taiwan, and even showed signals of preparing nuclear strikes
against targets in the mainland10. This made the tension much higher compared with the previous
crisis. Fortunately, the purpose of this shelling was to test America's bottom line in the Taiwan
Issue. In the following shelling, the PLA only attacked the KMT targets, and discovered that the
US warships did not fight back or defend their KMT allies, but chose not to engage the PLA. In
these circumstances, Beijing realized that the US was trying to avoid direct military conflict with
the mainland, just like the mainland also avoided to trigger a full scale warfare with the US. This
6 Zhao Xuegong. (2004). The Nuclear Weapon and US Policy towards First Taiwan Strait
Crisis. AMERICAN STUDIES QUARTERLY. 18 (2), p100-115.
7 Zhang Shuya. (1993). Ceasefire Case of UN Secturiy Council: US Strategy for Dealing with First
Taiwan Strait Crisis. Bulletin of the Institute of Modern History Academia Sinica . 22 (6), p63-106.
8 Zhang Wei. (2007). Comment on Research of Second Taiwan Strait Crisis in 1958. A survey of
research on the key issues of contemporary China history studies : A collection of papers presented
at the academic annual meeting on contemporary history of China. 1 (1), 1.
9 Macmillan, H (1982). Macmillan' Memoir (IV). Beijing: The Commercial Press（CP）. p538.
10 Lin Zhengyi (1985). The US Policy towards China in 1958 Taiwan Strait Crisis. Taipei: The
Commercial Press (CPTW). p74.
4prompted Beijing to adjust its hardline policy, resuming ambassadorial talks with the US and
easing the tension across the strait.
It should be noted that during these two crisis, mainland China had no intention to occupy Taiwan
by force or realize national reunification. But the rapid escalation of crisis has demonstrated that,
as long as they failed to accurately predict how would other actors respond to their behavior, the
mainland or any other actor involved in the Taiwan Issue could never completely control the
development of cross-strait situation. Any actor’s tough declarations or measures were likely to
cause military conflict, damaging peace and stability across the strait rather than achieving its own
goal. Unfortunately, this situation did not change too much in the post Cold War era, but was even
intensified because of the changing internal situations of most actors. This can be proved by the
outbreak of the Third Taiwan Strait Crisis. In the middle 1990s, when the rise of the
pro-independence forces largely changed Taiwan’s position, mainland China was becoming
increasingly confident because of its rising economic strength, while the US believed certain
policies and behaviors would not lead to intensive military conflict like what had happened in the
1950s. Unsurprisingly, these misjudgment of other actor’s potential response resulted in another
round of cross-strait crisis. What made it worse was, within the context that China maintained a
rapid economic growth while the US dominated the global hegemony as the only superpower, the
increasing strength of two actors hugely raised the danger of such crisis. Once there is a
miscalculation or an accidental firing, the history can easily repeat itself while the scale and
intensity of potential military conflict will be much larger.
Therefore, current peace across the strait does not mean that actors involved in the Taiwan Issue
can afford to be relaxed. On the contrary, different positions and misjudgments of others’ potential
reactions can still trigger serious conflict, which may lead to a disastrous consequence. The worst
case will be a full scale warfare between the world’s only superpower and the world's second
largest economy, while both of them are the nuclear powers. In such a case, it is very necessary to
research the Taiwan Issue which is characterized by sudden outbreak of conflict, rapid escalation
of confrontation, and disastrous consequences.
It is not difficult to realize that serious conflict usually breaks out across the strait when Beijing’s
pursuit of achieving national unification is facing strong opposition. This means whether there will
be a new round of Taiwan Strait Crisis is to a large extent determined by the intensity and form of
opposition against Chinese unification, which involves a variety of questions such as what
opposition is faced by Beijing’s pursuit, what measures Chinese leaders have taken to deal with
those difficulties, and how the interaction among actors with different positions will shape the
Taiwan Issue. Thus, this study will take into account of research findings made by a large number
of scholars, and adopt a theory that can conduct comprehensive analysis on all above questions, in
order to provide a persuasive conclusion to the question: under what circumstances, mainland
China may be able to achieve its unification with Taiwan.
Research Status of Taiwan Issue
The researches of the Taiwan Issue can be divided into three groups according to which actors
they focused on: researches on the cross-strait relations, researches on the US intervention in the
5Taiwan Strait, and researches involved Japan.
The cross-strait relations has been given much weight by scholars, who paid most attention to the
policy making in mainland China and Taiwan. Usually, this group of scholars admitted that One
China principle is very important. For example, Harbin Institute of Technology’s Professor Ge
Yongping argued that whether political negotiations will be achieved is dependent on the two
sides’ comprehensive understanding of the concept of One China principle11. Taiwanese scholars,
in contrast, often had negative opinion about One China principle. For example, Professor
Chien-min Chao from National Chengchi University argued that the two sides cannot work
together to achieve any agreement on issues related to political implications of “One China”,
implying that such principle insisted by Beijing is an obstacle for development of cross-strait
relations12. This kind of argument indicated that many Taiwanese scholars overlooked the fact that
One China principle actually involves fundamental interest of mainland China. Meanwhile, there
are also debates among western scholars about the principle. For example, Dr. Markus G. Puder
from Loyola University once suggested that the case of the co-existence of two Germany could
serve as an example for resolving the conflict between the PRC and Taiwan, which in fact
identified the two sides across the strait as two independent countries13. But other scholars, such as
Professor Jianming Shen from St. John's University made it clear that because of the nullification
of Japanese Treaty of Shimonoseki, China has completely restored its sovereignty over Taiwan,
denying the argument that Taiwan’s status is unsettled14. In the 1950s, western scholars usually
supported the opinion that Taiwan should be recognized as a part of China. For example, Dr. D.P.
O’Connell from University of Adelaide argued that a government is only recognized for what it
claimed to be, implying that as long as Taipei does not change its title, it is still recognized as a
part of China15. In the meantime, Professor Quincy Wright from American Society of International
Law also made it clear that if “the Japanese surrender constituted a definitive renunciation of
Formosa and the Pescadores and that the Chinese occupation constituted definitive re-annexation
of these territories by China”, the CCP regime should have a legal claim to those islands16.
Furthermore, Chinese scholars’ research about One China principle are often related with how the
mainland can achieve national unification. For example, Professor Wang Yingjin from Renmin
University of China compared different unification models proposed by scholars and politicians
from the two sides, believing that “One Country, Two Systems” based on the One China principle
11 Ge Yongping. (2013). The Meaning and Requirement of One China Principle in the View of
Jurisprudence. Study & Exploration. 7 (1), 68-73.
12 Chao C. Will economic integration between mainland China and Taiwan lead to a congenial
political culture?[J]. Asian Survey, 2003, 43(2): 280-304.
13 Puder M G. The Grass Will Not Be Trampled Because the Tigers Need Not Fight — New
Thoughts and Old Paradigms for Détente across the Taiwan Strait The Grass Will Not Be Trampled
Because the Tigers Need Not Fight [1] —New Thoughts and Old Paradigms for Détente Ac[J].
Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law, 2001, 34(May).
14 Shen J. Sovereignty, Statehood, Self-Determination, and the Issue of Taiwan[J]. Am.u.intl L.rev,
1999(5).
15 O'Connell D P. The Status of Formosa and the Chinese Recognition Problem[J]. American
Journal of International Law, 1956, 50(2):405-416.
16 Wright Q. The Chinese Recognition Problem[J]. American Journal of International Law, 1955,
49(3):320-338.
6is the most realistic option for Beijing and Taipei17. However, to achieve reunification, Taiwan's
attitude is very important. Before the DPP became the ruling party, scholars had already realized
that serious conflict might rise between the two sides, and therefore hoped that both the mainland
and Taiwan could adopt a pragmatic attitude in dealing with cross-strait relations to reduce
conflict18. During this period, many western scholars gave more weight to Taiwan’s
democratization, believing this generated a new definition of the cross-strait relations. For
example, when Lee Teng-hui gradually revealed his pro-independence stance in Taiwan’s political
transformation, some western scholars such as Professor Jean-Marie Henckaert from Webster
University, Geneva, supported the view of pro-independence forces that democratization process
had entitled Taiwan to statehood, arguing that the international community should recognize the
island as an independent sovereign state19. Meanwhile, many western scholars were not optimistic
about the effect of “One Country, Two Systems” on resolving the Taiwan Issue. For example,
Professor George E. Edwards from Indiana University contended that legal situation of Hong
Kong was quite different from that of Taiwan, because Taiwan had lived on its own feet for
decades and established a democratic political system20. Professor Jonathan I. Charney from
Vanderbilt University School of Law and Professor J.R.V. Prescott from the University of
Melbourne even argued that while the two sides conducted good-faith negotiations for cross-strait
reunification, there was still “an appropriate basis” for Taiwan to claim to statehood21. However,
Dr. Phil C.W. Chan from the National University of Singapore examined Taiwan’s legal status and
its meaning for the mainland and the US, arguing that Taiwan’s claim to the right of
self-determination and to statehood based on its democratization were both defective under the
international law. He pointed out that Taiwan’s people will be deemed to have the right of
self-determination only on the premise that Taiwan has reunited with China22.
More attention were paid to Taiwan’s pro-independence forces. Professor Zhang Wensheng from
Taiwan Research Institute of Xiamen University, through analyzing the DPP internal competition
and the evolution of its policy towards mainland, pointed out that refusing to accept the 1992
consensus has always been the consensus of various forces inside the party, so whatever
statements made by its leader would not change the party’s pro-independence position23. Scholars
have also noted that relations between the rise of the pro-independence forces and the
establishment of Taiwan's electoral politics. Professor Alan M. Wachman from Tufts University
pointed out that democratization in Taiwan has exerted huge impact on Taiwan’s mainland policy
through increasing pro-independence forces’ power and influence while weakening political
17 Wang Yingjin (2008). A study of the modes of state unification. Beijing: Jiuzhou Press. p255-270.
18 Qiu Kaiming. (1998). Taiwan Authorities Should Have a more Pragmatic Concern about
Cross-Strait Relations . Tai Sheng. 8 (1), p1.
19 Henckaerts, Jean-Marie, ed. The international status of Taiwan in the new world order: legal and
political considerations. Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1996.
20 Edwards G E. Applicability of the One Country, Two Systems Hong Kong Model to Taiwan: Will
Hong Kong's Post-Reversion Autonomy, Accountability, and Human Rights Record Discourage
Taiwan's Reunification with the People's Republic of China[J]. New Eng. L. Rev., 1997, 32: 751.
21 Charney J I, Prescott J R V. Resolving cross-strait relations between China and Taiwan[J].
American Journal of International Law, 2000: 453-477.
22 Chan P C W. The Legal Status of Taiwan and the Legality of the Use of Force in a Cross-Taiwan
Strait Conflict[J]. Chinese Journal of International Law, 2009, 8(2):455-492.
23 Zhang Wensheng. (2012). The DPP Remains its Pro-Independence Position. Liang An Guan Xi.
1 (1), p44-46.
7dominance of the KMT who supported unification24. Professor Kenneth Lieberthal from
University of Michigan also agreed that electoral politics in Taiwan has largely influenced
cross-strait relations since the mainland policy became a prime subject for campaign
manipulation25. Dr. Lu Chengjun from Peking University argued that the DPP’s senior leaders
have been dedicating to street struggles and social movements, and after obtaining power, they
continued to promote Taiwanese identity and therefore arouse irrational emotion in society, which
seriously affected Taiwan’s public attitude toward the cross-strait relations26. Associate Professor
Yong Suhua from Nanjing University of Information Science and Technology made a
comprehensive analysis of Taiwan’s election culture, and had the similar opinion that elections in
Taiwan were too intensive, making most politicians concern about how to use extreme topics to
attract voters. Within this context, opposing Beijing’s pursuit of unification has become an
effective tool utilized by pro-independence parties to obtain social support27.
There are also analysis focusing on the identity issue which was often used by the DPP in its
propaganda against unification. Guangzhou Institute of Socialism’s Professor Liu Qiang argued
that the outbreak of this identity problem was related to Taiwanese people’s visit to the mainland
in the late 1990s. Their disappointment and sense of strangeness about their hometown in the
mainland and strong familiarity with their current home in Taiwan significantly weakened their
previous Chinese identity28. It is worth to note that there are also scholars such as Professor S
Corcuff from the University of Lyon who researched Taiwanese identity along ethnic lines29, but
most western and Chinese scholars preferred to link the establishment of Taiwanese identity with
Taiwan’s democratization process. For example, Professor Christopher R Hughes from the
London School of Economic and Political Science argued that democratization played an
important role in building the so called Taiwanese identity30. Professor Shelley Rigger from
Davidson College criticized some inaccurate researches that simply recognized Chinese and
Taiwanese identity as a dichotomous choice faced by Taiwan’s society, emphasizing that what
Taiwanese people actually had to choose behind these two identities was reunification and
independence31. Similarly, Dr. Robert Marsh analyzed the heated public discourse caused by two
competing identities in Taiwan’s society, and realized that behind the issue of identity there was
the confrontation between unification and independence32. In such a case, Professor Chu Yunhan
from National Taiwan Univeristy pointed out that this process of changing identity in Taiwan was
quite difficult to reverse, so its negative impact on Beijing’s pursuit of achieving peaceful
24 Wachman A. Taiwan: National identity and democratization[M]. ME Sharpe, 1994.
25 Lieberthal K. Preventing a war over Taiwan[J]. Foreign Aff., 2005, 84: 53.
26 Lu Chengjun. (2008). Analyzing the DPP's Populism. Peking University Doctoral Dissertation.
27 Yong Suhua. (2003). Taiwan's Election Culture in Recent Ten Years.Nanjing University Doctoral
Dissertation.
28 Liu Qiang. (2009). Cross-Straits Interaction and State Identity. JOURNAL OF THE CENTRAL
INSTITUTE OF SOCIALISM. 4 (1), 13.
29 Corcuff S. Taiwan’s “Mainlanders,” New Taiwanese[J]. Memories of the future: National identity
issues and the search for a new Taiwan, 2002: 163-195.
30 Chan G, Hughes C. Taiwan and Chinese Nationalism: National Identity and Status in
International Society[J]. 1998.
31 Rigger S. Disaggregating the Concept of National Identity[J]. The Evolution of a Taiwanese
National Identity, Asia Program Special Report, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars,
2003 (114): 17-21.
32 Marsh R. National identity and Ethnicity in Taiwan[J]. Corcuff, Stéphane, 2002: 144-158.
8reunification would become a serious problem33. Professor Daniel Lynch from Dalhousie
University also admitted that efforts taken by Lee Teng-hui and the following DPP authorities to
promote Taiwanese identity while burying Chinese identity were not based on any accurate history
but the political motive to separate Taiwanese people from Chinese identity34. Professor Teufel
Dreyer from the University of Miami, also agreed that the goal of pro-independence forces was to
cut off the link between language, culture, and history of Taiwan and those of China. In other
words, they were promoting de-Sinification35.
Other scholars, such as Professor Shao Zonghai, the famous Taiwanese expert on cross-strait
relations, argued that the reason that the DPP authorities proposed its theory of “one country on
each side” and even attempted to initiate a referendum to realize Taiwan’s de jure independence,
was that rising Taiwanese identity strengthened by the de-Sinification movements had offered
sufficient support to those pro-independence leaders36. Although then DPP authorities did not
achieve their goal of realizing Taiwan’s de jure independence, Professor Brett Benson from
Vanderbilt University and Professor Emerson Niou from Duke University both emphasized that
the polling result registered in Taiwan’s public opinion polls, which did not support Taiwan’s
independence, reflected not the heart felt ambition but pragmatism of Taiwanese people. In a word,
most people have accepted Taiwanese identity, but they were status quo supporters because they
knew the severe consequence they would face if they preferred Taiwan’s immediate
independence37.
Based on various researches about Taiwan’s pro-independence forces’ development and political
pursuit, scholars also analyzed how should the mainland deal with the pro-independence forces in
order to achieve cross-strait reunification. These studies usually focused on two aspects, which
were military deterrence adopted by Beijing to contain separatist movements on the island, and
Beijing’s cooperation with Taiwan’s anti-independence politicians. For example, Dr. John W.
Garver from the Georgia Institute of Technology argued that there was a link between political
leaders’ competition for power that increased military influence on Beijing’s Taiwan policy
making38. The logic behind this argument was that hardline policy could raise the support of
Chinese nationalists for the CCP regime. Taiwanese scholars, such as Dr. Wu-ueh Chang from
Tamkang University and Professor Chien-min Chao from National Chengchi University, analyzed
policy made by China’s fourth generation leaders toward Taiwan. They argued that these fourth
generation leaders, especially then President Hu Jintao, were taking a “harder but softer” policy to
deal with cross-strait relations, showing that China was willing to compromise on issues of great
33 Chu Y.. (2004). Taiwan's national identity politics and the prospect of cross-strait relations. Asian
Survey. 44 (4), 484-512.
34 Lynch D C. Taiwan's self-conscious nation-building project[J]. Asian Survey, 2004, 44(4):
513-533.
35 DREYER J T. The Evolution of a Taiwanese National Identity[J].
36 Shao Zonghai. (2004). An Analysis of Chen Shui- bian's"One Country on Each Side"Theory and
Its Effects on Cross- Straits Relations. Taiwan Research Quarterly. 2 (1), 6.
37 Benson B V, Niou E M S. Public opinion, foreign policy, and the security balance in the Taiwan
Strait[J]. Security Studies, 2005, 14(2): 274-289.
38 Garver J W. Face off: China, the United States, and Taiwan's democratization[M]. University of
Washington Press, 2011.
9concern for Taiwan39. But the study of Keyuan Zou, who is the Professor from Lancashire Law
School, argued that in order to maintain national unity within the context of the rise of
pro-independence forces, the mainland should make it clear its deterrence was completely based
on Anti-Secession Law, because the seriousness of law made the threat of using force against
separatist movements more credible40.
Other scholars emphasized the importance of the CCP’s cooperation with the pan-blue political
alliance, which includes the KMT and other political parties that openly endorsed the One China
principle. For example, Beijing Union University’s Professor Xu Bodong analyzed the KMT’s
cooperation with the CCP during the period of the Chen Shui-bian administration from 2000 to
2006, arguing that Beijing can win Taiwanese people’s hearts and minds because Taiwan’s society
has benefited from these cooperation, and therefore reduce Taiwan’s social support for the
pro-independence stance41. The idea that cross-strait cooperation can increase the possibility of
national unification is supported by more scholars after the KMT won the 2008 election. For
example, Dr. Liu Ge from Tsinghua University concluded in his analysis that cross-strait
exchanges and cooperation after Ma Ying-jeou came to power would let people on both sides
benefit, and therefore gradually eliminate Taiwanese society’s hostility against the mainland,
reducing barriers for achieving unification42. Professor Zhang Guanhua from Chinese Academy of
Social Sciences reviewed the rapid development of cross-strait economic exchanges after 2008,
especially the huge income brought by tourists from the mainland, believing Taiwan that has
benefited from such exchanges was unlikely to take any separatist actions to provoke Beijing43. Dr.
Bonnie Glaser and Dr. Brad Glosserman from the China Power Project at CSIS also agreed that
the result of Taiwan’s 2008 presidential election and Ma Ying-jeou’s position of “no
independence” has shown that the pro-independence forces in Taiwan was not as strong as it
declared to be44.
But for the cross-strait economic exchanges, western scholars had a relatively negative opinion
compared to their Chinese counterparts. As early as in 1992, Professor Emerson M. S. Niou from
Duke University and Professor Peter. C. Ordeshook from California Institute of Technology
argued that China sought to transfer its economic power into a political leverage over Taiwan45.
Obviously, most Taiwanese scholars held the same view, such as Professor Yu-Shan Wu46,
39 Chang W, Chao C. Managing stability in the Taiwan Strait: non-military policy towards Taiwan
under Hu Jintao[J]. Journal of Current Chinese Affairs, 2009, 38(3): 99-118.
40 Keyuan ZOU. Governing the Taiwan Issue in accordance with law: An essay on China's
anti-secession law[J]. Chinese Journal of International Law, 2005, 4(2): 455-463.
41 Xu Bodong, Li Zhenguang. (2007). The KMT's Mainland Policy and Its Trend. Modern Taiwan
Studies . 1 (1), p31-36.
42 Liu Ge. (2014). Political, Cultural and Social Effect of Cross-Strait Economic
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Professor Tse- Kang Leng47, Professor Tun-jen Cheng48, and Professor Steve Chan49, all believing
that the mainland was using economic exchanges to force Taiwan to accept national reunification.
Professor Christopher M. Dent from White Rose East Asia Center supported the view that
Taiwan’s economy was pulled by the PRC economy within the context of burgeoning growth of
cross-strait economic exchanges, suggesting that Taipei should concern about its economic
security in the face of further economic integration with the mainland50. Professor Paul J. Bolt
from University of Illinois even declared that Taiwan’s businessmen were used by Beijing to
impose political pressure on the Taiwan authorities51.
For the effect of economic exchanges between the two sides, Professor Douglas B. Fuller from
King’s College London argued that Taiwanese investment played a significant role in China’s
rapid economic growth, such as training Chinese engineering elites and pushing Chinese
technological development52. In other words, it was mainland China rather than Taiwan that
benefit from the cross-strait economic exchanges. Professor Shu Keng, Professor Lu-huei Chen,
and Professor Kuan-bo Huang from Soochow University pointed out that Taiwanese people’s
perception of economic and cultural exchanges across the strait was not only related to their
economic interest, but also largely influenced by their position on the unification and
independence issue53. Professor Chen-yuan Tung from National Chengchi University, unlike many
Taiwanese politicians and scholars who worried about the mainland would use economic threat to
force Taipei to give up its current political autonomy and gradually meet Beijing’s demand on
national unification, argued that economic interdependence actually constrained the mainland’s
capability to use economic leverage against Taiwan54. Professor Phillip C. Saunders added that
China’s increasingly trade dependent economy would also face huge pressures from the US if it
used economic leverage to threaten Taiwan55. Dr. Terry Cooke from the University of
Pennsylvania also agreed that it was very unlikely that Beijing would impose pressure on Taiwan’s
economy, because within the context of economic globalization, such behavior might create
negative impact on foreign companies and countries, and therefore elicited discontent from the
international community toward the Chinese government56. Dr. Addison Craig had similar view,
arguing that a broad economic sanction was too costly for mainland China because Taiwanese
47 Leng T K. A political analysis of Taiwan's economic dependence on mainland China[J]. Issues &
Studies, 1998, 34(8):132-154.
48 Cheng T. China-Taiwan economic linkage: Between insulation and superconductivity[J].
Dangerous Strait: The US-Taiwan-China Crisis, 2005: 93-130.
49 Chan S. The politics of economic exchange: Carrots and sticks in Taiwan-China-US relations[J].
ISSUES AND STUDIES-ENGLISH EDITION-, 2006, 42(2): 1.
50 Dent C M. Being pulled into China's orbit? Navigating Taiwan's foreign economic policy[J]. Issues
& Studies, 2001, 37(5):1-34.
51 Bolt P J. Economic ties across the Taiwan Strait: Buying time for compromise[J]. Issues &
Studies, 2001, 37(2): 80-105.
52 Fuller D B. The Cross-Strait economic relationship's impact on development in Taiwan and China:
Adversaries and partners[J]. Asian Survey, 2008, 48(2): 239-264.
53 Keng S, Chen L, Huang K. Sense, sensitivity, and sophistication in shaping the future of
cross-Strait relations[J]. ISSUES AND STUDIES-ENGLISH EDITION-, 2006, 42(4): 23.
54 Cross-strait economic relations: China's leverage and Taiwan's vulnerability[J]. 問題與研究,
2003, 39(3): 137-175.
55 Saunders P C. Supping with a long spoon: dependence and interdependence in Sino-American
relations[J]. The China Journal, 2000: 55-81.
56 Cooke T. Cross-Strait Economic Ties and the Dynamics of Globalization[J]. Cross-Strait
Economic Ties: Agent of Change, or a Trojan Horse, 2008: 8-11.
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investment toward the mainland would be also seriously damaged57. Professor Gerald Chan from
the University of Auckland examined the economic and social exchanges across the strait, arguing
that Beijing did not always gain advantage in its interaction with Taipei58. Furthermore, Dr. Karen
M. Sutter from US-China Business Council argued that Taiwan’s businessmen would prefer to
refrain from any engagement in political issues, implying that businessmen were unlikely to meet
Beijing’s demand59. Dr. Choon Yin Sam from TMC Education Corporation Limited, Singapore,
also had a pessimistic view about economic exchanges across the strait, arguing that economic
integration between Taiwan and the mainland is almost impossible as long as two sides’ authorities
fail to reach a political consensus while they are able to exert much influence on business
behavior60. This kind of opinion has been proved by Professor Yu Yi Wen, who made it clear that
Beijing’s policies which were beneficial for Taiwan failed to attract Taiwanese businessmen, and
the relation between two sides’ industries was transformed from a cooperation to a more intensive
competition61. In general, effects of economic exchanges promoted by the mainland may not be
consistent with Beijing’s target.
It seems that most scholars agreed that Beijing had few effective measures for promoting
unification. For instance, Dr. Alan D. Romberg from the East Asia Program at the Stimson Center
in Washington, D.C. argued that in order to maintain peace and stability across the strait, a formal
and enduring framework of negotiation for cross-strait relation must be established. But according
to his view, this step was very difficult to reach, even though the two sides have made several
achievements in the phase of discussing practical issues62. Professor Li Yihu from Peking
University also noted that sustainable development of cross-strait relations has almost touched the
phase of political negotiations, which would inevitably involve how Beijing and Taipei to identify
each other, but Ma Ying-jeou did not give any positive response to Beijing63. Professor Guo
Jianqing from Academy of Social Sciences in Fujian even offered a more straightforward
conclusion that Ma Ying-jeou gave more weight to Taiwan’s relations with the US and Japan
rather than the cross-strait relations, arguing that Beijing can hardly make much progress for
achieving cross-strait unification even when the anti-independence pan-blue forces was in power64.
Some western scholars, such as Dr. Stephen J. Flanagan, believed nationalist sentiment could
create negative impact on Beijing’s policy making because it gave Chinese military more
opportunities to lobby the government to formulate more coercive security policies65. But Dr.
57 Addison C. Silicon Shield: Taiwan's Protection Against Chinese Attack[M]. Fusion Press, 2001.
58 Chan G. Diplomacy across the Taiwan strait: From competition to cooperation?[J]. East Asia,
2004, 21(1): 24-39.
59 Sutter K M. Business dynamism across the Taiwan Strait: the implications for cross-strait
relations[J]. Asian Survey, 2002, 42(3): 522-540.
60 Sam C Y. Economic management in Taiwan and Mainland China: Why and how they have been
politicized[J]. Global Economic Review, 2007, 36(1): 69-87.
61 Yu YW, Yu K C, Lin T C. Political Economy of Cross-Strait Relations: is Beijing’s patronage policy
on Taiwanese business sustainable?[J]. Journal of Contemporary China, 2016, 25(99): 372-388.
62 Romberg A D. Cross-Strait Relations: First the Easy Steps, Then the Difficult Ones[J]. China
Leadership Monitor, 2008, 26: 1-31.
63 Li Yihu. (2014). Significance and Solution of Identifying Taiwan's Status.Journal of Peking
University(Philosophy and Social Sciences). 1 (1), p137-144.
64 Guo Jianqing. (2013). From Old 'Three Noes' to New 'Three Noes': Ma Ying-jeou's Cross-Strait
Policy in his Second Term. Modern Taiwan Studies. 4 (4), p12-15.
65 Flanagan, Stephen J. The People's Liberation Army and China in transition /[M]. National
Defense University Press, 2003.
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Erica Strecker Downs from Rand Corporation, along with Professor Phillip C. Saunders, denied
that rising nationalism in China was able to drive the Chinese government to take irrational
actions against Taiwan, arguing instead that the Chinese leadership was not constrained by
nationalists when dealing with sensitive foreign policies regarding territorial disputes66. But they
contended this was because Beijing gave more weight to China’s economic growth. There were
also a few scholars, such as Professor David M. Lampton from the Johns Hopkins University, who
seemed to be optimistic that China’s foreign policy will become more pluralistic, implying that
moderate and liberal views toward Taiwan may become acceptable67.
In addition to researches that focused on cross-strait relations, a few scholars’ studies about the
impact of China's rise on the Asia-Pacific region and the world also involved the Taiwan Issue.
For example, Professor Zhang Wenmu from Strategic Problem Research Center of Beihang
University comprehensively analyzed China's security interests from a geopolitical perspective,
concluding that without cross-strait unification, China was not only unable to realize its strategic
goal of becoming a maritime power, but even unable to secure its own coastal areas in regional
conflicts. He also pointed that if two sides eventually achieve unification, China will be in a very
favorable position in resolving territorial dispute with its neighboring countries68. But the number
of such studies is relatively small. Most scholars concerned about the influence of China’s rise on
Beijing’s options of how to realize its targets. For example, Professor James R Holmes and
Professor Toshi Yoshihara from the Strategy and Policy Department at the U.S. Naval War College
believed that the growth of Chinese national strength has triggered Beijing’s demands for
maritime interests, and made Beijing’s policy on the relevant issues become increasingly tough69.
M. Taylor Fravel, who is the associate Professor of Political Science and a member of the Security
Studies Program at MIT, also concerned about the territorial disputes between China and its
neighboring countries, arguing that the possibility that China may use force to resolve such
disputes should not be ruled out. Similarly, his reason is the rising economic strength and political
influence of China has made Beijing more confident in protecting its significant interests70. But
such studies rarely gave any specific analysis about the Taiwan Issue.
There are also a few scholars noticing the situation across the Taiwan Straits is linked to China's
internal stability. From their perspective, the separatist movements in the name of ethnic
self-determination have posed a serious threat to legitimacy of Chinese government and stability
of Chinese society. Professor Yang Mansu from Yunnan University and Professor Zhang Jiadong
from Fudan University examined the development of separatism in the world history, analyzing
the damage of such movements for the territorial integrity of multi-ethnic countries such as
66 Downs E S, Saunders P C. Legitimacy and the limits of nationalism: China and the Diaoyu
Islands[J]. 2012.
67 Lampton D M. The Making of Chinese Foreign and Security Policy in the Era of Reform,
1978-2000[M]// The making of Chinese foreign and security policy in the era of reform, 1978-2000 /.
Stanford University Press, 2001:438-439.
68 Zhang Wenmu (2012). Analysis of China's Security Interests in World Geopolitics. Beijing: China
Social Science Press . p166-167.
69 James R． Holmes and Toshi Yoshihara，Chinese Naval Strategy in the 21st Century: The Turn
to Mahan，Routledge，2009，p54．
70 M. Taylor Fravel. (2007/2008). Power Shifts and Escalation: Explaining China's Use of Force in
Territorial Disputes. International Security. 32 (3), 44-83.
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China71. Analysis of Dr. Zhou Wanghong from Hebei Finance University made it more clear that
damage of separatist movements can be intensified when different separatist groups cooperate
with each other under certain conditions to fight their common enemy, that is the Chinese
government. In such a case, Taiwan’s pro-independence forces’ activities will obtain support from
other separatist groups, and encourage those groups to carry out corresponding movements,
forming a domino effect which will lead to social unrest72.
In a word, the study of cross-strait relations tends to give more emphasis to the role played by the
pro-independence forces, offering a detailed analysis about its damage to Beijing’s pursuit of
unification. The shortcomings of this kind of study are obvious. First of all, they did not pay
enough attention to relations among the pro-independence forces, anti-independence forces, and
Taiwan society, failing to find the mechanism behind the phenomenon, and therefore give no
appropriate solution. Secondly, although scholars who researched cross-strait relations usually
emphasized importance of the Taiwan Issue for China’s interests, they did not offer a detailed
discussion about which interests are involved in the issue. This may lead to the dispute about the
priority of Taiwan and other issues in Chinese foreign policy making process. The third problem
of these studies is that they ignored influence of other actors involved in the Taiwan Issue, leading
to a very inaccurate conclusion that Beijing will be able to achieve national unification as long as
mainland China can resolve the negative effect created by Taiwan’s pro-independence forces.
For the third problem, a group of scholars have combined Taiwan Issue with the Sino-US relations,
offering relatively more convincing conclusions. For example, Professor Jean Garrison from the
University of Wyoming reviewed US policy evolution from Nixon to G. W. Bush toward China,
analyzing the influence of China’s rise on US commitment to Taiwan73. Taiwanese scholars, such
as Professor Chen-yuan Tung from National Chengchi University, pointed out that in the past,
especially during the period of China’s third generation leadership, what China concerned most
was the negative impact of Taiwan Issue on China’s economic modernization. He argued that
Beijing did not have sufficient power and its policy for dealing with Taiwan’s pro-independence
movements actually relied on the US influence on Taipei74. Professor Phillip C. Saunders from the
National Defense University's Institute for National Strategic Studies in Washington, D.C. , like
many other US scholars, emphasized a potential threat to the US interest created by China’s
pursuit of achieving unification with Taiwan. After analyzing the long term trend shaped by
domestic situations in the mainland, Taiwan, and the US, Saunders predicted that conflict among
these three actors may lead to future instability in the area75. Similarly, Dr. Ted Galen Carpenter
from the Cato Institute was also worried about the ultimate outcome of the Taiwan Issue, arguing
that there may be an inevitable Sino-American military confrontation in the future because Taiwan,
71 Yang Mansu, Zhang Jiadong. (2002). National Separationism and Its Impact. International
Review. 1 (1), p27-32.
72 Zhou Wanghong. (2009). Maintaining High Alert on Pro-independence Forces in Taiwan, Tibet
and Xinjiang to Follow Each Other. A Summary of the Annual Meeting of Hebei Social Sciences in
2009.
73 Garrison J A. Making China Policy: From Nixon to GW Bush[M]. Boulder and London: Lynne
Rienner Publishers, 2005.
74 Tung C. An assessment of China's Taiwan policy under the third generation leadership[J]. Asian
Survey, 2005, 45(3): 343-361.
75 Saunders P C. Long-term trends in China-Taiwan relations: implications for US Taiwan policy[J].
Asian Survey, 2005, 45(6): 970-991.
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China, and the US pursue different goals76. Professor Steven Goldstein from Smith College and
then Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Randall Schriver analyzed the importance of the Taiwan
Relations Act, pointing out that the Congress is able to impose more pressures on the US president
if he or she is not upholding the TRA, generating more policies in favor of Taiwan’s interests77.
Some of these studies gave more weight to Taiwan Strait Crisis. For example, Professor Zhang
Chunying from Zhongnan University of Econimics and Law pointed out that during the period of
the First and Second Taiwan Strait Crisis, the United States invested its main energy in creating
“Two Chinas” in the international community, because Washington on one hand wished to
obstruct the mainland’s military liberation, while on the other hand, refused to get involved in a
direct military conflict with the mainland78. Stanford University Professor Gordon H. Chang gave
a more detailed analysis about the Eisenhower Administration's Taiwan policy making during that
period, pointing out that the US internal disagreement between the White House and the US army
on how to deal with the mainland’s military actions shaped the US actual behavior in the crisis79.
The Third Taiwan Strait Crisis occurred in 1995-1996 was paid more attentions by western
scholars, such as Boston College's Professor Robert S. Ross80, and University of Arizona's
Professor Allen S. Whiting81, as well as Georgetown University's Professor Andrew Scobell82. But
their point of views are almost exactly the same, which is how China's dramatic military actions
changed its previous image for the international community and seriously damaged regional
security and stability. Other American scholars, such as Professor Harry Harding from George
Washington University83, then Chairman of American Institute in Taiwan Richard C. Bush84, and
Professor Joseph S. Nye85, also worried that the cross-strait relationship was not stable and
warning that history could easily repeat itself. According to these US scholars, the Taiwan Strait
Crisis is solely caused by China, and Washington must take effective measures to contain Chinese
assertive behaviors in the future. By contrast, a small number of Chinese graduate students
analyzed the crisis from the perspective of the Game Theory, hoping to find out what kind of
interactions between China and the US can better avoid the outbreak of serious conflict. For
example, Shen Hexue from East China Normal University used theories and models proposed by
Glenn Snyder and Paul Dyson in her analysis and pointed out that China and the US were
76 Carpenter T G. America's coming war with China: a collision course over Taiwan[M]. Macmillan,
2015.
77 Goldstein S M, Schriver R. An Uncertain Relationship: The United States, Taiwan and the Taiwan
Relations Act[J]. The China Quarterly, 2001, 165: 147-172.
78 Zhang Chunying. (2000). Chiang Kai-shek's Five Times Resistance against the US Plan of
Separating Taiwan from China. Liang An Guan Xi. 12 (1), p22-26.
79 Chang G H. To the nuclear brink: Eisenhower, Dulles, and the Quemoy-Matsu crisis[J].
International Security, 1988, 12(4): 96-123.
80 Ross R S. The 1995–96 Taiwan Strait confrontation: Coercion, credibility, and the use of force[J].
International Security, 2000, 25(2): 87-123.
81 Whiting A S. China's use of force, 1950–96, and Taiwan[J]. International Security, 2001, 26(2):
103-131.
82 Scobell A. Show of force: Chinese soldiers, statesmen, and the 1995–1996 Taiwan Strait crisis[J].
Political Science Quarterly, 2000, 115(2): 227-246.
83 Harding H. Toward a Modus Vivendi in the Taiwan Strait[C]//International Conference on"
US-Taiwan Relations: Twenty Years after the Taiwan Relations Act," Institute of European and
American Studies, Academic Sinica. 1999: 9-10.
84 Bush R C. The US-Taiwan-PRC Triangle, Mid Year[C]//Annual Conference of the Taiwan
Chamber of Commerce of North America, Chicago. 1999.
85 Nye J. A Taiwan Deal[J]. Washington Post, 1998, 8: C7.
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experiencing a variety of different game process in this nearly ten-month crisis, explaining why
the tension was finally eased86.
Based on the analysis of the Taiwan Strait Crisis, scholars made their conclusion about the US
position on the Taiwan Issue. The leading expert in Chinese studies, professor David Shambaugh
from George Washington University, like many other US scholars, concerned about China’s steady
military build-up in recent decades, arguing this increasing military capabilities might create
negative influence on the peace and stability across the strait87. However, while concerning about
Chinese potential threat toward Taiwan’s security, many US scholars, such as Dr. Michael O'
Hanlon, argued that the mainland lacked sufficient military capabilities to take over Taiwan by
force88. This kind of argument actually revealed that most US scholars are confident in the US
relative power to curb Chinese military actions, without prudently examining interests of both
countries involved in the Taiwan Issue. For example, Professor Michael S. Chase from the Pardee
RAND Graduate School recognized there was a trend that the US government continued to
reinforce its support to Taiwan through larger arms sales and stronger statements about coming to
aid if the island were attacked by the PRC, and argued that the security cooperation between the
US and Taiwan would make Washington well prepared for a future Taiwan Strait contingency
while simultaneously imposing more pressures on Beijing89.
Professor Yu Zidao from Fudan University90 and Director Pan Jingguo from Party Documents
Research Office of the CPC Central Committee91 both analyzed the fact that the US government
did not support Taipei’s policy of retaking mainland in the 1950s, pointing out that the US target
was only obstructing cross-strait unification rather than starting a direct warfare with the mainland.
Professor Pan Zhongqi from Fudan University held the same view that the United States tried to
avoid military conflict with the mainland when dealing with cross-strait tensions92. Professor Qian
Zhenqin and Dr. Wang Jianke from PLA University of Science and Technology analyzed changes
in the US policy towards Taiwan since the late 1940s, arguing that such policy evolution was to
seek permanent separation between Taiwan and the mainland93. In fact, most Chinese scholars
agree that current US target is to maintain peace and stability across the strait, which means the
US has successfully maintained Taiwan’s de facto independence while avoiding to get involved in
a direct military conflict with the mainland. However, Professor Wu Xinbo from Fudan University
argued that opposing any unilateral changes in the status quo is not Washington’s real target,
86 Shen Hexue. (2013). Analyzing Game between the US and China in Taiwan Strait Crisis during
1995 to 1996. East China Normal University Master's thesis.
87 Shambaugh D. A matter of time: Taiwan's eroding military advantage[J]. Washington Quarterly,
2000, 23(2): 119-133.
88 O'Hanlon M. Why China Cannot Conquer Taiwan[J]. International Security, 2000, 25(2): 51-86.
89 Chase M S. US-Taiwan Security Cooperation: Enhancing an Unofficial Relationship[J].
Dangerous Strait: The US-Taiwan-China Crisis, 2005: 162-85.
90 Yu Zidao. (2006). The Third Taiwan Strait Crisis: Taiwan's Military Counterattack and US
Policy. Military History Research . 1 (1), p67-82.
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Taiwan Policy. Taiwan Studies. 3 (3), p71-75.
92 Pan Zhongqi. (2003). Three Problems Faced by Strategic Ambiguity of US Policy towards
Taiwan. World Economics and Politics. 1 (1), p21-25.
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believing that US government is actually pursuing Taiwan’s peaceful independence94.
Compared to those studies only focusing on cross-strait relations, scholars who take into account
the US position have provided different conclusions on how the mainland can achieve unification.
Associate Research Fellow Wu Xianbin from Chinese Academy of Social Sciences clearly argued
that the US-Taiwan military relations is the biggest obstacle to the realization of reunification,
suggesting that Beijing should appropriately deal with challenges from such military alliance95. Dr.
Zhang Jincui from Fudan University also pointed out that the United States concerned about the
gap of military strength across the strait within the context of China’s rise, and tried to improve
Taiwan’s defensive capabilities through arms sales, which would undoubtedly make it more
difficult for Beijing to achieve national unification96. It seems that most Chinese officials agreed
that the US would take actions to block Chinese pursuit of unification, but there were optimistic
views about the degree of this potential intervention. For example, Director Gong Xiaoxiong and
Associate Research Fellow Cong Hongquan from of the United Front Work Department of the
CPC Central Committee both argued that before taking military intervention, the US government
will have to take into account of the facts that China is a permanent member of the UN Security
Council and a nuclear power, and most US allies may not be able to offer any effective support for
US in such a dangerous warfare. In such a case, the US intervention may be not as powerful as
Taiwan has expected97. Meanwhile, many Chinese scholars’ researches about the US potential
intervention give more weight to the attitude of the US society for the Sino-American military
conflict, believing that the US society can hardly tolerate the risk of involving in an all-out war
with China, which will constrain Washington in making its decision to send troops to the Taiwan
Strait98. It is noteworthy that American scholars are also very cautious on this subject. For
example, Professor Robert S. Ross believed there is not enough evidence that the US must
intervene in the conflict across the Taiwan Strait at the cost of damaging Sino-US relations99.
Professor Thomas J. Christensen from Princeton University also pointed that even if containing
the mainland is necessary, the US still faces the problem about how to control the degree of such
intervention. Like many other American scholars, he agreed that the current approach adopted by
Washington not only works well but also can be recognized as the only realistic option for the
US100. The RAND Corporation’s scholars such as David A. Shlapak, seemed to hold a similar
point of view that emphasized the significance of interfering in the Taiwan Straits but did not
endorse military actions against China101.
94 Wu Xinbo. (2006). Taiwan Issue: New Situation of Sino-American Interaction. International
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95 Wu Xianbin. (2003). The Background and Influence of US-Japan Alliance's
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96 Zhang Jincui. (2006). 2006 Report of the Military Power of the PRC and the US new
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97 Gong Xiaoxiong, Cong Hongquan. (2000). Restrictions on US Military Intervention in Taiwan
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In general, through analyzing the US impact on the Taiwan Issue, this group of scholars conclude
that the mainland’s pursuit of national unification will certainly suffer intervention from the
United States, and the degree of this intervention will decide whether the unification can be
achieved. It is interesting that some Chinese policies toward Taiwan will be welcomed from some
US scholars while simultaneously being recognized as a potential threat to US interest by other
scholars. Christensen’s explanation is there are two competing perspectives to judge the trend in
the region. But this study will prove it is actually related to US interests at different levels.
Compared to a large number of studies about the US influence on the situation across the Taiwan
Straits, attentions paid by scholars to Japan’s role in the Taiwan Issue is much less. The chief
exception are studies focusing on Japan-Taiwan relations. For example, Professor Zhai Xin from
Shanghai Jiao Tong University reviewed the history that Japan once wished the US to support the
PRC to join in the UN on the premise of maintaining the ROC’s status, arguing that Japan’s real
purpose was creating “Two Chinas” in the international community, and this purpose did not
change in the following period102. Dr. Gao Shiying from Changchun University of Science and
Technology and Professor Chen Jingyan from Jilin University made similar argument, pointing
out that Japan formulated a series of policies to ensure its economic relations with the mainland
would not damage its political ties with Taiwan. Trying to maintain relations with both sides
across the strait at the same time, from these scholars’ point of view, was an effort to create “Two
Chinas”103. By analyzing Japan’s policy towards Taiwan in the post Cold War era, Professor Ba
Dianjun, who is a famous expert on Japan-Taiwan relations from Jilin University, even argued that
Japan has never given up its ambition on Taiwan, believing Tokyo will try to regain its control
over Taiwan through deepening its unofficial relations with Taipei104. A few scholars, such as Dr.
Cai Liang from Shanghai Institute for International Studies, analyzed the political exchanges
between Japan and Taiwan after they broke off diplomatic relations, especially the fact that Tokyo
and Taipei both established semi official agencies playing the role of diplomatic embassy and
increased mutual visits between senior officials, arguing that Japanese politicians actually have
already negated the One China principle105. Although they have realized that Tokyo is involved in
the Taiwan Issue, these studies usually give little analysis on how Japan will affect the mainland’s
pursuit of national unification.
By contrast, western scholars preferred to give more weight to Japan’s security concern in the
Taiwan Strait. Professor Willy Lam from Chinese University of Hong Kong argued that Taiwan
should be recognized as a key component of both Chinese and Japanese security requirements106.
Despite China’s increasing military capabilities, Professor Robert Sutter from the George
Washington University pointed out that in order to defend its interests in relevant sea areas,
102 Zhai Xin. (2008). Creation and Failure of Ikeda Administration's 'One China, One Taiwan'
Policy. Contemporary China History Studies . 6 (6), p81-87.
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Beijing will try to control the continental shelf and nearby islands such as Taiwan107. Professor
Mohan Guruswamy, Jeevan Prakshi Mohanty and Ronald Joseph Abraham from the Center for
Policy Alternatives, New Delhi, argued that China’s inability to resolve the Taiwan Issue has
increased Beijing’s security anxiety108. In such a case, Professor James R. Holmes and Professor
Toshi Yoshihara from the U.S. Naval War College argued that China will pursue national
reunification in order to exercise successful defense of its maritime interests109. Within this context,
Dr. Jason J. Blazevic mentioned in his study that Japanese authorities will view the loss of
Taiwan’s status of “long-standing de facto independence” as a serious threat to Japanese maritime
lifeline110. Furthermore, Dr. Christopher W. Hughes from the ESRC center believed that Japan is
inclined to make strong response to this potential threat, which means the Japanese government
will take necessary actions to block China’s pursuit of reunification111. In fact, in the early 1980s,
Japan’s Comprehensive National Security Study Group pointed out a potential military conflict in
the Taiwan Strait was bound to threaten Japan's territorial security and maritime transport112.
Scholars, such as Dr. Pehrson, Christopher J. from Strategic Studies Institute, United States Army
War College, also agreed that China’s policies of achieving reunification will damage the status
quo across the Taiwan Strait, leading Japan to be at a disadvantage and even incapable of
defending its interests113.
Dr. Euan Graham from the Lowy Institute also agreed that an unified China would have a huge
impact on Japan, and he pointed out that even without using force, the mainland can still constitute
a heavy blow to both Japan and Taiwan through blockading the sea area near the Taiwan Strait,
and that is why Japan has to obstruct such unification114. In his study, Dr. Graham mentioned a few
Japanese scholars, such as N. Tanaka and H. Takase, hold the opinion that in order to reduce the
threat of cross-strait conflict to Japan, Tokyo should unite Taipei to resist Beijing’s policies and
behaviors115. Professor Thomas J. Christensen held similar opinion, arguing that China’s coercive
policy toward Taiwan and China’s domestic anti-Japanese protests have contributed to an
improved ties between Japan and Taiwan116. Meanwhile, some scholars pointed out that according
to Treaties of Security and Safeguard between Japan and United States, Japan is able to intervene
in the Taiwan Issue through US-Japan alliance’s actions. For example, Professor Zhou Yongsheng
from China Foreign Affairs University noted that Japan's political elites have a clear consensus
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that Japan must provide any necessary support once the United States takes actions in the Taiwan
Strait117. Assistant Professor Lam Peng-Er in National University of Singapore also believed that
Japan’s geographic location and the US-Japan alliance have decided that Japan has no choice but
to be involved in any serious conflict in the Taiwan Strait and provide support to the US military
actions118. In fact, compared with Japan’s relations with Taiwan, US-Japan alliance obtained more
attention from scholars, such as Professor Thomas J. Christensen119, Dr. Banning Garrett and Dr.
Bonnie Glaser120, as well as the George Washington University’s Professor James R. Bailey121 and
so on. But the problem is that all of them focus on the interaction between US-Japan alliance and
China in the security field, while Taiwan is only incidentally mentioned.
It is clear that scholars who focus on different topics will provide different conclusions. Those
studying the cross-strait relations usually give more weight to the policy evolution in Beijing and
Taipei, attributing the making and changing of those policies to political leaders’ personal will,
and emphasizing that the rise of pro-independence forces in Taiwan has become the largest
obstacle to the mainland’s pursuit of unification. In these cases, the conclusions offered by these
scholars were usually about how to contain separatist movements rather than how to achieve
unification. In contrast, scholars who take into account the US impact have paid more attention to
the development of Sino-US relations, using the changing world situation in the post Cold War era
to interpret the two countries’ foreign policy adjustment. Their conclusion is that the US
intervention rather than pro-independence forces should be regarded as the biggest obstacle to
unification. However, regarding the degree of this possible intervention, scholars do not seem to
reach agreement. Some have insisted that the US policy regarding the Taiwan Issue is not so
extreme, implying that Washington may not concentrate all its efforts on obstructing the
mainland’s behavior to take over Taiwan. The last group is scholars who research Japan-Taiwan
relations. They usually use Japanese historical and current contacts with the Taiwan authorities
and society, and Japanese concerns about its security, to explain Tokyo’s policies and behaviors in
the Taiwan Issue. But compared with the pro-independence forces and the US intervention,
obstruction caused by Japan has not been viewed by these scholars as a serious threat to the
mainland’s pursuit of national unification, but rather as a secondary variable that may create
trouble through supporting separatist movements and being affiliated to the US strategy.
Obviously, these conclusions are oversimplified and insufficient to answer the question that how
mainland China can achieve national unification, because they have ignored the fact that there are
four actors involved in the Taiwan Issue, which indicates that analysis should not be limited to
behavior of two or three actors. These four actors in the Taiwan Issue have formed a structure in
which they mutually affect one other. More precisely, mainland China and Taiwan are the core of
117 Zhou Yongsheng. (1998). Japan's Diplomacy and Its Relations with the US in the Post Cold War
era. World Economics and Politics. 11 (1), p66-70.
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this structure, and the United States is the most influential external factor that is close to the core,
while Japan temporarily occupies the outmost layer of this structure and seemingly impacts the
core through the US strategy. In such a case, to properly answer the research question, it is
necessary to analyze all four actors and their interactions, rather than simply using mainland
China’s conflict with one of the other three actors as the conclusion.
Research Theory of This Study
It is worth to note that above studies have used either personal will of leadership, pressures created
by the international structure, or interaction between the authorities and society as their
independent variable. This implies that international system, the state, and individual person
should be all incorporated into the research in order to provide a persuasive and comprehensive
conclusion. Meanwhile, the Taiwan Issue is related to high politics, so realism seems to be more
applicable than other paradigms. But this research will analyze policy making of each actor,
explaining what they try to achieve and when they try to achieve that, so it should be based on a
theory of foreign policy rather than a theory of international politics which focuses on outcomes of
state interactions and only includes general assumptions about motivations of individual states. In
such a case, options are limited: offensive, defensive, and neoclassical realism. For offensive
realism, it tries to use systemic variable to explain state behavior, but ignoring domestic factors
leads to the question which offensive realists cannot appropriately answer: why states in similar
structural positions do not always act alike122. For adherents of defensive realism, although paying
attention to domestic level variables, they do not show sufficient respect to the status of relative
power, assuming international anarchy is benign and trying to explain most conflict by using
internal variables introduced on an ad hoc basis123. Apparently, previous studies make it clear that
domestic factors play significant roles in the Taiwan Issue, which implies pure systemic
explanation may have difficulty to account for the behavior of each actor and thus cannot provide
a persuasive conclusion about how to achieve unification. On the other hand, relative material
power should be viewed as the dominant factor which shapes the broad pattern of any actor’s
policy making, because compared with all those domestic factors such as certain political leader’s
opinion or the rise of certain political force, relative power establishes the basic parameters of
foreign policy. The scope and magnitude of an actor’s policy is determined by the rise and fall of
its relative amount of material power resources, and so that is where analysis of foreign policy
should begin. In such a case, the neoclassical realism, which makes relative power as its chief
independent variable for interpreting foreign policy making, while at the same time, points out that
there is no direct link between relative power and foreign policy behavior because systemic
pressures are translated through the unit level intervening variables, is a appropriate theory of
foreign policy for analyzing the interaction among all four actors in the Taiwan Issue.
Neoclassical Realism and State Behavior
For internal factors used in explaining state behavior, neoclassical realists focus on the domestic
political structure and the perceived relative power of decision makers. The former is the concept
122 Gideon Rose, “Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy”, World Politics, Vol.51,
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proposed by Zakaria’s state-centered realism theory124. According to Neorealism, the international
distribution of power determines the behavior of individual state, indicating that a country is
bound to do external expansion when its relative power rises. However, Zakaria found that this
cannot explain why the United States did not accordingly pursue greater political ambitions when
its power was quickly rising in the second half of the 19th century. His explanation is that the US
domestic political structure limited the government’s capabilities to extract and direct resources
from the society, which eventually prevented the country from transforming its growing national
power at the international level into the state power at the domestic level, thereby inhibiting the
US expansion plans125. In other words, the reason for a state’s irrational behavior is that the
change of national power at the international level may not necessarily result in the modification
of foreign policy, because in many cases, national power does not transform directly into the state
power, while the latter is the real basis on which a government can formulate its foreign policy.
State power is the proportion of national power that the government can control for its own
purpose through domestic mobilization, which is usually less than the country's overall strength.
Therefore, what government concerns is how much national power can be allocated to the foreign
policy, which is affected by the nation’s domestic structure in the view of Zakaria.
Other scholars, such as Wohlforth, have focused more attentions upon policy makers’ perceptions,
emphasizing that international distribution of power can drive country’s behavior only by
influencing the decisions of flesh and blood officials. Considering the fact that political leaders are
usually unable to obtain complete information and their capabilities to analyze information are
also limited, they may overestimate or underestimate the real national power, and this inaccurate
perception may ultimately lead to the deviation of foreign policy from the real requirements of
international structure126. Once they realize such deviation, the current policies will be modified127.
Like the concept of domestic structure, the perceived relative power is also used to constitute a
new version of the international structure. Precisely, this perceived power can change much more
easily and more frequently compared with the country's real national power or its state power,
which means that changes in state behavior may be caused by the change of decision makers’
perceptions rather than by real change in the international distribution of power. Therefore, it may
be appropriate to define the international structure using perceived relative power rather than real
relative power128.
Thus, in this study, all four actors’ policy adjustments and potential reaction to external pressure
will be analyzed by these two intervening variables proposed by neoclassical realists, establishing
a foundation for speculating how they may create a favorable environment for Chinese unification.
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National Interests and the Range of Policy Adjustment
Apart from the reasons for policy adjustment, in order to analyze actors’ interactions, it is still
necessary to define the range of policy adjustment, which is related to the position each actor
insists in the Taiwan Issue. To analyze this range, this study will focus on the relationship between
relative power and national interest. There is perennial debate about just how the concept of
national interest should be defined and operationalized, and realists have their own answers.
According to Morgenthau, the concept of national interest contains two components: one that is
logically required and, in that sense, necessary, and one that is variable and determined by
circumstances129. More precisely, the invariable component of national interest is to protect the
physical, political, and cultural entity called the nation, which is described by him as the
“minimum features” that will not be affected by time and place. Therefore, it is the fundamental
core of national interests and enjoys bipartisan political support in the making of foreign policy130.
In addition, Morgenthau also believes there is a variable component of national interest, which is
dependent on history or culture, including personalities, sectional interests, and public opinion131.
In fact, Morgenthau’s description of the invariable component of national interest, clearly covers
today’s concept of national security in a broad sense. In Morgenthau’s opinion, this component is
the most important interest that every country must realize. In contrast, he admits it is difficult or
even impossible for science to explain the variable component, and he has never offered any clear
explanation about the relationship between these invariable and variable components of national
interest132.
Variable
Component
Invariable
Component
Figure 0.1 Morgenthau’s concept of national interest
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In the view of neorealism, Waltz argues that the country is motivated by a desire for security, and
whether the security can be obtained and maintained is determined by the relative power.
Countries do not have a personality or any internal need to dominate other countries, but they do
have a strong ambition to maximize their relative power, as this is the best way to ensure their
security and survival in this anarchic international community133. Although national interest does
not have a significant status in his theory, Waltz has largely improved the concept by revealing the
relationship between relative power and national interests: in essence, the state’s capability to
achieve security is determined by its relative rather than absolute power. Thus he avoids the
problem in Morgenthau’s theory that countries pursue absolute power to realize national interest,
which may eventually lead the power itself to be perceived as the national interest.
Relative Power National Interest
(Security)
Figure 0.2 Waltz’s argument of relations between national interest and relative power
Realists also generate two theories of foreign policy, which are offensive and defensive realism, to
better interpret behavior of individual state. From the point of view of offensive realists, security
is very scarce and must be recognized as a pressing issue, because the country cannot pursue any
other target if it is conquered by its enemy. Therefore, the concept of national interest in offensive
realism mainly refers to national security134. Similarly, defensive realism also focuses huge
attention on national security, admitting that it is a fundamental interest of the country, and even
implies that the state has no ambition to pursue other interests, such as overseas economic benefits
or leadership in the international affairs once its security has been realized135.
Indeed, no one can deny that any goals pursued by the state must not conflict with its security,
indicating that security has priority over all other interests. But it is still very difficult to make a
detailed description about all contents of national interest. In fact, scholars have gradually
transferred their focus from the contents to the levels of interest. For example, the Commission on
America’s National Interests, which was established in 1992, has issued reports that divide the US
national interests into four levels as vital interest, extremely important interest, just important
interest, and secondarily important interest136. Dividing national interests into different levels is
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not only better than offering an overly broad definition of national interest which will make the
concept too ambiguous, but also successfully avoids the impossible task of listing all the contents
of such concept. Therefore, it has actually promoted researches about a country's foreign policy
and external behavior.
Extremely Important Interest
Just Important Interest
Secondly Important Interest
Vital Interest
Figure 0.3 the Commission on America’s National Interests’ idea of dividing national interests into
different levels
This method is consistent with previous theories, particularly their emphasis of national security.
Precisely, the offensive and defensive realism’s argument that no other interests is as significant as
security, has revealed that different interests have different status, and the status is more or less
equated to the concept of level here, into which national interests can be divided. However, this
method used by the Commission on America’s National Interests is defective, because it divides
national interests into different levels according to each interest’s urgency in foreign affairs during
particular period. Urgency can be changed by the development of international situation, so one
interest may be defined as a “just important interest” at one moment but then becomes a
“secondarily important interest” if the tension is eased137. Obviously, this flaw is the result of
ignoring the significant role of relative power emphasized by Waltz.
Combining all above thoughts of national interest with certain insights of neoclassical realism, the
central feature of national interest used by this study will be defined. The most significant
difference between neoclassical realism and neorealism or offensive realism is that, according to
neoclassical realists, the focus of national interest should not be limited to national security. After
admitting that there are other interests, neoclassical realists assume that countries will seek to
control or shape their external environment to respond to the uncertainties of international anarchy.
Therefore, national security should be put at the most fundamental level while dominating the
world occupies the highest level, and between these two ends there are various other interests,
137 Ni Shixiong (2001). Contemporary International Relations Theory. Shanghai: Fudan University
Press . p256.
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which are pursued by the state according to its material capabilities138. More precisely, when the
state’s relative power is growing, it will seek greater influence in the international community, but
once its relative power falls, the policy makers’ ambitions will shrink to the bottom line of
maintaining national security and survival139.
In the process of policy making, national interest becomes concrete target of foreign policy.
Adopting external expansion or taking actions to balance the potential threats is determined by
what kind of interest the state wishes to realize, and whether such target can be achieved depends
on relative power of the state. It is noteworthy that a state can pursue interests at high levels only
when interests at fundamental levels have been already realized. Otherwise, the policy makers are
overestimating the relative power of their state, which can lead their fundamental interests to be
damaged while the high level interests also fail to be realized. In essence, without choosing
interest at the appropriate level, targets will be difficult to achieve, and the state will suffer
punishment for misunderstanding the systemic pressure created by the international structure.
High Level
Interest
Fundamental
Interest
Figure 0.4 Neoclassical realism’s concept of national interest
In summary:
1.Interests such as national survival and continuity, sovereignty, and territorial integrity are at the
fundamental level, and what Morgenthau called the variable elements of the national interest
should be replaced with state’s external influence in the international community, in which ruling
the world is clearly at the highest level.
2.Each interest’s level is determined by the relative power needed to realize it.
3.Achieving a high level interest should be on the premise of realizing fundamental level interest.
138 Song Wei (2011). International Relations Theory: From Political Thoughts to Social Science.
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4.Interests involved in specific issues will guide the state’s foreign policy and external behavior.
Figure 0.5 the final version of national interest used in this study
It is noteworthy that neoclassical realists have little ambition to clearly define the concept of
national interest. As a theory of foreign policy, what neoclassical realism concerns is how to
interpret the behavior of individual state. In such a case, its adherents emphasize the importance of
relative power, arguing this is the single dominant factor shaping the broad pattern of a nation's
foreign policy over time140. Furthermore, neoclassical realists make it clear that the concept of
power here refers to the capabilities or resources with which states can influence each other. This
means that the magnitude of foreign policy is determined by a country’s material power resources
rather than the interest defined by the state. In the view of neoclassical realists, interest is the goal
or preference of the state when making its foreign policy. Its main function is to guide the
country's external behavior. More precisely, material power resources determine the objective
scope of foreign policy, that is, what kind of target the state is able to achieve, while the interest is
the target itself, defining the purpose of the use of material power resources.
Neoclassical realists acknowledge that the state may have myriad ways for defining its interests,
and it seems that they do not want to give a neoclassical version of that definition. Rather, scholars
point out that no matter how to define interest, the relations among interest, power, and foreign
policy are clear, that is, in order to cope with the uncertainties of international anarchy, the state
will pursue external influence to the extent that it is able to do so141. This perspective makes
scholars have more freedom to use the concept of interest to analyze foreign policy making.
Indeed, according to Morgenthau's definition, whether the mainland and Taiwan are eligible to
have “national interest” may be questioned. The One China principle has insisted that both the
mainland and Taiwan are parts of China, which indicates that China's sovereignty should cover
140 Rose G. Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy[J]. World Politics, 1998,
51(1):144-172.
141 Rose G. Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy[J]. World Politics, 1998,
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these two areas. But the two sides across the strait have not reached any agreement on who is the
central government that is able to exercise the sovereignty of the whole China. Thus, it seems that
neither the goal of the mainland’s policy nor the goal of Taiwan’s policy can be regarded as
national interest of the whole China, because the interests to be realized by policies formulated by
Beijing must be the interests of the mainland, while the policies formulated by Taipei will
inevitably seek to realize the interests of Taiwan. However, there is no problem in using the
concept of interest to examine whether a particular foreign policy made by Beijing or Taipei is
reasonable. This is because, despite the vagueness of the political relationship between the two
sides and the significant controversy over the sovereignty of One China, Beijing and Taipei have
not denied and cannot deny the reality that the government on each side is controlling the
mainland and Taiwan respectively. In such a case, the interests of the region under either
government’s control will influence that government’s policy making. Like Washington and Tokyo,
Beijing and Taipei seek to respond to the uncertainties of international anarchy by pursuing largest
influence, and therefore the relations among their interest, material power, and foreign policy, are
consistent with the neoclassical realist perspective. Even though there is no compromise reached
in sovereignty-related issues, interest can still be used to interpret and evaluate policies made by
two sides’ governments regarding the Taiwan Issue.
It is also noteworthy that the relations between interests’ level and relative power implies that
states are supposed to achieve or give up some of their interest pursuit if their relative power is
changing, regardless whether these states’ leaders are willing or aware that they must do so. In
such a case, interest is more or less an objective reality that can be used to define the scope of
policy evolution within a certain period of time when the relative power does not experience
violent fluctuations. More precisely, the reason to analyze the interests of each actor involved in
the Taiwan Issue is that the highest level interest involved can be regarded as the eventual target of
each actor, determining the tendency of their policy evolution, while the fundamental level interest
involved reveals each actor’s bottom line which they are very unlikely to relinquish. With the
changing perceived relative power, each actor endeavors to achieve the target related to its highest
level interest while trying to ensure that its bottom line will not be overstepped. Between the
eventual target and the bottom line, there is the scope of policy adjustment. This scope is very
important because it actually limits the possible ultimate outcomes of the Taiwan Issue. If all
actors’ bottom lines are fundamental interests that cannot be compromised, there is little question
that the Taiwan Issue will end in a military conflict between actors with different positions.
However, if the bottom lines of different actors are related to different levels of interest, then the
actor whose bottom line is not related to its fundamental interest has a possibility to soften its
position. That means, at least in theory, a compromise can be reached in the Taiwan Issue. Only
under this circumstance, the analysis of the conditions for achieving cross-strait reunification will
make sense. Meanwhile, the tendency of policy evolution revealed by such scope also plays an
significant role in the analysis. As mentioned, it is very difficult to make accurate prediction for
actors’ potential response in the interaction if the analysis simply focuses on their policies or
strategies at a given time without defining their ultimate purpose. In such a case, in order to
predict what actions those actors will tend to take under certain conditions, it is necessary to
define each actor’s ultimate goal. In other words, only when the tendency of each actor’s policy
evolution is clear, the analysis of unification’s conditions will be persuasive.
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Figure 0.6 identify the policy target by interests involved in a specific issue
Domestic Factors and the Answer to the Study’s Question
On the basis of this static analysis, this study is able to examine the conditions for realizing
cross-strait reunification. Obviously, within the scope of their policy adjustment, the possibility of
achieving unification greatly depends on actors’ interactions, which means whether they will
formulate appropriate policies that favor Beijing’s pursuit of unification. It is noteworthy that the
dynamics that may prompt such policy making are inside each actor. Under the premise that
relative power does not experience any dramatic changes, these internal dynamics can lead each
actor to take audacious actions or make compromise in pursuit of its ultimate goal.
In this study, internal dynamics are generated by those domestic factors which translate the
systemic pressures and shape the way how states will respond to their external environment. In
this section, the intervening variable used in the analysis is domestic state structure. Compared to
political leaders’ perception, domestic state structure is more suitable for offering a comprehensive
analysis in interpreting state’s potential response to external pressure under certain conditions.
However, although many neoclassical realists have paid much attention to the role of domestic
state structure in the foreign policy making process, they have different point of views about
which internal factors can influence the final choice adopted by the state to meet its international
challenges.
It is important to notice that domestic state structure concerns not only the political system of the
state, but also the relationship between the authorities and its surrounding society. In such a case,
unlike Zakaria and Christensen who give more weight to the strength of state, seeking to improve
the paradigm’s core concept of relative power, Professor Randall Schweller makes a more detailed
and comprehensive analysis for domestic state structure itself when examining its impact on the
National
Interest
Specific Issue
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country’s external behavior. In his research about the balance of power, Schweller divides the
authorities and society into four internal factors: elite consensus, elite cohesion, social cohesion,
and government / regime vulnerability142. Although Schweller focuses on why a state does not
take necessary actions to contain potential external threats, these four variables have already
covered most internal elements of a country or political entity, and can be used to analyze state
behavior in most circumstances. Therefore, examining situation of these four internal factors can
reveal what response is most likely to be made by each actor when facing various external
pressures. On this basis, the conditions for the mainland to achieve national unification, which
means that actors are prone to make policies favorable to Beijing’s pursuit, are actually equivalent
to several specific changes happening in these factors of each actor.
First of all, this study will introduce the historical background of Taiwan Issue, especially certain
historical events which led to the emergence of the issue and shaped the issue’s development.
Because most of these events happened in the interaction between the two sides across the strait,
and it is difficult to elaborate them in one chapter when some of them are closely linked with
Taiwan while others happened in the mainland, so there will be two chapters for introducing these
history, which are Chapter I and III. In such a case, Chapter II will define Taiwan’s real stance and
why it maintains such a stance through explaining its mainland policy evolution, while Chapter IV
will focus on mainland China’s interests involved in the Taiwan Issue, using different levels’
interests to interpret China’s behavior. Apart from that, there are a few events related to the US,
but many of them have been more or less mentioned in Chapter I and III, so Chapter V will give
more weight to those significant policy adjustment of the United States since the 1950s in order to
identify its real targets in the Taiwan Issue. In particular, level of its interests will be defined
before this study further analyze its potential behavior toward Chinese pursuit of national
unification. In Chapter VI, the study will examine Japan’s role in the Taiwan Issue. Considering
the fact that Japanese policy has been following the US in the region and there is no sufficient
historical event which can reveal the country’s stance, this chapter will pay attention to those
subtle differences between Japanese and US behavior, and give more priority to its strategy,
defining its interests involved in the Taiwan Issue by analyzing the relation between this strategy
and China’s rise.
Based on these six chapters, the study makes it clear which levels’ interests that each actor has
involved in the Taiwan Issue. This means their bottom line and final target are clearly identified.
For those actors whose bottom line are completely fundamental interests, it is very difficult for the
government or society in them to accept any dramatic change in their policy toward Taiwan Issue.
But if the interests involved are all at high level, there is the possibility that actor may make
adjustment because the cost is much lower compared with giving up fundamental interests such as
homeland security or sovereignty. Meanwhile, the final target reveals the tendency of policy
evolution so the study can predict actors’ potential reaction in their future interactions rather than
being confused by their temporary behavior which may not be quite consistent with their real
stance in the Taiwan Issue.
142 Schweller, Randell (2015). Unanswered Threats: Political Constraints on the Balance of Power.
Beijing: Peking University Press. p13-15.
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Only after revealing the real stance of each actor, the study can analyze the necessary condition for
Chinese unification. Otherwise, any conclusion will be easily challenged by a certain statement or
policy because these actors may not always explicitly show the target they wish to achieve and
sometimes even adopt a policy that seems to be contrary to their real stance. For example,
Chapter V mentions that then US government criticized then Taiwan authorities’ plan of
conducting a referendum for constitutional amendment, containing pro-independence forces’
pursuit of promoting Taiwan’s de jure independence. This behavior was in conflict with US
previous policies of blocking Chinese unification. In the face of Washington’s various targets in its
policy toward Taiwan Issue, the analysis of American potential reaction under certain
circumstances may not be able to provide any persuasive conclusion if previous chapters have not
revealed the real stance of US.
If the power distribution among all these actors does not experience dramatic change, these stance
will be maintained and the Taiwan Issue, according to analysis in Chapter I to VI, does not seem to
evolve to any unification. In such a case, in order to find out possible conditions for the mainland
to achieve that end, Chapter VII will focus on their domestic factors, examining how these
intervening variables may influence systemic pressures and whether they can lead to appropriate
changes in actors’ policy making. This chapter thus reveals what situation of these domestic
factors are needed for create those changes, which can be regarded as conditions for Chinese
unification. It should be pointed out that some of these situations of domestic factors in several
actors will happen only when certain other situation appears in the US. This means changes in US
is the premise of appropriate changes in other actors. In other words, there are two kinds of
conditions for Chinese unification: one is the changes which should happen in the US, the other is
those changes that will be able to happen in mainland China, Japan, and Taiwan. This is the reason
why there is Chapter VIII which examines the possibility of these necessary changes in US by
analyzing the US hegemony and under what circumstances the government may adjust its strategy.
Precisely, the circumstances that US may adopt a retrenchment, reducing its intervention in the
Taiwan Issue, can be regarded as the first order condition for Beijing to achieve national
unification. Within that context, other appropriate changes are likely to appear in domestic factors
of other three actors, and if Beijing can formulate policies to promote all these changes, it may be
able to realize unification eventually.
In general, this study will use policy makers’ perceived relative power to interpret each actor’s
policy adjustments, and define the scope of such policy adjustments by analyzing each actor’s
different interest involved in the Taiwan Issue, which will reveal their true positions. Therefore,
through analyzing and comparing the situations of four internal factors of each actor, this study
will offer its conclusion that under which conditions these actors may formulate appropriate
policies that makes it possible for mainland China to achieve national unification with Taiwan.
This study may not be the only research which involves all four actors in the Taiwan Issue, but it
is one of very few which use neoclassical realism to analyze both domestic and systemic factors of
each actor, providing the final conclusion by examining interaction between all four actors and
influence of each actor’s state, society, and their relations on policy making. In other words, most
conclusions of previous researches have been taken into account and revised. Furthermore,
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although this study is for answering the question that under what circumstances the mainland may
be able to achieve national unification, the analysis can also be used to interpret the real impact of
any certain change in domestic or systemic level on the development of Taiwan Issue and predict
the potential consequence that can be caused by such change. This means this study provides a
useful structure for future research on Taiwan Issue, defining the effect and constraint of most
potential independent variables and therefore reducing the likelihood that scholars may reach an
inaccurate conclusion when they are confused by certain policy or behavior of any actors. Within
this context, this study can be regarded as a first step for improving the application of neoclassical
realism, attempting to further elaborate how intervening variables translate systemic pressures and
influence the foreign policy making by examining the relations among different factors of certain
intervening variable.
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Chapter I The Evolution of Taiwan’s Policy towards
Mainland China since Late 1980s
Mainland Policy between 1949 and 1987: AContinuation of Chinese Civil War
At the end of the World War II, Japanese Emperor Hirohito officially capitulated to the Allies in
August 1945, and the official surrender was signed on September 2nd aboard the US warship143.
Two days later, the Chinese Kuomintang (KMT) government issued a statement, noting that
Japan’s unconditional surrender meaning the return of Taiwan and the Penghu Islands to China.
On September 9th, the Chinese army accepted the surrender of the Japanese army in Nanjing, and
in the same evening, then commander of Japanese army in China ordered all Japanese troops in
Chinese territory, including Taiwan and the Penghu Islands, to surrender to the KMT
government144. Within this context, the KMT army arrived in Taiwan in October 1945, and held
the ceremony for accepting the Japanese surrender on 25th of that month. After the ceremony,
Chinese officials formally announced that Taiwan and the Penghu Islands were to be China’s
territory again, and all the lands and people would be under the Republic of China (ROC)
government's sovereignty145. From that point on, more KMT army and civil servants were sent to
Taiwan.
In the autumn of 1948, the KMT army was starting to lose the civil war in China. Thus, then ROC
President Chiang Kai-shek, who was also the KMT actual supreme leader, decided to make
Taiwan, which according to him was a pure land free of communist infiltration, to be the last
anti-communist base. In April 1949, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) led by the Chinese
Communist Party (CCP) occupied then ROC capital Nanjing, marking the collapse of the KMT
authorities in mainland China. On 1st October the same year, the People’s Central Government of
People’s Republic of China (PRC) declared its establishment in Beijing, while most KMT officials
and troops had retreated to Taiwan146. In such a case, liberating Taiwan became the next target of
the PLA. In late October 1949, the PLA successfully captured Xiamen, which is the island
locating in the Southeast coast of China, and then launched an attack against the KMT army on
Kinmen Island. Had the plan succeeded, the next step would be directly attacking Taiwan and
realizing Chinese national liberation. However, due to the lack of experience in landing operations
and without strong support from navy and air force, the PLA’s plan of capturing Kinmen
eventually failed147.
Afterwards, when preparing for another round of attack, mainland China decided to clear the
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barrier outside Taiwan, occupying all important islands in the Chinese coastal area besides Taiwan,
Penghu, Kinmen, and Matsu. This goal was successfully achieved before May 1950148. However,
because of the outbreak of the Korean War, military operation against Taiwan had to be
temporarily suspended, which made two sides across the strait step into a long term military
confrontation. During the following decades, even though there were Chinese shelling in Kinmen
Island and Taiwan’s harassing attacks in Chinese coastal areas, warfare between the two sides with
a target to control the whole China has never happened. In other words, the Chinese Civil War was
ended.
However, until 1987, the interaction between the Kuomintang and the Communist party was more
like a continuation of Chinese Civil War, and the main content of Taiwan’s mainland policy was
“Recovering the mainland” (Fan Gong Da Lu). In May 1950, Chiang Kai-shek clearly proposed
that Taiwan’s target was “one year for preparation, two years for recovering mainland, three years
for sweeping enemies, and five years for achieving victory, thus reviving the Republic of China”.
Subsequently, the Taiwan authorities regrouped its army, using Kinmen and Matsu as military
bases to start harassing attacks in the mainland’s coastal areas149.
This policy was maintained by Taipei until 1958 when the US government strengthened its
military aid to Taiwan in return for Chiang Kai-shek’s concession of adjusting his “recovering the
mainland” into a relatively moderate policy, which was “restoring freedom of the people in the
mainland through the Three People’s Principle”150. But in fact, Chiang did not give up his idea of
taking over the mainland by force. When the mainland suffered economic difficulties in 1959,
Chiang believed this was the opportunity for realizing his target, and began to make detailed plans
such as the KMT army first landing in China’s Fujian Province, occupying coastal cities, and then
attacking inland areas. It is worth to notice that Chiang’s plan was not a simple slogan. In 1962,
the Taiwan authorities imposed a special tax on society to raise its military spending. Meanwhile,
the KMT purchased a large quantity of arms, announced the extension of its military service time,
and gathered its troops in the military base near Kaohsiung, preparing to send them to the
mainland151. However, this policy did not get support from the United States. Since Chiang
proposed his plan of recovering the mainland, Washington repeatedly advised him to be realistic,
believing such a military operation was unlikely to be successful, and making it clear that US
military aid should not be used to attack the mainland152. Although Chiang was reluctant to
relinquish this policy, the development of US-China relations showed that the US government
would not change its position to support Taiwan’s military actions against the mainland. After the
US established the formal diplomatic relations with mainland China in the 1970s and broke its
diplomatic ties with Taiwan, this policy of recovering the mainland completely failed.
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After Chiang Kai-shek's death in 1975, there was a power transition inside the KMT authorities,
and Chiang Kai-shek’s son, Chiang Ching-kuo, finally succeeded as the ROC President and the
chairman of the KMT. During this period, mainland China began to adjust its policy towards
Taiwan, taking active measures to develop cross-straits trade while simultaneously seeking contact
and cooperation with the Taiwan authorities. But Chiang Ching-kuo did not give any positive
response, believing that the mainland’s effort of developing cross-straits relations was a plot of
Beijing for achieving unification under communist ideology, and insisting on his “Three Noes
policy” of “no contact, no negotiations, and no compromise”153. Obviously, this Three Noes policy
maintained Taipei’s previous position, so it should not be regarded as policy adjustment. During
Chiang Ching-kuo’s period, compared with his father, the only change in the mainland policy was
that he completely relinquished the plan of recovering the mainland, replacing that with a new
slogan of “Reunifying China under the Three People’s Principles”. In March 1981, during the
opening speech in the KMT 16th National Congress, Chiang Ching-kuo claimed that reunifying
China under the Three People’s Principles was the only viable path for making China into a
modern country with peace and freedom154. The reason of making this small adjustment in the
mainland policy is that the Taiwan authorities has become more realistic, replacing its previous
military operation with a political counterattack, in the hope that the KMT’s ideology would shake
the mainland’s social stability and win most people’s hearts and minds.
No matter the recovering the mainland or reunifying China under the Three People’s Principles,
Taiwan’s mainland policy before 1987 was completely controlled by KMT’s top leader who still
viewed the cross-strait interaction as a continuation of struggles between the KMT and the CCP
during the Chinese Civil War. However, public opinion has played an increasingly important role
in the making of Taiwan’s mainland policy since the authorities lifted the ban on visiting relatives
in mainland China in 1987, while other factors such as economy and culture also became
significant driving forces for improving cross-strait relations155. In these circumstances, the
mainland policy, although it was still essentially under control of the top political leader, gradually
became a public policy which was formulated by the Taiwan authorities through guiding and
integrating Taiwan's public opinion after 1987.
Evolution of Taiwan’s Mainland Policy after 1987
The Start of Cross-Strait Contact: Lifting the ban on visiting relatives in the mainland between
1987-1988
In the middle of 1980s, Taiwan’s political situation dramatically changed because of the political
reform led by Chiang Ching-Kuo. This reform included a series of measures supported by Chiang,
such as ending the Marital Law, lifting the ban on political parties, and reforming the KMT party’s
workings. Within this context, Taiwan’s mainland policy was also adjusted.
The political reform raised the strength of Taiwan's society and led to various kinds of social
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movements. The most influential one was the strong appeal pushed by the KMT soldiers for lifting
the official ban on visiting their relatives in the mainland, which imposed increasing pressures on
Chiang Ching-Kuo. More precisely, ever since moving to Taiwan in 1949, the KMT authorities
has always emphasized that the ROC is the sole legal representative of China while the PRC
should be regarded as a rebel group. This kind of hostile position was usually described by Taipei
as “the government will never consort with the rebel group” (Han Zei Bu Liang Li), intensifying
the separation and confrontation between the two sides across the strait156. But people in Taiwan
wanted to end this confrontation and change the authorities’ hostile position. According to
statistics, above eighty percent of the total population in Taiwan were supporting local residents to
visit their relatives in the mainland, while simultaneously, other opinions such as allowing people
to fly to the mainland directly also received a very high support157. This strong public desire then
became a powerful weapon used by Taiwan’s legislators to criticize the authorities, and finally led
to the formal decree issued by the Legislation Yuan (Li Fa Yuan) to adjust the mainland policy
from previous Three Noes Policy to a more open position towards the mainland.
Consequently, Chiang Ching-Kuo had to reevaluate his old confrontational approach in Taiwan’s
mainland policy, and let officials in the KMT authorities begin analyzing the issue of local people
visiting mainland China158. The scope of such analysis was soon expanded and finally involved
the whole KMT party and even political and security systems of Taiwan. In August 1987, the
decision-making meeting held by then vise president Lee Teng-hui and attended by other senior
officials from Taiwan's foreign policy, intelligence, and news agencies, offered its conclusions of
this analysis, approving local people to visit their relatives in the so called “occupied area in the
mainland”. In October, the Executive Yuan (Xing Zheng Yuan) formally passed its decision of
allowing people to visit the mainland159. This can be seen as a great breakthrough in Taiwan's
mainland policy, because it was the first legally binding executive decision made by the
authorities that started the contact across the strait after nearly forty years’ confrontation.
It is also noteworthy that, although this change in mainland policy was pushed by strong public
opinion, the whole policy making process, no matter the analysis or the eventual implementation,
was completely controlled by Chiang Ching-Kuo personally. In other words, it was still the top
political leader rather than the authorities or social groups that played the dominant role in
adjusting Taiwan’s mainland policy during this period. Moreover, this lifting the ban on visiting
the mainland was the start of cross-strait contact, but should not be regarded as the start of formal
cross-strait relations, because Taipei’s fundamental position towards the mainland was not
changed. For example, Chiang Ching-Kuo proclaimed that anti-communism was still the center of
the ROC’s mainland policy160. In such a case, allowing people to visit their relatives in the
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mainland was only a first step of mainland policy's evolution.
The development of cross-strait relations: one country, two equivalent political entities between
1988-1993
After Chiang Ching-Kuo's death, Lee Teng-hui succeeded as the president and was in charge of
further adjustment of Taiwan’s mainland policy. After he took office, Lee realized that the political
democratization and mainland policy's adjustment have both become major concern for Taiwan’s
society. Within this context, to strengthen his leadership and to stabilize social situation, Lee
preferred to largely promote the adjustment of mainland policy. It is also worth to note that the
person who controlled mainland policy making would doubtlessly obtain huge political influence,
because this was the most significant and complex policy related to Taiwan's future. That is why
Lee was no longer the political puppet during Chiang Ching-Kuo's period but became the real
manipulator of Taiwan's political issues after he exercised great control of the mainland policy
making process.
When Lee's status was stable, the mainland policy making also entered a new phase that was
obviously different from Chiang Ching-Kuo's time. In July 1988, the 13th National Congress of
KMT passed the case of “Current Mainland Policy”, which was often regarded as the start of
KMT's formal policy adjustment towards the CCP161. This bill made a prudent evaluation of the
policy for lifting the ban on people’s visiting relatives in the mainland, arguing that the making of
such policy, which was mainly due to humanity concerns, led the authorities to face different kinds
of problems in political, law, economic, and security areas. To meet all those challenges, Taipei
made a clear statement about the target of its future mainland policy, which was described as
“establishing a new China of freedom, democracy, equal prosperity, peace and unification”. The
Congress also made a distinction between the communist party and the people in the mainland,
emphasizing that the future policies would not ignore the conflict between Taiwan and its enemy,
while simultaneously, keeping a national sentiment with people in the mainland162.
The bill did not mention Chiang Ching-Kuo and his father’s old position of “Reunifying China
under Three People’s Principles”, stating instead that Taipei pursued to “establish a new China of
freedom, democracy, equal prosperity, peace and unification”163. This statement was to avoid
tensions and conflicts caused by different ideologies of the two sides. More precisely, the “Three
People’s Principles” was the unique ideology of the KMT, and therefore “Reunifying China under
Three People’s Principles” can be understood as “the KMT reunifies China”, which obviously
would never be accepted by Beijing. By contrast, the expression of “freedom, democracy, and
equal prosperity” was better adapted to the reality because its ambiguity avoided further
provoking the CCP, trying to creating sufficient room for both sides to maneuver in contact.
This 13th National Congress was usually viewed as the real start of mainland policy's evolution,
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but it focused on ideological claim, rather than actually making changes to the cross-strait
relations. In fact, the Taiwan authorities were still quite conservative in changing its previous
“Three Noes policy”, refusing to lift the ban on Taiwan’s direct investment to the mainland or
other contact with the communist authorities164. This conservative attitude was in conflict with the
relatively open position in Taipei’s ideological claims. According to many specialists, the open
position in ideology was nothing but a concession made by the authorities because of the social
pressure it was facing, while the top leader actually maintained previous position in constraining
normal contact between people from the two sides. Apparently, this situation could not satisfy
people in Taiwan and therefore caused a strong social discontent against the authorities. Due to the
circumstance, Lee Teng-hui began to make further breakthrough in the mainland policy making,
particularly Taiwan's self-identification in the international community, in order to make more
contact with Beijing.
In June and July 1990, Lee held a conference in Taipei to discuss mainland policy with politicians
from both ruling and opposition parties, seeking to integrate their opinions towards the cross-strait
relations165. The conference finally offered a report which stated that most people agreed to accept
the reality there were two governments across the strait, admitting that the mainland and Taiwan
were both political entities with authorities to govern their own area. But there were different
opinions about the definition of One China166. Based on these consensus and disputes, the
National Unification Council which was established in September of this year issued a
programmatic document called “National Unification Guideline” for adjusting mainland policy.
This National Unification Guideline confirmed that the final target of Taiwan’s mainland policy
was to achieve national reunification, and emphasized that the territory of China included both the
mainland and Taiwan167. It made a clear definition of cross-strait relations as two political entities
on equal footing to finish then disputes about sovereignty. In fact, the political entity is an
ambiguous description. For instance, Israel was treated by the UN as a political entity before it
finished the foundation. It is important to notice that, for a political entity, specialists always paid
great attention to whether it would eventually become a country or what kind of country it would
become. The National Unification Guideline was very clear on this point, admitting that two
political entities were belonging to One China and implying the future trend of two political
entities would be realizing their reunification. Based on this, the Guideline then noted the
authorities should promote cross-strait contact and reciprocity to reduce misunderstandings and
hostility. The previous Three Noes policy was now replaced by promoting high level mutual visit
and expanding civil exchanges across the strait.
This statement of “One Country, Two Political Entities” also changed the Taiwan authorities' old
position that Taipei was the sole legal government of China while the PRC was only a rebel group.
For the first time, Taipei offered Beijing an equal political status in cooperation of dealing with
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cross-strait issues. In the past, the controversy between the two sides centered on who was the
legal representative of China in the international community, but this new position seemed to
resolve such problem by changing “one China, one legal central government” to “one China, two
governments, two areas, and two equal political entities”. Since then, two sides across the strait
having equal political status has become a premise in Taiwan’s mainland policy. As Lee
emphasized, the cross-strait negotiations were equal talks between two governments168.
Within this context, even though Taipei and Beijing had no official contact, the two semi-official
agencies, which were the Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Strait (the ARATS) and the
Strait Exchange Foundation (the SEF), have already started their consultations on specific issues
in the cross-strait exchanges. Based on these dialogues, the Taiwan authorities realized that it
needed to issue more concrete regulations and rules to resolve problems appeared in cross-strait
contact. Between July 1987 and September 1993, there were almost 280 regulations promulgated
by the Taiwan authorities in areas such as trade, postal service, and personnel exchanges related to
mainland China169. In 1992, the Legislative Yuan passed “the Act Governing Relations between
Peoples of the Taiwan Area and the Mainland Area” in July and put it into practice in September170.
This was the first systematic act to regulate cross-strait exchanges, which filled the gap in
Taiwan’s legislation of mainland related issues.
In general, Taipei’s policy was adjusted during this period for better contacting and cooperating
with mainland China. It is important to notice that within the context of political reform, Taipei
had to listen to all kinds of voices from both the authorities and society about the cross-strait
issues before making its final decision, even though Lee Teng-hui had already stabilized his
political leadership. This indicated that the time that one political leader can control every thing in
the formulation of mainland policy has gone.
The subtle shift in cross-strait relations: inching toward a pro-independence stance between
1994-1999
In the view of many western specialists, the sharp change in the relations between Taiwan and
mainland China happened in 1995 when Lee Teng-hui made his visit to the US. However, the fact
is there have been already a series of setbacks in cross-strait relations since the late 1993 when the
authorities started to waver in its previous insistence on the One China principle.
During the period between 1949 and late 1980s, Taiwan’s mainland policy has been maintaining
this One China principle while declaring that Taipei is the sole legal representative of China in the
international arena. However, this principle caused a large number of disputes because two sides
had quite different definition of One China, which cannot be resolved in short time. With
increasing contacts between the two sides in the mid-1990s, the One China principle was being
seriously challenged by the changing cross-strait situation, and Taipei had to give more weight to
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its own legitimacy and survival. Within this context, a series of significant issues such as the
establishment of diplomatic relations between the PRC and the Republic of Korea while the latter
breaking its relations with Taiwan, which were regarded as the failure of Taipei’s then “Pragmatic
Foreign Policy”, caused sharp criticism from Taiwan’s society against the authorities’ One China
position. In fact, most people criticized it was Taipei’s insistence of such principle that led to all
those defeats in Taiwan’s diplomacy.
In such a case, Taipei made a subtle change in its expressions related to One China principle.
Although the KMT authorities, including Lee Teng-hui himself, had been upholding that principle,
some politicians began to believe the principle led to misunderstandings in the international
community that Taiwan was a part of the PRC. Then Minister of Finance Chiang Pin-Kung clearly
argued that the authorities should adopt a “Two China” policy, while regarding the One China
policy only as the eventual target171.
In July 1994, the Taiwan authorities issued a white paper called the Introduction of Cross-Strait
Relations, which elaborated Taipei’s new view of relations between Taiwan and the mainland172.
The core of this white paper was hollowing the One China principle and creating a fundamental
change in Taiwan’s mainland policy, which soon influenced peace and stability across the strait.
More precisely, this white paper still seemingly insisted the KMT’s old position of One China, but
did make a new interpretation of the principle’s definition by declaring that “One China” meant a
historical, geographic, cultural, and consanguineous China, and declared that the current reality
that each side had governing power over its own area should be recognized as two separate legal
political entities in the international community. Obviously, the “historical, cultural, geographic,
and consanguineous China” only existed in the past, which actually implied that there was no One
China in the current reality. Meanwhile, the white paper also stated that Taipei would abandon its
competition with Beijing for the status of sole legal representative of China in the international
arena. Denying that there was One China in reality and also giving up its own legal position of
representing this One China, indicated that the foundation of mainland policy was transformed
from One China to “Two Chinas”, which was obvious with a pro-independence stance.
Moreover, the white paper even declared that the people in Taiwan would accept either
reunification or independence depending on the development of cross-strait relations, which was
the first time that pro-independence opinion was included in Taiwan’s official document173. Then
it is not surprising to find that within this context, more and more conflicts appeared in the
following cross-strait contact, especially when Taipei used the so called holiday-making
diplomacy, transit diplomacy, and summit diplomacy to gradually create the reality of “Two
Chinas” in the international arena. These efforts reached the peak when Lee Teng-hui made his
visit to the Cornell University in 1995, which therefore caused the Third Taiwan Strait Crisis174.
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Consequently, the cross-strait relations entered into a low ebb.
However, it is also noteworthy that although the Taiwan authorities made several statements to
deny there was One China in the reality, and even ambiguously implied that Taiwan and mainland
China were actually two independent sovereign states in the international community like South
and North Korea, Taipei only used expressions such as “One divided China”, rather than clearly
defining the two sides across the strait as two countries in its official statements and documents175.
In essence, this phase should be regarded as a transitional stage before Taipei openly pursued
Taiwan’s de jure independence.
Pro-independence stance in the mainland Policy: from Two-State Theory to “One Country on
Each Side” between 1999-2008
Based on previous efforts of hollowing the principle of One China, the Taiwan authorities finally
abandoned this position in 1999 by publicly proclaiming its pursuit of Taiwan’s independence. In
July, Lee Teng-hui made his Special State to State Relationship statement at a German radio
interview, which severely damaged the foundation of peaceful exchanges across the strait and
heightened tensions between Taiwan and mainland China176. According to Lee, his statement had a
strong support from the ROC Constitution which stated that the president, vice-president, and
members of Legislative Yuan and National Assembly should be elected by the people in Taiwan.
This implied the government only represented the people in Taiwan, and its legitimacy can only be
proved by the people in Taiwan. In these circumstances, the authorities had nothing to do with the
people in the mainland, and therefore the relations between two sides was not like the central and
a local government within one country, but rather international relations between two countries,
which at least could be described as a special state to state relationship.
Taiwan’s officials, such as then chairman of Mainland Affairs Council Su Qi, seemed to support
this change in the definition of cross-strait relations, believing the expression of two equal
political entities mentioned by the National Unification Guideline was outdated and could no
longer reflect the reality across the strait177. He even admitted that the theory of two equal political
entities had been adopted only for avoiding disputes with Beijing, and argued that the Third
Taiwan Strait Crisis and Beijing’s insistence of One China principle as the premise for resuming
cross-strait dialogues, forced Taipei to reveal the core of its mainland policy. As many other
politicians, Su agreed that only explicitly identifying the cross-strait relations as state to state
relations could help eliminate the misunderstanding that Taiwan is a province of the PRC178.
By this time, all preparations for identifying Taiwan as a distinct sovereign state were finished,
and Taiwan’s mainland policy explicitly shifted toward a pro-independence stance. In the
international arena, Taiwan began to replace its old identity of a political entity with a new identity
of an independent sovereign country when dealing with international affairs.
Strategy Towards the United States and Taiwan[J]. The Lessons of History: The Chinese People’s
Liberation Army at, 2003, 75: 379-402.
175 Central Daily News, 23rd February 1997.
176 Jacobs J B, Liu I B. Lee Teng-hui and the idea of “Taiwan”[J]. The China Quarterly, 2007, 190:
375-393.
177 The United Daily News 15th July, 1999.
178 The United Daily News 11st July, 1999.
41
In 2000, Chen Shui-bian won the presidential election, which made the Democratic Progressive
Party become the ruling party. Although pursuing Taiwan’s independence was in its party platform,
the DPP had no experience of governance and faced enormous pressure from mainland China.
Therefore, it appeared much more moderate than many specialists had anticipated. By adopting
the so called “New Central Line”, the Chen Shui-bian administration prudently dealt with the
cross-strait relations and avoided further provoking Beijing179. During his inauguration speech,
Chen seemed to try to ease Taiwan’s tension with mainland China by mentioning his promises of
“Four Noes and One Without” (Si Bu Yi Mei You), which meant that his administration would not
declare Taiwan’s independence, change the national title from the Republic of China to the
Republic of Taiwan, incorporate the doctrine of special state to state relations into the Constitution,
or promote a referendum to let the people in Taiwan make preference between unification and
independence, and would not abolish the National Unification Council and the National
Unification Guideline. In essence, he promised not to change the status quo180.
However, this seemingly moderate mainland policy elicited increasing debates inside the DPP, and
therefore lowered Chen’s support from the party, especially from those hard-liners. What made it
worse for Chen Shui-bian’s administration was that politicians from the KMT and other
opposition parties started to visit the mainland and openly endorsed the One China principle,
which was the very thing Chen was not able to do as the DPP leader181. In these circumstances, the
Chen Shui-bian administration formed a cross-party team to integrate opinions from both the DPP
and those opposition parties, attempting to establish the so called “Taiwan Consensus” on the
cross-strait relations to extricate the authorities from the dilemma. This cross-party team then
offered its conclusion of three acknowledgments and four recommendations in 2000, which could
be regarded as the DPP authorities’ initial interpretation of the cross-strait relations182. It admitted
that Taiwan was a part of China in a broad sense, while the ROC and the PRC had no subordinate
relations, and also suggested that any future changes of the status quo must be approved by the
referendum in Taiwan183. Based on that, then chairwoman of MAC Tsai Ing-wen stated that the
DPP would keep an opening mind when dealing with cross-strait issues and not exclude any
possible options.
This was obviously a more flexible position compared with pursuing Taiwan’s independence in
the DPP’s party platform. However, even this flexibility did not exist long enough when the
pro-independence forces became stronger. In late 2001, the DPP won the legislative election and
became the largest party in the congress. In 2002, the DPP passed the bill of synchronization of
the party and the government, to allow Chen Shui-bian to be the president and the party chairman
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p16-17.
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at the same time, which therefore largely strengthened his political power184. Within this context,
Chen began to reveal his pro-independence stance by publicly proclaiming that Taiwan was an
independent sovereign state, and defined cross-strait relations as “one country on each side”. He
argued that Taiwan should choose its own way of development and must not be downgraded into a
local government like Hong Kong. More precisely, he insisted that only the people in Taiwan can
decide Taiwan’s fate, especially whether to change the status quo by a referendum185.
The mainland policy then completely shifted to a pro-independence stance. In order to redefine the
cross-strait relations, the DPP authorities started the movement of de-Sinicization by emphasizing
that “One China” was only a topic for discussing rather than a principle which could not be
violated. Meanwhile, the authorities also stated that Taipei would never accept the 1992 consensus
because it would downgrade Taiwan and eventually wipe out the ROC186. Apart from that, the
Chen Shui-bian administration also promoted idea of Taiwan’s independence in areas such as
education, history, and culture, to establish the so called Taiwan cultural identity. For example, the
local dialects such as Hakka and Min were listed by the authorities as “national languages”, while
the subject of “modern history of China” was replaced by “modern history of Taiwan” in the
Examination of Civil Service187. Based on these movements, the DPP focused more attention on
the “Name Modification Campaign”. During his inauguration speech in 2004, Chen Shui-bian
gave the word “Taiwan” an equal status as “the ROC” in his expression, declaring that it was the
same for people to use Taiwan or the ROC188. In December, he stated all the overseas agencies
would change their names into Taiwan Representative Office, and all domestic agencies whose
names might be confused with China would also be modified189. In these circumstances, the
mainland policy was further adjusted from Lee Teng-hui’s “special state to state relations” to a
more audacious “one country on each side”, which could be regarded as another step towards the
DPP’s final goal of Taiwan’s de jure independence. This new position then impacted Taipei’s
concrete regulations and rules when Chen Shui-bian posed many obstacles in the cross-strait
exchanges. In fact, since completely abandoning the One China principle, the DPP authorities has
already taken a series of actions to restrain Taiwan’s business ties with the mainland, such as
forbidding people in Taiwan to buy RMB special stock (known as B share) in the mainland, and
strictly monitoring Taiwan’s investment towards the mainland190.
The Rapprochement of Cross-Strait Relations: No unification, No independence, and No use of
force after 2008
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During the whole eight years of Chen Shui-bian administration, the DPP took a variety of actions
to adjust the mainland policy in order to achieve Taiwan’s de jure independence step by step. This
process, which was described by specialists as “Salami Slicing”, heightened cross-strait tensions
and increased the military pressure against Taiwan from the mainland. But this dangerous
tendency finally stopped in mid 2008 when the KMT candidate Ma Ying-jeou won the election,
who beat his DPP counterpart by more than 2 million votes191. The transfer of political power in
the island ended the pro-independence force’s rule, and therefore caused a great shift in Taiwan’s
mainland policy.
It is significant to note that, even though it was quite different from the pro-independence stance
insisted by the DPP authorities, Ma and the KMT’s position about cross-strait relations was not the
same as that of Chiang Kai-shek and Chiang Ching-kuo before 1990s. In fact, Ma and his party
had made a series of statements about the definition of cross-strait relations since he became the
party leader of the KMT in 2005. For instance, Ma once stated that “for our party, the eventual
goal is reunification” when he was interviewed by the Newsweek in 2005192. But in 2006, the
KMT advertised in a pan-green newspaper, declaring that Taiwan’s future included many options,
and whether accepting the unification should be decided by Taiwan’s people, implying that
Taiwan’s independence was also an option193. Nevertheless, Ma revised these controversial
statements after he took office and finally made his definition of cross-strait relations much clearer.
For the self-identification of Taiwan, Ma emphasized that he was elected to be the president of the
Republic of China, rather than the Republic of Taiwan, and he would never agree the expression
that “the ROC is equivalent to Taiwan”194. In essence, he negated the efforts made by the previous
DPP administration for pursuing Taiwan’s de jure independence. Based on that, it was not
surprising to see that Ma identified the relations between Taiwan and the mainland as two
authorities both governing parts of traditional territory of China respectively, which meant two
sides across the strait both belonged to One China while maintained governance in their own
area195. This “One China, Two Areas” was almost the same as the 1992 consensus that was
interpreted by Taipei as “One China, Different Interpretations”, and therefore could be accepted by
Beijing. In an interview by El Sol de Mexico in September 2008, Ma stated clearly that two sides
were now in a special but not state to state relations, because neither side’s Constitution would
allow the existence of another sovereign state in the territory196. However, it is worth to notice that
this shift from Lee Teng-hui’s Two State Theory or Chen Shui-bian’s “One Country on Each Side”
was mainly for repairing Taiwan’s relations with the mainland, making the island face less military
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pressure while enjoy more economic benefit, rather than for achieving national reunification as
Beijing wished. In fact, Ma declared that the reunification issue should be decided by time and
history, and even admitted that he did not believe this issue would be resolved during his lifetime.
What he really focused on was how to deal with those challenges Taiwan was facing and how to
make the current situation stable and better. In other words, he preferred to maintain the status quo,
which was usually described as a new Three Noes policy as “No Unification, No Independence,
and No Use of Force”197. This policy, as Ma explained, meant his administration would neither
discuss with Beijing about reunification, nor support Taiwan’s independence, while opposing any
military option to be used to resolve the Taiwan Issue.
Based on such a position, Ma reassured the 1992 consensus for maintaining peace and stability
across the strait, and spent much effort in adjusting concrete regulations in cross-strait exchanges,
such as resuming cross-strait dialogues and signing economic cooperation agreement with the
mainland. In June 2008, the two sides resumed dialogues between the ARATS and the SEF, which
had been suspended for 8 years, and achieved agreements on weekend charter flight and travel of
mainland residents to Taiwan198. Since then, there have been eight rounds of these talks, achieving
a series of agreements on cross-strait cooperation in different areas, such as medicine and public
health, nuclear safety, joint fight against crime and so on199. Apart from that, the exchanges and
cooperation between the CCP and the KMT also played a more significant role. This was different
from the KMT leaders’ previous visits to the mainland, because now the KMT was the ruling party
and therefore any agreement it made with the CCP could really become part of Taiwan authorities’
mainland policy. For example, the issue of charter flight was discussed by the two parties and a
preliminary compromise was then reached in May 2008, before the ARATS and the SEF began to
negotiate about this issue. Meanwhile, Taipei also eased its restrictions on exchanges of officials
between the two sides, promoting local mayors and county magistrates to visit mainland China,
which was quite rare during the DPP’s time200.
All these increasing exchanges and cooperation between the two sides showed that the KMT
administration’s strong desire of repairing the cross-strait relations from previous damage. But
these changes in the mainland policy, such as defining cross-strait relations as “One China, Two
Areas”, did not mean that Taipei was back to its early stance of pursuing national reunification.
More precisely, Ma Ying-jeou gave more weight to the economic exchanges with the mainland,
while repeatedly emphasized that it was not appropriate to consider cross-strait political
negotiations under present situation. This explained why all agreements signed by the ARATS and
the SEF during this period were only related to economic issues. In such a case, the sequence
which was described as “from economy to politics” was more and more questioned because Taipei
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seemed to avoid political issues in its contacts with Beijing. In other words, Taiwan’s mainland
policy during Ma’s period, no matter how well it worked in improving cross-strait relations, did
not resolve any fundamental problem in the whole Taiwan Issue, and could be adjusted when the
pro-independence forces regain the power.
Maintaining the status quo: adjustment of the DPP’s mainland policy before and after 2016
After 2008’s election, the DPP’s strength and influence were greatly weakened. Tsai Ying-wen,
who succeeded as the party chairwoman, did not make any adjustment to the DPP's mainland
policy at that time, showing no interest in reviewing the party’s radical pro-independence position.
This was because the adjustment of mainland policy was not urgent for the DPP which had
become an opposition party, and any significant change in its mainland policy might lead to more
controversy or conflict inside the party.
But when the DPP won the county and city mayor’s election in 2009, Tsai Ing-wen's leadership
was consolidated, and she began to show her style in the party’s mainland policy making. In May
2010, Tsai said that the DPP “does not rule out a direct dialogue with China to accurately convey
the view of Taiwanese people if there is no political precondition”201. It seemed that the DPP
started to change its image of “opposing everything of China” (feng zhong bi fan). In June 2011,
Tsai noted that “building a peaceful and stable cross-strait relation is the common responsibility of
Taiwan and mainland China. In the future, the DPP will promote more positive dialogues with the
Chinese mainland”. But she also emphasized that her party would never sacrifice Taiwan's
Democracy nor accept the “One China” principle202. Like Lee and Chen, she tried to form the so
called “Taiwan consensus” through democratic mechanism, and wished to use this Taiwan
consensus instead of 1992 consensus as the political foundation for establishing stable interaction
with China, which would undoubtedly clash with the One China principle and damage the peace
and stability across the strait203. In a word, the DPP during this period adjusted its mainland policy
to favor contacts with the mainland, but there was no substantive change in the party’s
pro-independence position.
Even this seemingly moderate attitude did not last long after Taiwan’s 2012 presidential election.
In July 2014, Tsai argued in an exclusive interview that if the DPP won the 2014 Nine in One
election, the mainland would adjust its tough policy toward the pro-independence forces. She even
believed that “as long as the DPP wins the 2016 presidential election, China will automatically
adjust its stance to adapt to Taiwan’s change, and the United States will also adjust its policy due
to China's adjustment"204. Indeed, the DPP’s victory in that year’s Nine in One election made the
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party firmly believe it would regain power in 2016 and thus review and adjustment of its mainland
policy was no longer important. As some senior party members argued, there was no need to
adjust the mainland policy if the party could win the presidential election without changing its
position on cross-strait relations.
Within this context, the DPP's stance became tougher. In January 2015, Tsai stated that Taiwan
must safeguard its “national sovereignty” and its democratic system, and must obtain public
recognition and affirmation when promoting cross-strait relations205. She also criticized that then
Ma Ying-jeou administration’s mainland policy gradually weakened Taiwan’s “national
sovereignty”206. But this hardline stance was adjusted shortly afterwards when Tsai faced
pressures from both the mainland and the US. In such a case, she made a more moderate statement
in April that the DPP’s principle of dealing with cross-strait relations was to maintain the status
quo, which she defined as peace and stable development in cross-strait relations207. She made it
clear that this was the goal that the DPP would achieve after return to power. Although there was
no mention of the 1992 consensus nor the One China principle, maintaining the status quo can be
regarded as a significant concession made by Tsai Ing-wen and the DPP compared to their
previous emphasis on Taiwan's “national sovereignty”. But there were also voices that
“maintaining the status quo” was too ambiguous and could be only a temporary response to
external pressure, like Chen Shui-bian’s “Four Noes and One Without”. In other words, it needed
to be further clarified and tested.
It can be argued that all these statements made by Tsai before the 2016 presidential election were
not very significant, because the DPP was still an opposition party during that period. But Tsai's
exposition of cross-strait relations in her inauguration speech on 20th May 2016 should be taken
seriously, as it can be regarded as the official mainland policy of the Taiwan authorities. The most
important adjustment was that Tsai announced the new government would deal with cross-strait
affairs on the basis of the Constitution of the Republic of China, the Act Governing Relations
between Peoples of the Taiwan Area and the Mainland Area, and other relevant laws208. It is
noteworthy that "the Constitution of the Republic of China" and "the Act Governing Relations
between Peoples of the Taiwan Area and the Mainland Area" are words she and the DPP have
always avoided using in the past years, because the Constitution implies that two sides both
belong to One China, which is the core of 1992 consensus, while the “Act” also defines the two
sides as “one country, two areas”, which is completely different from pro-independence forces’
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two state theory or “one country on each side”. Moreover, these two documents both have
statements related to “national unification”. In such a case, the DPP and many specialists thought
this expression has released a great deal of goodwill toward the mainland.
However, it is very difficult to understand how will the Taiwan authorities define relations
between Taiwan and the mainland based on the ROC Constitution when Tsai Ing-wen clearly
refuses to accept the 1992 consensus. There is no question that such consensus is the basis for the
two sides maintaining stable contacts after 2008. If Tsai Ing-wen wants to maintain this status quo,
but is still reluctant to accept the foundation of the status quo, the future cross-strait interaction
may not work as well as it was during the KMT’s period.
All in all, the current DPP's mainland policy has been adjusted to a certain degree compared to
that of the Chen Shui-bian administration, releasing much goodwill to the mainland. But without
clear definition of cross-strait relations, and within the context of Tsai Ing-wen's refusal to accept
the 1992 consensus, it is almost impossible that the cross-strait relations can develop as it was
during the KMT’s period, while the likelihood of serious confrontation should not be ruled out.
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Chapter II The Political Transformation and the
Fundamental Change in the Definition of Cross-Strait
Relations
Taiwan's mainland policy during Chiang Kai-shek and Chiang Ching-kuo’s period was to seek
reunification with the mainland by military actions and to regain the KMT’s ruling position in the
whole of China. However, since 1987, Taiwan’s mainland policy has experienced a series of
changes. With cross-strait contacts and the rise of pro-independence forces, a fundamental shift
eventually happened in the Taiwan authorities’ position on cross-strait issues. Analyzing this
evolution of policy will help to define Taipei’s true position in the Taiwan Issue after 1987. It is
noteworthy that in the previous chapter there were various changes in Taipei’s mainland policy
after 1987, and it is impossible to give equal attention to every temporary policy’s formulation and
adjustment during that period. In such a case, before analyzing the evolution of mainland policy, it
is necessary to point out which type of policy is directly related to the Taiwan authorities’ position.
Three Levels of Mainland Policy
Taiwan’s mainland policy includes three different levels. The first and also the most significant
level is how the Taiwan authorities defines relations between Taiwan and mainland China, which
actually means how to interpret the word “China”. This is the core of Taiwan's mainland policy
and also a vital question that the Taiwan authorities has to answer. For Taiwan, is it the seat of the
ROC government, a normal province of the PRC, or a distinct sovereign state that has nothing to
do with the ROC or the PRC? For the Taiwan authorities, an undeniable fact is that the PRC has
replaced the ROC as the legal representative of China in the international community since the
1960s. Meanwhile, the Constitution of the ROC insists that there is only “One China” in the world.
This makes the government in Taipei in a very hard place. Precisely, the Taiwan authorities on one
hand, will not accept any downgrade of the ROC’s status in the international community, while on
the other hand, also cannot publicly declare Taiwan’s de jure independence as long as it has not
realized constitutional amendment. Consequently, there are many different statements made by the
Taiwan authorities regarding the definition of relations between Taiwan and mainland China. As
Lee Teng-hui once admitted, one major purpose of mainland policy was to find out an appropriate
definition of cross-strait relations209.
The second level is ideological slogan or basic model adopted by the Taiwan authorities to deal
with issues related to mainland China. After answering the questions in the first level, Taipei has
to be unambiguous about its plan for resolving the cross-strait issues. For example, during the
period of Chiang Ching-kuo, the ideological slogan adopted by Taipei in its mainland policy was
“Reunifying China under the Three People’s Principles” (San Min Zhu Yi Tong Yi Zhong Guo).
This was mentioned by Chiang on the 4th Plenary Session of the 11th KMT Central Committee in
209 Shao Zonghai (1994). Mainland Policy and Corss-Strait Relations. Taipei: HWA
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December 1979, in response to Beijing's statement of peaceful reunification210. But since the late
1980s, in order to adapt to the changing domestic and international environment, there has been a
decay of ideological influence on Taiwan's mainland policy making. After 1988, senior KMT
leaders such as Lee Teng-hui usually preferred expressions like “Cultural and Economic
Cooperation” or “Democracy, Freedom and Equal Prosperity” instead of the Three People’s
Principles when they talked about the reunification issue211. It is noteworthy that all these
ideological slogans, no matter uncompromising or moderate, were based on the premise that two
sides across the strait belong to “One China”. This position had been upheld until the mid-1990s
when the pro-independence forces began to rise in the island.
Compared with the slogan, the basic model is relatively more specific because it is supposed to
answer which kind of political system that Taiwan and mainland China may build together for
future cross-strait relations. For example, some politicians and specialists once suggested in the
early 1990s that the two sides should achieve reunification through establishing a federation with a
strong central government. By contrast, some other scholars who were afraid of the downgrade of
Taiwan's status, believed the EU model was more appropriate for the cross-strait situation212. It is
quite obvious that when these politicians and specialists in Taiwan tried to give clear statement
about basic model in mainland policy, they all rejected the idea of Taiwan's independence and
were optimistic for the future reunification with mainland China. This was because the first level
during that period defined the two sides both as parts of One China.
The third level in the mainland policy are concrete laws and regulations set by the Taiwan
authorities for dealing with cross-strait contacts and exchanges. Since local residents were allowed
to visit their relatives in the mainland in 1987, the cross-strait contacts have been increased sharply.
Especially after the end of Taiwan's Martial Law, people in Taiwan could openly visit, trade, or
marry with people from mainland China. Consequently, more and more problems appeared in
cross-strait exchanges, and Taipei had to consider about how to regulate those contacts in trade,
technology, education, culture and other areas. In such a case, the Taiwan authorities promulgated
a variety of rules, laws, and regulations in order to put orders into chaos and maintain the
development of cross-strait relations. This level can be regarded as the most concrete part of
mainland policy which are often changed. But they cannot violate policies related to first two
levels. Precisely, if the first level has defined the two sides both as parts of One China, the
concrete laws and regulations in this level are supposed to be beneficial rather than detrimental to
the development of cross-strait relations.
Obviously, the core level determines the content of other two levels, and is related to Taipei's true
stance in the Taiwan Issue. Therefore, the analysis should focus on the evolution of the core level’s
policies.
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Since the late 1980s, the core level of mainland policy has experienced a fundamental shift from
the authorities’ previous insistence of One China to publicly pursuing de jure independence of
Taiwan. Although the KMT took back the office in 2008 and modified the core level back to the
One China position, Chiang Kai-shek and Chiang Ching-kuo’s pursuit of reunifying two sides
across the strait seemed to be completely abandoned.
This fundamental shift was caused by various factors, such as political leader’s personal decisions,
pushes made by political groups, amendments to the Constitution, changes of political system,
shift of public opinion, and so on. All these different factors had one thing in common, that was
they were all strongly connected with the process of political transformation in Taiwan. In fact, it
is not surprising to realize that the evolution of mainland policy, especially the most sharply
change in the core level, happened in the same period of the political transformation from the late
1980s to mid-2008. In such a case, through analyzing the process of political transformation and
combining it with the concept of national interest, this chapter will offer an interpretation with
sufficient explanatory power for the phenomenon of fundamental change in the core level of
Taipei’s mainland policy.
A Brief Introduction of Taiwan’s Political Transformation between Late 1980s
and Mid 2008
The political transformation began in the way of political reform pushed by Chiang Ching-kuo in
late 1980s, and was largely promoted by Lee Teng-hui and Chen Shui-bian. Those reform
measures in both political and social areas directly influenced the mainland policy making, but
many of them were adjusted or even suspended in 2008 when the KMT won the presidential
election and redefined the cross-strait relations as “One China, TwoAreas” 213.
The Political Reform during Chiang Chingkuo ’s Period
When the Chinese Civil War came to its end, Chiang Kai-shek made “the Temporary Provisions
Effective during the Period of National Mobilization for Suppression of the Communist
Rebellion”, which enabled the president to take emergency measures to safeguard the security of
the nation and the people, and to be reelected more than two terms. This “Temporary Provisions”,
in fact, was not very temporary since it has been working as a wartime Constitution for more than
40 years after the National Assembly added it to the Constitution in April 1948214. In such a case,
the beginning of political transformation pushed by Chiang Ching-kuo in 1987, was targeted at
this Temporary Provisions. As Chiang pointed out, the reform which was based on democracy and
the Constitution, was to change the KMT’s conservative image through effective measures215.
During this period, the most important reform measures were abolishing the Martial Law and
repealing the party ban. In July 1987, Chiang Ching-kuo announced that the Martial Law period
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was ended, and the authorities also took a series of measures for relaxing restrictions in society216.
Compared with ending the Martial Law, which was decided and implemented by the authorities,
repealing the party ban should be regarded as the compromise between the KMT leaders and the
social pressures they faced. With the increasing political movements supported by the non-KMT
forces, it has become very clear that the establishment of new political parties in Taiwan was
inevitable, even though the KMT authorities still refused to lift the ban. In September 1986, the
DPP was founded without permission from the KMT authorities, which largely encouraged other
non-KMT forces that were also discontent with the authorities217. Within this context, in 1987,
Chiang had to give up KMT’s previous policy of party ban218.
The end of Martial Law and the repeal of party ban indicated there were huge changes in the
KMT’s political dominance and its relations with political oppositions. In fact, the authorities
began to make compromise with other political forces when the latter were largely enhanced and
becoming stronger. However, the changes in both political and social areas were still far from
enough, and further and deeper reform measures were required by the whole society. It is
noteworthy that this initial reform also influenced the core level of mainland policy when more
and more people started to publicly express their discontent with Chiang Ching-kuo and his
“Three Noes” policy, while at the same time, the pro-independence forces were strengthened by
extracting support from these discontents219.
The Constitutional Amendment during the period of Lee Teng-hui and Chen Shui-bian
administrations
After Chiang Ching-kuo’s death, Lee Teng-hui became the president and continued the reform by
making policies which were consistent with Chiang’s previous measures220. However, the
outbreak of the March Student Movement (also known as Wild Lily Movement) forced him to
reevaluate the political reform. In March 1990, the fact that Lee was the only candidate of the
presidential election triggered fierce criticism from Taiwan’s society and therefore caused a large
scale mass protest, which was chiefly composed of university students. This revealed the serious
conflict between previous reform measures which did not touch the old constitutional system of
the ROC, and Taiwan’s society which was strongly anxious to achieve democracy221. Within this
context, in order to respond to the public demand and stabilize the regime, the Lee Teng-hui
administration began its constitutional reform. During the ten years from 1990 to the end of Lee’s
presidency in 2000, there were six amendments in the ROC’s Constitution, which firstly led to the
repeal of the ‘Temporary Provisions’ and reduction of restrictions on Taiwan’s people, and then
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focused on adjusting the state structure and increasing the power of president222. This high
frequency of constitutional amendments during this period not only established legal foundation
for further political reform, but also made the Constitution lose its seriousness and stability, and
even become a tool used by political parties to gain their own political interest. Particularly, the
pro-independence forces started to be able to extricate itself from previous restrictions of the ROC
Constitution, and gradually raised its influence on both political and social areas by utilizing the
democratization process223.
In 2002, Chen Shui-bian, who won the presidential election two years ago, for the first time
mentioned constitutional amendment in his presidency with a relatively moderate stance224.
However, in 2003 and 2004, he repeatedly announced that then Constitution could no longer
satisfy the current and future need of Taiwan, and he wished to establish a new Constitution
through referendum225. In August 2004, the Legislative Yuan passed its first proposed revision of
the Constitution, and on June 7th 2005, the National Assembly approved the Legislature’s
proposed revision to Articles 1, 2, 4, 5, 8, as well as the addition of Article 12 to the ROC
Constitution, which was the 7th amendment since the political transformation started226. This
amendment made it clear that any change of the ROC territory must be “initiated upon the
proposal of one-fourth of total members of the Legislative Yuan, passed by at least three-fourths of
the members present at a meeting attended by at least three-fourths of the total members of the
Legislative Yuan”. This actually implied that the pro-independence forces led by the DPP would
be able to change the definition of the ROC territory and largely promote Taiwan’s de jure
independence as long as they could obtain sufficient support in the Congress227. After that, Chen
again proclaimed many times that he wanted to establish a completely new Constitution for
Taiwan, but his real target might be using the constitutional amendment to divert public attention
from discontent and criticism against his domestic and cross-strait policies.
Democratization and Localization
The political transformation in Taiwan has impacted on many areas, but to analyze the
fundamental shift in the core level of the mainland policy, this study will only pay attention to its
influence on Taiwan’s political and social areas. More precisely, the political transformation
happened first in the political field in the form of democratic reform, which then caused a social
change that influenced people’s self-identity and their opinions about Chinese culture. In such a
case, the study divides the political transformation into the process of democratization in the
political area, and the process of localization in social and cultural areas. It is noteworthy that
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democratization and localization in Taiwan had an unique feature, which was their strong
connection with the separatist movements, and that was why they can be used to explain how
those changes happened in Taipei’s definition of cross-strait relations.
The central feature of democratization: enhancing the pro-independence force
Lee Teng-hui and his administration played a very special role in Taiwan’s democratization. In
addition to largely promoting democratic reform in the KMT old political system through
constitutional amendments, his reform measures seemed to give more weight to enhancing the
pro-independence forces and gradually denying the “One China” principle, which ultimately
caused the fundamental change in the core level of mainland policy.
First of all, the Lee Teng-hui administration established a theoretic foundation for future separatist
movement by emphasizing the concept of “popular sovereignty”, declaring that democratic
politics could never be achieved without popular sovereignty228. In essence, sovereignty belonged
to people in a specific area, and these people together formed a community229. Thus, Lee Teng-hui
argued that Taiwan’s sovereignty only belonged to the community formed by Taiwan’s people,
which provided a theoretic foundation for realizing Taiwan’s de jure independence. However,
according to the One China principle insisted by the previous Chiang Kai-shek and Chiang
Ching-kuo authorities, the sovereignty of the ROC must cover both Taiwan and the mainland,
indicating that sovereignty should belong not only to people in Taiwan but also to those on the
mainland. In such a case, Lee’s announcement that the ROC’s sovereignty was limited in Taiwan
and only belonged to Taiwan’s people, denied the existence of the mainland within the ROC’s
sovereignty, actually implying that Taiwan was a sovereign state rather than a part of China230. On
the base of this concept, the democratization doubtlessly prompted the authorities to approach the
pro-independence stance.
Meanwhile, during the process of democratization, Taiwan’s state structure was changed in a way
that largely enhanced the pro-independence forces. In the early 1990s, the Lee Teng-hui
administration began to concern and accept suggestions presented by the pro-independence forces,
which had been completely excluded from Taiwan’s policy making process231. Among those
suggestions, the direct popular election of the president and freezing the provincial government
should be regarded as the most important issues. In May 1992, the constitutional amendment that
required “the president and the vice president shall be elected by the people in the free area of the
Republic of China for, at most, two terms of four years each” was passed232. No one would deny
that the direct election of the president, which was often regarded as a significant symbol of
democracy, indicated that Taiwan’s political reform has made great progress. However, when
considering the cross-strait relations, this progress did have a negative implication that should not
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be ignored. That is, if the president of the ROC is elected directly by people in Taiwan, he or she is
only responsible for people in Taiwan, rather than representing the interest of all Chinese people.
In such a case, the legitimacy of the president and the authorities were shrunken from the whole of
China to Taiwan, which was why this reform was strongly supported by the pro-independence
forces.
In 1997, the fourth version of the ROC Constitution promulgated by Lee, clearly pronounced that
“Taiwan provincial elections shall be suspended; Taiwan province shall have a provincial
government and a provincial advisory council; the members of the provincial government, one of
whom shall be the provincial governor, shall be nominated by the president of the Executive Yuan
and appointed by the president of the Republic”233. This change suspended provincial elections
and streamlined relevant government organizations in order to resolve the conflict between the
Constitution and the actual sovereign area. More precisely, the new version of the Constitution
defined the sovereign area of the ROC as Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu,abandoning the
mainland area. Therefore, the concept of the “Taiwan province”, which clearly showed that
Taiwan is a part of China, became outdated and could not be tolerated by the pro-independence
forces.
The aim of these changes in Taiwan’s state structure was quite clear: to limit the legitimacy of the
authorities within Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu, denying that the ROC should represent the
whole of China and therefore virtually creating “Two Chinas”.
Apart from that, Taiwan’s anti-independence forces were continually weakened in the process of
democratization. Before political transformation, Taiwan’s political issues were totally controlled
by the KMT authorities, which upheld the One China principle and defined the cross-strait
relations as a relation between free area controlled by the legal government and occupied area
controlled by the rebel group. In such a case, the KMT was the major force against any
pro-independence ideas and movements. In fact, during the period of Chiang Kai-shek and Chiang
Ching-kuo administration, all pro-independence forces were driven out of Taiwan and no
pro-independence movement was allowed inside the island234. However, in the process of
Taiwan’s democratization, the KMT’s ideology and organization started to be continually
weakened. When the political reform started, there was a confusion in the KMT’s ideology,
influencing the party’s cohesion. But Lee Teng-hui paid little attention to this serious problem,
taking no measures to help the KMT to adapt to Taiwan’s changing political and economic
situation235. Consequently, only 10,000 new members joined the party in 2001, and it became
difficult to recognize which group’s interest the KMT represented, implying that the party was
losing its social foundation236. Meanwhile, more conflicts broke out inside the KMT, while Lee
Teng-hui, as the party chairman, failed in resolving these conflicts but rather stirred up more
dissension with other senior party members, which finally led to serious split in the party. In 1993,
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a few non-mainstream members of the KMT proclaimed their independence and founded the New
Party237. In 1996 and 2000, other senior party members, such as James Soong, who were
dissatisfied with Lee Teng-hui’s control of the party’s nomination for the presidential election, also
left the KMT and founded the People First Party238. All these splits largely weakened the KMT’s
influence on Taiwan’s society and therefore led to a decline in its vote share in legislative elections
between 1989 and 2001, falling from 60.14% to only 28.56%239. In essence, the KMT that started
the democratic reform, did not benefit from the process but was recognized by Taiwan’s people as
an obstacle to democracy. In these circumstances, with declining approval ratings and serious
splits inside the party, the KMT gradually lost its dominance in Taiwan’s political issues and could
not effectively contain the rise of pro-independence forces. Consequently, for the first time in
Taiwan’s history, pro-independence forces obtained administrative power when the DPP won the
presidential election in 2000.
In general, in the process of democratization, the popular sovereignty created a theoretical
foundation for separatism, and constitutional amendments established a system supporting the
pro-independence movements, while the major anti-independence force was continually weakened
and lost its political dominance. Within this context, a series of changes happened in the core level
of mainland policy240. In 1991, the abolishment of “the Temporary Provisions” transformed the
identity of the mainland from “rebel group” to “political entity” and defined the cross-strait
relations as “One China, Two Equal Political Entities”. But this ambiguous definition did not last
long when subsequent constitutional amendments redefined the sovereign area of the ROC from
the whole of China to Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen, and Matsu, which was described by Lee as “the
ROC is in Taiwan”241. By denying that the mainland was under the ROC’s sovereignty, Lee
declared that the definition of cross-strait relations must be understood as “One China, Two
Countries” to protect Taiwan’s status242. This definition still admitted that the two sides belonged
to “One China”, but clearly defined Taiwan as a country rather than the ambiguous “political
entity”. In 1999, within the context that the KMT was suffering serious internal splits while the
pro-independence forces had gained more influence, which indicated that he faced less restrictions
from his own party and stronger support from the DPP, Lee Teng-hui made his famous “special
state to state relationship” statement in an interview with Deutsche Welle, defining the cross-strait
relations as “state to state”. Thus, the One China principle was openly denied, and the core of
mainland policy completely shifted to a pro-independence stance243. Since then, this definition of
cross-strait relations was remained and promoted by the following DPP administration until
mid-2008.
The essence of localization: promoting the de-Sinification movement
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The political transformation weakened the power of the KMT and made it unpopular with
Taiwan’s society. Within this context, the pro-independence forces wished to take advantage of
this social discontent to create an appropriate social environment for further advancing their
pursuit of Taiwan’s de jure independence. The major method was to establish the so called
Taiwanese identity while cutting off Taiwanese people’s ties with Chinese culture by promoting
localization in Taiwan’s social and cultural areas.
It should be pointed out that the concept of localization presented by the pro-independence forces
was completely different from the “localization movement” in Taiwan’s history before the end of
World War II. During that period, localization was the opposite of the de-Sinification, because
Taiwan’s people fought for protecting their Chinese culture and language from the Kominka
movement pushed by the Japanese colonists244. The DPP’s localization is also different from the
economic concept that means certain development mode emphasizing a nation’s own features
within the context of globalization245.
The localization promoted by the pro-independence forces rose from the conflict between the
KMT authorities and Taiwan’s local people, rather than from a necessary fight against external
political or economic pressures. More precisely, before Chiang Ching-kuo’s political reform, there
was a strong social discontent with the fact that political issues were totally controlled by the so
called external province natives (wai sheng ren). For that reason, Chiang increased the number of
local people as government officials246. His goal was to absorb local elites into the authorities,
thereby ensuring that the KMT would stay in power. In essence, this was a policy easing the
tension between internal and external province natives, rather than a movement that influenced the
whole society and impacted the mainland policy making. However, in the view of the
pro-independence forces, this issue could be utilized to create an appropriate social foundation for
future separatist movements. Although the number of internal province natives (ben sheng ren) as
senior political or military officials had been increased to a level that greatly eased previous
tensions, Lee Teng-hui and his successor still gave more weight to this localization process,
gradually changing its essence from increasing the political participation of internal province
natives to promoting the Taiwanese identity and cultural independence. Since then, the
localization has been closely linked with separatism.
For the pro-independence forces, the identity issue was a significant challenge that Taiwan’s
society had to face when pursuing democracy. They believed that people would not love Taiwan or
fight for establishing the democratic system if they did not identify Taiwan as their home country.
In other words, the Taiwanese identity was the premise of realizing democratization. This identity
issue first appeared in late 1980s when Chiang Ching-kuo allowed local people to visit their
relatives in the mainland. Because of nearly forty years’ separation and confrontation, few people
had experience in dealing with the mainland or knew the real situation there. In such a case, their
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strong emotions about relatives and old hometown made them overestimate the situation in the
mainland, which led to serious disappointment when they arrived there and therefore weakened
their Chinese identity247. By contrast, when they ended their visit and returned to Taiwan, the
familiar daily lives evoked the feeling that Taiwan rather than the mainland was their real
hometown. This feeling was the beginning of Taiwanese identity, and what pro-independence
forces pursued was to reinforce this feeling, prompting more people in Taiwan to identify
themselves as Taiwanese.
During the period that Taipei upheld the One China principle, both internal and external province
natives were identified as Chinese, and in the view of most people, “Taiwanese” was equated to
“Chinese”. For that reason, the Lee Teng-hui administration created the concept of “New
Taiwanese”, which referred to people who were not Chinese but identified Taiwan as their only
hometown and would fight for Taiwan’s interests, unlike the “Chinese” who loved Chinese culture
and refused to relinquish their pursuit of national unification248. In other words, whether a person
was “New Taiwanese” depended on whether he or she opposed national unification, or as
pro-independence forces implied, whether he or she supported Taiwan’s de jure independence. In
order to promote Taiwanese identity, Lee Teng-hui even defined the KMT authorities as an
“external authorities” (wai lai zheng quan), equating the KMT with the Dutch and Spanish
colonists in Taiwan’s history249. He argued that the old KMT authorities did not represent the
interests of Taiwanese people, implying that only a Taiwanese regime could emancipate Taiwanese
people from external authorities’ oppression. He even stated that the grief of Taiwanese people
was deeply rooted in mainland China because the old KMT authorities always identified
themselves as the regime of whole China250. In such a case, people who identified themselves as
New Taiwanese should boycott external authorities that supported One China, and seek to
establish Taiwanese own regime by promoting separatist movements. It is noteworthy that the
identity issue has already largely impacted Taiwanese people, shifting their support from
unification to independence. By 2004, over 60% of Taiwanese people identified themselves as
Taiwanese, which explained why the pro-independence stance in Taipei’s mainland policy faced
little resistance from the society251.
After 2000, the DPP became the ruling party and implemented various measures to further
improve this localization. Its major target was to cut off ties between Chinese culture and Taiwan’s
society, achieving independence in cultural area first, and therefore prompt the society to support
separatist movements in the political area. During this period, the authorities promoted
localization in Taiwan’s education, in which language and history were impacted most severely.
For language, the authorities raised the significance of Taiwan’s local dialect, requiring all primary
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schools to provide courses taught in that dialect252. After 2000, the Chen Shui-bian administration
publicly proclaimed that the local dialect was not a branch of Chinese Min Nan (Min Nan Yu), but
should be recognized as “Taiwanese”(Tai Yu)253. In the meantime, the localization in history
education was with a more obvious pro-independence stance. According to Taiwan’s history
textbook designed by the Lee Teng-hui administration, Taiwan historically had no relations with
China and thus should be defined as an “ownerless land” (wu zhu zhi di), which implied that
Taiwan was not a part of China but an independent sovereign state254. Based on this, the Chen
Shui-bian administration made further changes in history education, separating “Taiwanese
history” from “Chinese history”, incorporating the “theory of the undetermined status of Taiwan”
into the official textbook, and even recognizing Sun Yet-sen as a “foreigner”255. All these changes,
as Chen admitted, were to liberate Taiwan’s history research and education from the restrictions of
Chinese influence, and to establish the dominant status of Taiwanese own historical viewpoint256.
In addition, it is also noteworthy that localization can enhance the pro-independence forces in
Taiwan’s election when identity was utilized to form widely popular support for those pan green
politicians. More precisely, pro-independence forces such as the DPP usually defined Taiwan’s
election as a fight between “New Taiwanese” who loved Taiwan and “Chinese” who betrayed
Taiwan, imposing huge pressures on voters who did not vote for the DPP candidate257. In these
circumstances, localization gradually defined itself as the only correct political position which
should not be questioned.
It is difficult to reverse the effects of these measures promoting cultural independence when
pro-independence opinions have been widely accepted by the society. Identifying with a certain
culture is the foundation of identifying with certain nation. If Taiwanese people’s ties with Chinese
culture were completely cut off, it will be impossible for them to identify themselves as Chinese
or support national unification. This is why the localization in cultural area was viewed by the
pro-independence forces as a necessary stage before Taiwan could finally achieve its de jure
independence. In fact, according to the DPP’s plan, after the democratic political system was
established in the democratization, the authorities should emphasize Taiwan’s status in the cultural
area by using “Taiwan” rather than “China” in official expressions and replacing “China” with
“Taiwan” in official departments’ titles. With all these preparation, the authorities could try to
declare Taiwan’s de jure independence through a referendum that aimed to change the nation’s
title from the “ROC” to “Taiwan”. It is not difficult to realize that whether this final step can
succeed is dependent on Taiwan’s public attitudes towards the identity of “New Taiwanese” and
Chinese culture. In other words, although the pro-independence forces can use democratization to
make itself become the ruling party and formulate policies to promote separatist movements, they
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are also constrained by the democratic system, which means they have to concern about the
response of Taiwan’s society to their pro-independence behaviors. This on one hand explains why
they paid so much attention to the localization, largely promoting de-Sinification in Taiwan’s
society, while on the other hand, also implies that Taiwan’s de jure independence cannot be easily
achieved as long as the society has a pragmatic consideration about Chinese military pressure.
Political Transformation, Taipei’s Perception of Relative Power, and Taiwan’s
Interest
In the process of political transformation, a democratic political system was successfully
established while Taiwan’s society seemed to have accepted Taiwanese identity and the pursuit of
Taiwan’s independence. Within this context, the fundamental change happened in the core level of
mainland policy. Through the above analysis, it is clear that the democratization enhanced the
pro-independence forces while weakening the power of the KMT, and the localization affected
Taiwan’s public attitudes towards unification and independence by promoting de-Sinification in
social and cultural areas. In such a case, no one will deny that the political transformation has
generated huge impact on Taipei’s definition of cross-strait relations.
Some scholars even postulated that political transformation alone led to this pro-independence
trend in mainland policy making before 2008258. They argued that the high frequency of election
in Taiwan between 1988 and 2002 seriously radicalized the campaign debate, making mainland
policy, which was very complex, emotional, and significant for the voters, become a prime subject
for campaign manipulation259. In these circumstances, the pro-independence forces easily obtained
sufficient public support and won these elections when the society was disaffected towards the
KMT and accepted Taiwanese identity. As then president of the Taiwan Association for Human
Rights admitted, the democratization and pro-independence movements were two aspects of one
issue and actually reinforced each other260. However, this conclusion that political transformation
alone determined fundamental shift in Taipei’s definition of cross-strait relations, seems to be
provided by Innenpolitik theories which privilege domestic independent variables to account for
state behavior. As neoclassical realists point out, the pure unit-level explanations are misguided
because they ignore the dominant role played by the relative material power. In fact, if the political
transformation is the only independent variable of the change in the core level of mainland policy,
it has difficulty accounting for why the Chen Shui-bian administration failed to hold a referendum
for achieving Taiwan’s de jure independence before 2008.
Within the context that political transformation enabled the DPP to extract Taiwan’s political and
social resources for formulating pro-independence policies, it seems there was few restrictions
from political opponents or society on DPP’s separatist movements. Then why the DPP could not
declare Taiwan’s de jure independence? Furthermore, the gap between two sides’ military power is
huge, and separatist words and deeds of the DPP will never be accepted by Beijing, but why the
pro-independence forces dared to create the fundamental change in the core level of mainland
policy? Indeed, the DPP’s behavior seemed irrational when most Taiwanese people agreed that
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separatist activities would inevitably elicit a strong reaction from mainland China. These
contradictions indicate that other factors should be taken into account when analyzing Taipei’s
mainland policy making during the period of political transformation.
More precisely, the pro-independence forces redefined the cross-strait relations not only because
the political transformation increased their power, but was also due to the way they perceived
relative power. In the modern society, the information dissemination is very efficient, so policy
makers are unlikely to ignore the reality of a huge gap between two sides’ power. But Taipei was
still able to adjust its mainland policy and promote Taiwan’s independence, because
pro-independence leaders preferred to compare power of Taiwan’s allies with that of mainland
China rather than compare power between two sides across the strait. This comparison, which was
used to interpret the systemic constraint and guide the formulation of Taiwan’s mainland policy, is
due to Taiwan’s limited power and its confidence in its powerful allies’ intervention. Among all
four actors in the Taiwan Issue, the United States is the only global super power, while mainland
China and Japan are both influential regional powers. Compared with them, Taiwan is extremely
weak in military, political, and economic areas. In such a case, only based on the estimation of the
US or Japanese response to Chinese policy and behavior towards Taiwan, Taipei could figure out
Taiwan’s interest pursuit and therefore formulate and adjust its mainland policies.
The problem is that Taiwan cannot always accurately predict its allies’ specific behaviors. One
example is when Chiang Kai-shek believed his “recovering mainland” policy would be
implemented within the context that there was serious military confrontation between the US and
mainland China, Washington refused to support that plan. This showed that Taipei could hardly
realize its policy target if it made a false prediction about what actions its allies would take in the
Taiwan Strait. This significant feature remained unchanged after 1987. After all, effects of political
transformation was to change Taiwan’s domestic state structure, rather than raise the authorities’
ability to predict potential US behavior or ability to realize its own targets in the absence of US
support. However, according to the pro-independence forces, there is no doubt that the US and
Japan’s position on the Taiwan Issue, especially about the cross-strait reunification, was quite
different from that of China. That means if Beijing tries to take over Taiwan by force, the US and
Japan will come to Taiwan’s aid without hesitation. Therefore, the magnitude of mainland policy’s
formulation and adjustment, including the fundamental change in Taipei’s definition of cross-strait
relations, is shaped by potential activities of the US and Japan that can curb China’s military
intimidation.
According to this view, Taiwan has common targets with its powerful allies, which are
maintaining Taiwan’s current de facto independence and even supporting Taiwan’s de jure
independence. From the DPP or other pro-independence forces’ perspective, the US is far stronger
than mainland China, so the latter will have to focus on its own fundamental interests such as
safeguarding its coastal area security if it faces military intervention from the US. In other words,
Taiwan’s interest of maintaining its de facto independence is under no real threat. For example,
Lee Teng-hui declared on many public occasions that Taiwanese people had no need to worry
about the potential military actions from mainland China, because Beijing did not dare to start a
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cross-strait war261.
Thus, the seemingly irrational provocations made by the pro-independence forces against
mainland China in political transformation was the result of power comparison between China and
Taiwan’s allies. More precisely, Taiwan’s political leaders believed Taiwan’s most fundamental
interest of maintaining its de facto independence was safeguarded, so it was reasonable for them to
try to realize an interest in a relatively high level, which was declaring Taiwan’s de jure
independence. It is noteworthy that Taipei’s failure in realizing such interest before 2008 actually
reveals that changes caused by political transformation in Taiwan’s state structure cannot meet the
pro-independence forces’ demand, and the authorities may have overestimated the relative power
of Taiwan’s allies. More detailed analysis about these two facts will be provided by Chapters IV, V,
VI and VII.
Conclusion
The relation between Taiwan’s political transformation and the fundamental change in the core
level of mainland policy is clear. The direct result caused by political transformation was the rise
of pro-independence forces. Within the context that there was less constraints from its political
opponents and increasing support from society, the DPP eventually became the ruling party and
started to use its own perception of relative power to guide the formulation of Taiwan’s mainland
policy. Even though the Chen Shui-bian administration did not realize Taiwan’s de jure
independence, the impact of political transformation on Taiwan’s mainland policy making was
maintained. One evidence is that the Ma Ying-jeou administration abandoned Chiang Kai-shek
and Chiang Ching-kuo’s pursuit of national reunification, only bringing back the KMT’s old
position of “One China, different interpretations”262. With the growing economic and cultural
exchanges across the Taiwan Strait between 2008 and 2016, the KMT authorities still had no
confidence or interest to touch sensitive political issues with Beijing, because such behavior would
make them face strong resistance from both oppositions and society. In other words, effects of
political transformation continued to reduce the possibility of a cross-strait political negotiation for
unification. But on the other hand, it is worth to note that political transformation which enhanced
the pro-independence forces through democratization and localization, did not enable the DPP to
realize its pursuit of Taiwan’s de jure independence. In realty, like the KMT, the pro-independence
forces are also constrained by the democratic political system. Although it has regained power in
2016, the DPP cannot let the core level of mainland policy to be seriously changed again if there is
not sufficient social support.
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Chapter III The Evolution of Policy Made by Mainland
China towards Taiwan
The Chinese Civil War between 1945 and 1949 ended with the defeat of the KMT and its retreat to
Taiwan. At first, the KMT refused to accept its political and military failure, formulating offensive
policies such as “recovering the mainland” (fan gong da lu) and attempting to regain its power in
the whole of China263. In the meantime, mainland China also made a tit-for-tat policy known as
“Must Liberate Taiwan” (yi ding yao jie fang Taiwan) to wipe out the enemy and achieve national
liberation, shelling Kinmen islands in 1954264. This goal of achieving national unification across
the Taiwan Strait was remained in all following Taiwan policies made by Beijing. But this
coercive military actions caused a strong response from both the US and Taiwan, which made
Beijing realize that its specific measures for realizing unification should be adjusted to adapt to the
changing political and security environment in the East Asia area.
Beijing’s Policy towards Taiwan During the Cold War
The First Taiwan Crisis and “Peaceful Liberation of Taiwan”
After the Korean War, the KMT authorities did not suspend its military assault in coastal area of
mainland China, but rather escalated its attacks in islands near China’s Guangdong and Fujian
province and even intercepted ships trading with the mainland. This was viewed by Beijing as a
serious threat against the security and economic interest of the PRC265. Within this context,
Chinese official newspaper the People Daily published an editorial on 23rd August 1954, stating
that “we must liberate Taiwan”, and the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) started shelling Kinmen
as a retaliation266.
In these circumstances, the US Joint Chiefs wished to take direct military actions including air
strike to help the KMT army to protect Kinmen and Matsu. But such a plan was not accepted by
then President Eisenhower, who refused to take the risk of dragging the US into another war with
China for a few small islands267. Precisely, he wanted to protect Taiwan’s security while avoiding
warfare with China. For that reason, Washington suggested the KMT army to give up all other
islands and retreat back to Taiwan and Penghu Islands, and declared that protecting Kinmen and
Matsu was not US permanent duty. The real aim of this advice was to gradually force Taipei to
abandon all of its coastal islands, so that the potential contact between Taiwan and the mainland
would be cut off and therefore the US could build “Two Chinas” in the international arena268.
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In the face of pressures from the US, Beijing adjusted its hardline policy toward Taiwan. While
insisting that Taiwan must be liberated, Chinese leaders stated for the first time that if the US army
was withdrawn from the area, Taiwan could be liberated peacefully269. This new stance soon
elicited a positive response from Washington, which also agreed to resolve then Taiwan Strait
Crisis through negotiations270. Within this context, the Chinese government officially stated this
policy of “peaceful liberation of Taiwan”. On May 13th 1955, when speaking on the standing
committee of the National People's Congress, then Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai noted that there
were also peaceful ways for liberating Taiwan, and “Chinese people are willing to liberate Taiwan
peacefully under certain conditions”271. Thus, the PLA stopped its attack, and the tension across
the strait was largely eased, indicating that China’s policy of “taking over Taiwan by force” was
finally replaced by a more pragmatic “peaceful liberation”.
This change in Beijing’s Taiwan policy was mainly based on the concern of avoiding direct
military conflict with the US. In the view of Chinese leaders, even though it was important to
achieve unification, China could not afford to suffer more damage when there had been already a
severer blow on Chinese economic construction caused by the Korean War. Apart from that,
Beijing also took into account of the KMT’s situation. Although the two sides were in
confrontation, it was clear that Beijing and Taipei both upheld the One China principle, which
made the US attempt for building “Two Chinas” in the international arena face strong opposition
from both sides across the strait. Therefore, under the premise of maintaining the One China
principle, it might be possible for the two sides to seek common ground and find peaceful solution
to the Taiwan Issue. Furthermore, if Beijing continued to impose more military pressures on
Taiwan, the Chiang Kai-shek authorities might relinquish its pursuit of recovering the mainland
and accept the US advice, forming “Two Chinas” in the international arena. In these circumstances,
the policy of peaceful liberation could be regarded as a positive response to then Taiwan
authorities’ adherence to the One China principle.
It should be noted that Beijing refused to completely give up military option for realizing
unification when adopting this “peaceful liberation” because of the hostility from the US and
Taiwan. More precisely, the US continued its intervention in the Taiwan Issue, blocking Chinese
pursuit of national unification, while Chiang Kai-shek maintained his slogan of recovering the
mainland, indicating that the two sides were still in military confrontation. In these circumstances,
Beijing believed it should promote peaceful liberation to work for the best, while keep military
option to prepare for the worst.
The Idea of “One Country, Two Systems”
In the late 1970s, a series of changes occurred in China's domestic and international environment,
providing Beijing new opportunities and challenges in resolving the Taiwan Issue. Domestically,
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after the end of the Cultural Revolution in 1976, the focus of the Chinese government shifted to
construction of the socialist modernization, especially the economic development, beginning the
process of reform and opening up272. In the international arena, since the restoration of China’s
lawful seat in the United Nations in 1972, a large number of countries have established diplomatic
ties with Beijing and acknowledged that the PRC is the sole legal government of China, creating a
relatively favorable international environment for Beijing to resolve the Taiwan Issue273.
Especially in 1979, the normalization of Sino-US relations was realized, and Taiwan was no
longer regarded as a sovereign state by the US government.
From the end of the Chinese Civil War to late 1970s, cross-strait tensions was gradually eased
when Beijing adjusted its Taiwan policy from liberating the island by force to achieving a peaceful
solution. From Chinese leaders’ perspective, this implied that changes in its Taiwan policy could
lead to changes in cross-strait situations. Therefore, Beijing became increasingly optimistic, and
decided to put the national unification on the agenda, putting forward the idea of “one country,
two systems”. In January 1979, the standing committee of the National People's Congress issued
“A Message to Compatriots in Taiwan”, formally declaring Beijing’s policies of resolving the
Taiwan Issue and realizing national unification274. This “message” emphasized that Chinese
government would consider and respect the reality of Taiwan and opinions of Taiwan’s people,
and also noted that based on the One China principle, the two sides should start official
negotiations to end the cross-strait military confrontation and create a safe environment. It is
noteworthy that this was the first time Beijing formally abandoned the expression of “liberation”
and declared it would respect Taiwan’s current situation in its official document, which should be
regarded as a significant change in Beijing’s Taiwan policy275.
In October 1979, when meeting with the president of Japanese Asahi News agency Watanabe
Seiki, Deng Xiaoping declared that Taiwan would not change its social system but rather
continued its current capitalist way of life after reunification, while its non-governmental
exchanges with foreign countries would also be remained as the same. In short, as a local
government, Taiwan would enjoy a high degree of autonomy, even including the right of keeping
its own army. The only premise was that Taiwan must admit that it was a part of China276. This
was the first time that Deng Xiaoping clarified his opinion about how to deal with Taiwan's
political and social system after unification. It was quite different from previous uncompromising
stance that insisted Taiwan’s capitalist system must be transformed into socialist system after
unification.
In September 1981, the chairman of the National People's Congress standing committee Ye
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Jianying proposed nine principles of cross-strait peaceful unification on behalf of the Chinese
government, stating that Taiwan would enjoy a high degree of autonomy as a special
administrative region, and could keep its army, current social and economic systems, while
Taiwan's people could participate in the country’s management277. Deng Xiaoping then
summarized these principles as “one country, two systems”. More precisely, within the PRC, the
mainland’s socialist system would coexist with capitalist system in Hong Kong and Taiwan for an
extended period, working together to make the country prosperous and strong. As a special
administrative region, Taiwan would enjoy a high degree of autonomy, such as administrative,
legislative, independent judicial power, as well as power to deal with some certain foreign affairs,
and the right to keep its own troops. Moreover, the mainland would not send troops or
administrative personnel to Taiwan, but officials from the government of the Taiwan special
administrative region could serve as the leader of the state administrative institutions.
From liberating Taiwan by force to “one country, two systems”, Beijing finally admitted the
reality that Taiwan was under the KMT’s control, and promised to respect such reality after
reunification by providing Taiwan a high degree of autonomy. In such a case, Deng Xiaoping
made it clear that bipartisan negotiation between the KMT and the CCP was not talks between the
central and a local government which would become “I eat you or you eat me”, but rather mutual
efforts of the KMT and the CCP to achieve national reunification. It is noteworthy that in these
statements, Beijing always refused to define Taiwan as a political entity, because it would lead to
the sensitive question of admitting the existence of the Republic of China. Precisely, admitting and
respecting the reality that the KMT was ruling Taiwan indicated that the KMT had an equal
position as the CCP in the process of national unification, but defining Taiwan as a political entity
actually implied that Taiwan had an equal position as the mainland, which could create “Two
Chinas” when people regarded the mainland as the PRC and then found they had to regard Taiwan
as the ROC. This explains why in the mid-1990s, when the KMT alone could no longer represent
Taiwan because of political transformation, Beijing used the expression of cross-strait negotiations
instead of bipartisan negotiations, but did not clearly define the identity of the two sides in this
negotiation. In fact, Beijing stated that Taipei was not a local government, implying the island
almost had an equal position as the mainland, while simultaneously refusing to admit the existence
of the ROC, avoiding to create “Two Chinas”. In such a case, talks between the ARATS and the
SEF was defined as semi-official negotiations.
Challenges facing Beijing’s Taiwan Policy in the 1990s: Pursuit of Unification,
Rise of Pro-Independence Force, and the US Intervention
The situation in the Taiwan Strait experienced a series of changes in the 1990s. The
pro-independence forces were rising with the process of Taiwan’s political transformation,
promoting separatist activities and therefore creating huge negative impact on the relations
between the mainland and Taiwan. Faced by this new challenge, while continuing its effort in
achieving national unification, Beijing had to adjust its policy, taking necessary measures to deal
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with the pro-independence problem.
The 1992 Consensus and the Development of Cross-Strait Relations
In the late 1980s, although allowing the residents to visit their relatives in the mainland, the
Taiwan authorities still maintained Chiang Ching-kuo’s “Three Noes Policy”, which made it very
difficult for Taipei to deal with all those problems appeared in the cross-strait contact278. For that
reason, the authorities proposed to build an unofficial channel to contact with its counterpart in the
mainland, dealing with those issues when Taipei still refused to make political contact with
Beijing. In such a case, the Straits Exchange Foundation (SEF) was established in November
1990279. The mainland's response was very positive, preparing to set up a corresponding
non-governmental organization. In December 1991, the Association for Relations Across the
Taiwan Strait (ARATS) was established in Beijing for promoting cross-strait exchanges and
discussing relevant issues with the SEF280.
In fact, the ARATS and the SEF did play a very important role in improving cross-strait relations.
In October 1992, there was a meeting between the two agencies in Hong Kong for discussing how
to solve the difference between the two sides on defining One China, which was the first face to
face encounter of both sides. In the meeting, the ARATS and SEF respectively put forward five
different versions of that definition. The emphasis of the ARATS was the One China principle
must be unquestioned, and “in the process of seeking national unity, both sides should adhere to
the principle of One China”, while the focus of the SEF was that the status of Taiwan in the
cross-strait relations should not be downgraded, and therefore the slogan that “the two sides
should foster a consensus of democracy, freedom and equal prosperity, and together build a
unified China” was mentioned in the SEF’s expression281. Consequently, none of these ten
versions was recognized by both sides.
This difference was rooted in the fact that neither Beijing nor Taipei gave the other side a equal
position. According to the mainland’s “one country, two systems”, the Taiwan authorities which
was not viewed as a local government in the negotiations, would be still a special administrative
region government controlled by the central government after the unification. Similarly, Taipei
stopped describing the mainland as “occupied area”, but still insisted on the legal status of the
Republic of China in the international community. Consequently, this difference led each side to
have its own emphasis in the interpretation of the One China principle. On November 10th, the
SEF gave a written statement to advise that One China principle could be expressed by each side
through oral way as long as it was accepted by both sides. The ARATS immediately replied that it
fully respected and accepted the idea of expressing the principle in oral way, and stated its position
as “two sides of the Taiwan Strait both adhere to the principle of One China, and seek to achieve
the national unification, but the cross-strait practical negotiations would not involve the political
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implications of One China”, which had no essential distinction from Taipei’s version282. Thus, the
two sides reached the 1992 consensus, which according to Taiwan could be described as “One
China, different interpretations”. More precisely, the mainland focused on “One China”, arguing
that all other issues could be discussed under this premise, while Taiwan gave more weight to
“different interpretations”, emphasizing it was not a part of the PRC. This 1992 consensus then
became the premise and foundation of all following cross-strait dialogues.
The Third Taiwan Strait Crisis
The 1992 consensus can be regarded as a great achievement made by Beijing for approaching
final unification. However, when facing increasing provocations from the pro-independence forces
in Taiwan, Beijing had to adjust its policies to a more coercive stance against those threats.
Since the late 1980s, the two sides have made great development in cross-strait economic and
cultural exchanges. There were growing numbers of people from Taiwan to visit their relatives in
the mainland, and the Taiwanese investment towards mainland China also increased, while at the
same time, the negotiation channel between the ARATS and the SEF for dealing with cross-strait
practical issues also made the relationship between two authorities more closely. However, this
rapid development of the cross-straits relations was not consistent with the US policy. In 1993, the
United States in Taiwan Association Chairman Bellocchi made a comment on the KMT mainland
policy, stating that the authorities’ behavior of largely promoting exchanges with the mainland was
too optimistic, showing a disapproving attitude of Washington towards the rapid development of
cross-strait relations283. Based on this attitude, there were a series of US policies that ignored the
concern and interests of the mainland, raising tensions in the area. One example was that the US
government approved Lee Teng-hui's visit to the US in May 1995. This decision largely
intensified then contradictions between the two sides, and even made the Sino-American relations
enter into the most difficult period since 1979284. From Beijing’s perspective, all these US policies
and behaviors supporting Taiwan’s pro-independence forces were doubtless interference in
China’s internal affairs. Therefore, Beijing decided to show Chinese determination to safeguard its
national sovereignty and territorial integrity by taking a tough stance towards the Taiwan
authorities.
In July 1995, the PLA fired six ground-to-ground missiles to the area 65 nautical miles north of
Peng Chiayu, which is an island under Taiwan’s control. On August 2nd, there was another round
of missile test in China, and on 15th and 25th, the PLA did artillery live-fire exercises285.
Subsequently, a PLA nuclear submarine was found off the coast of Taiwan, and led Taiwan to
enter into combat readiness286. In early September, Chinese Beijing, Shenyang, and Jinan Military
Region held joint military exercise in the central mountains of Shandong province, while
simultaneously, Nanjing and Guangzhou Military Region were renamed as Nanjing War Zone and
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Guangzhou War Zone, and also hold a large scale joint exercises in Zhejiang and Guangdong
coastal areas. In late November, the Nanjing War Zone held another exercises in the Dongshan
island in southern sea area of Fujian province, which could be regarded as a simulation of possible
warfare in Taiwan Strait.287. Then Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission Chi Haotian
stated that the PLA was ready to complete the holy mission endowed by the party and the people.
All these missiles firings and large scale military exercises with strong nationalistic rhetoric were
regarded as real military threats to Taiwan in the eyes of American politicians, and many of them
wrote letters to then President Clinton, urging him to express a strong statement against Beijing's
behavior288. Within this context, an US aircraft carrier combat group was sent to the so called
international waters near Taiwan on March 11th, to prevent the use of force and “any wrong
judgment”289. This was US largest military buildup in the western Pacific region since the end of
the Vietnam War. Subsequently, the US Senate passed a resolution, requiring the US government
to assess the US defense spending and services that would be necessary to provide Taiwan a full
self-defense ability. Beijing strongly protested this US intervention, maintaining the PLA’s
military exercises in the area. Fortunately, neither the US nor China made any further behavior
that could worsen the situation, reducing the possibility of the outbreak of a cross-strait warfare
between the two countries. In the end, the US withdrew its aircraft carrier combat group from the
sensitive sea area, while the mainland also discontinued its military exercises and missile firings
which were targeted at Taiwan290.
For Beijing, this serious change in its Taiwan policy from previous moderate stance indicated that
Chinese leaders realized the difficulty of resolving the Taiwan Issue and were no longer too
optimistic about achieving national reunification. Since then, Beijing adopted a relatively
pragmatic attitude, taking both the US and Taiwan’s pro-independence forces into account when
making its policy. In such a case, the following Taiwan policy began to give more weight to deal
with these challenges against China’s bottom line. But it is worth to note that this coercive policy
was not a complete failure. The strong response from the mainland led Washington understand it
must be careful when handling this sensitive issue rather than simply asserting that China had no
viable option for opposing the US expansive policy towards Taiwan, otherwise it would face the
worst case that US might be dragged into an all out war with China if it continued to support
Taipei’s separatist activities. In these circumstances, the United States reiterated its commitment to
those principles established by the Three Sino-US Joint Communiques, declaring it would
implement the “One China” policy. More precisely, the US government would not support
Taiwan’s independence, “Two Chinas” or “One China, One Taiwan”, or Taiwan’s participation in
the United Nations291. During Clinton’s visit to China in 1998, the two governments agreed to
further promote dialogue and cooperation on major international issues, and continue to work
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together to establish a constructive strategic partnership facing the 21st century292. In Shanghai,
Clinton publicly reiterated the US “three noes” policy again, which obviously ran counter to the
expectation of Taiwan’s pro-independence forces293.
The Focus of Beijing’s Policy toward Taiwan in the 21st Century: Opposing
Taiwan’s Pro-Independence Activities
Lee Teng-hui’s Statement of Special State to State Relationship
After the Taiwan Strait Crisis, the Taiwan authorities continued to gradually break the One China
principle by making policies that reinforced the pro-independence forces and spread the separatist
thoughts in Taiwan’s society.
On July 9th 1999, Lee relinquished his previous ambiguous expression and openly declared that
the relationship between Taiwan and mainland China should be regarded as “a state-to-state, at
least, a special state-to-state relationship”294. This statement fundamentally denied the One China
principle and also destroyed the basis of cross-strait dialogues, making Beijing believe that future
development of the cross-straits relations largely depended on its struggle with Taiwan’s
pro-independence forces. In such a case, in addition to promoting cross-strait economic and
cultural exchanges, Beijing's policy towards Taiwan paid more attention to the anti-independence
issues. However, it is noteworthy that Beijing did not take any dramatic military actions against
Taiwan like what it did during 1995 and 1996, but only launched a propaganda war criticizing
Lee’s statement. On July 10th, there was a strong criticism made by the spokesman for the Taiwan
Affairs Office in mainland China, who blamed that the Taiwan authorities had walked too far on
its way for splitting the country, and emphasized that China firmly opposed any effort of
promoting Taiwan’s independence or creating “Two Chinas”, warning Lee and pro-independence
forces to “pull back before it is too late”295. On July 18th, then Chinese President Jiang Zemin
made a phone call with then US President Clinton, noting that Lee's statement was a dangerous
step, and in order to prevent severe consequences from happening, all sorts of separatist activities
should be immediately stopped. Clinton gave a positive response in this phone call by reiterating
US commitment to the One China policy296. Simultaneously, the US media also criticized Lee’s
statement, describing him as a “trouble maker”, and stated that the United States must constrain
Taiwan’s dangerous provocation, otherwise the next generation of American would have to fight
for Taiwan297. This strong reaction from China and the reality that he might not receive sufficient
support from the US forced Lee to return to the KMT’s previous position of “One China, Different
Interpretations” up to the end of his presidency.
Doubtlessly, the mainland's reaction to Lee’s statement, which included propaganda war and good
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cooperation with the United States, worked effectively. This adjustment in Beijing’s policy from
tough military deterrence in previous crisis indicated that Chinese leaders realized the fact that
Taiwan’s pro-independence force’s radical behavior would damage interests of both China and the
US, and therefore started to use the US influence to deal with separatist activities.
Beijing’s White Paper about the Taiwan Issue
However, this temporary success in opposing Lee’s statement could not change the fact that the
pro-independence forces in Taiwan had been largely encouraged by such statement and therefore
raised the likelihood that the DPP candidate Chen Shui-bian would win the upcoming election. To
cope with this uncertainty, Beijing decided to take an unprecedented proactive actions to influence
Taiwan’s election. On February 21st 2000, the Taiwan Affair Office issued a white paper called
“the One China principle and the Taiwan Issue”, stating that there was still a serious crisis across
the strait, and the Chinese government would uphold its policy of “one country, two systems” and
continue to strive for the peaceful reunification. Meanwhile, the white paper also clearly provided
three conditions under which Chinese government would use force against Taiwan to safeguard
China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity: Taiwan was split from China in any name, Taiwan
suffered a foreign invasion, and the Taiwan authorities indefinitely refused to achieve reunification
through peaceful negotiations298. According to the last condition, even if the Taiwan authorities
did not explicitly declare its independence, Beijing might still use military actions as long as
unification was refused by Taipei.
This white paper actually revealed that Beijing was anxious about the dark future if the DPP
became Taiwan’s ruling party. In fact, some Chinese leaders even warned that the victory of the
DPP could spark off a cross-strait war, arguing that Taiwan’s people should carefully choose what
path to follow, “otherwise it would be too late for regret”299. But all these coercive policies
backfired when most people in Taiwan were angry about being intimidated in their election, and
such anger led to more support from Taiwan’s prominent academic and business people to the
DPP300. This implied that without using large scale military exercises or missile firings, Beijing’s
deterrent against Taiwan’s independence did not work effectively. This was partly due to the
political transformation which had made Taiwan’s society gradually accept pro-independence
stance and question the credibility of Beijing’s military threat. But it is also noteworthy that the
white paper’s emphasis of the One China principle was widely accepted by Taiwan's opposition
parties, such as the KMT, the People First Party (PFP), and the New Part after the 2000 election.
In such a case, Beijing could widen its policy options by cooperating with those opposition
political parties in Taiwan, and therefore create increasing pressures on the DPP authorities301.
Chen Shui-bian’s “One Country on Each Side” and China’s Anti-secession Law
Although Chen Shui-bian was more moderate than many people anticipated at the beginning of his
298 Taiwan Affairs Office. (2000). The One China Principle and the Taiwan Issue. Available:
http://english.gov.cn/official/2005-07/27/content_17613.htm. Last accessed 15th Oct 2013.
299 Gartzke E, Li Q. How globalization can reduce international conflict[J]. Globalization and armed
conflict, 2003: 123-40.
300 Hai Chao. (2000). Li Yuanzhe supports Chen Shui-bian. Tai Qing Yao Bao. 10 (1), 3-5.
301 Zhang Wanming and Liao Zhenyun. (2005). Achievements made by KMT and PFP's visit to
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presidency, Beijing still did not trust him and expected no progress made by his administration for
promoting cross-strait relations. When facing Chen's ambiguous statement such as “Four Noes and
One Without, Beijing chose a “wait and see” policy to observe and assess the words and deeds of
the Taiwan authorities.
Beijing's judgment was proved to be correct. On August 3rd 2002, in the World Federation of
Taiwanese Associations held in Tokyo, Chen Shui-bian openly declared that Taiwan was a
sovereign independent state, defining the cross-strait relations as “one country on each side”, and
advocated a referendum to decide Taiwan's future302. This “one country on each side” statement
suffered the same fate as Lee’s two state theory, arousing a strong criticism from the mainland
while receiving almost no support from the United States. In these circumstances, Taiwan’s
pro-independence forces turned to the social and cultural areas, promoting the de-Sinification to
cut off the culture ties between Taiwan and the mainland, which would change the identity of
Taiwanese people and establish an ideal social foundation for achieving Taiwan’s de jure
independence. Meanwhile, the Chen Shui-bian authorities also wished to create a new
Constitution to legalize Taiwan's independence through a referendum. Within this context, on May
9th 2004, then Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao stated that the Chinese government would consider the
suggestion from the overseas Chinese people about enacting a law for reunification303. This was
the first time that Chinese leaders publicly discussed the possibility of special legislation on the
Taiwan Issue. On March 8th 2005, the Vice Chairman of the National People's Congress’s standing
committee Wang Zhaoguo explained the draft of Anti-secession Law, stating that since Chen
Shui-bian took the office, the Taiwan authorities had increased all sorts of separatist activities,
especially the constitutional referendum, which should be regarded as a serious threat to China's
sovereignty and territorial integrity and a significant damage to the prospect of peaceful
reunification304. According to the Anti-secession Law, if Taiwan’s pro-independence forces cause
the fact that Taiwan is separated from China, or if there is any incident leading to such a fact, or
the possibility of peaceful reunification has completely disappeared, the Chinese government must
take the non-peaceful action and other necessary measures to safeguard Chinese sovereignty and
territorial integrity. This draft was then passed by the Third Session of the National People's
Congress.
This change in Beijing’s policy implied that the mainland tried to make its military threat more
credible by clearly defining its bottom line for separatist activities. Before the Anti-secession Law,
Beijing’s coercive policy was usually in a demonstrative manner, that is, when there was
provocation made by pro-independence forces, Beijing would respond by taking military exercises
or missiles firings to prevent Taiwan from moving to independence. This not only made Beijing in
a passive position, but also weakened the intensity of China’s military intimidation when Taiwan
found that no direct military attack was included in Beijing’s strong response. It thus reinforced
the pro-independence forces’ confidence that the mainland dare not start a cross-strait war, and
302 Kuo S H, Nakamura M. Translation or transformation? A case study of language and ideology in
the Taiwanese press[J]. Discourse & Society, 2005, 16(3): 393-417.
303 Zhu Qinsheng & Zhan Shanqin. (2010). Oversea s Chinese and Deliberation s, Legislation and
Promulgation of the Anti-secession Law. Contemporary China History Studies. 17 (6), 52-59.
304Keyuan ZOU. Governing the Taiwan Issue in accordance with law: An essay on China's
Anti-secession Law[J]. Chinese Journal of International Law, 2005, 4(2): 455-463.
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such confidence would inevitably lead to more separatist activities. In essence, peace and stability
was difficult to be maintained if the mainland cannot use a credible military threat to reduce the
likelihood of Taiwan’s declaration of its independence. Considering that Beijing has already
abandoned the old policy of “liberating Taiwan by force” and pursued a peaceful reunification, it
is almost impossible for the mainland to use direct military attack like what it did in the First and
Second Taiwan Strait Crisis unless Chinese leaders believe they have no other means to prevent
Taiwan from declaring its de jure independence. The Anti-secession Law resolved this problem by
clarifying Beijing’s bottom line and forcing the Chinese government to take non-peaceful actions
if that bottom line was overstepped, which made the following intimidation become much more
credible viewed by Taiwan.
Apart from the military intimidation, Beijing also adopted a peaceful offensive strategy in its
policy against the pro-independence forces. It was usually in the way of strengthening cross-strait
exchanges, particularly cooperating with Taiwan's political, economic, and cultural groups that did
not openly support Taiwan’s independence, to gradually eliminate negative impact caused by
de-Sinification on Taiwan’s society. Among all these groups in Taiwan, the major target Beijing
wished to contact and cooperate with was opposition parties, such as the KMT, the PFP, and New
Party in the pan-blue camp. On April 26th and May 5th 2005, the KMT chairman Lien Chan and
the PFP chairman James Soong visited the mainland respectively at the invitation of the General
Secretary of the CCP central committee Hu Jintao. On July 6th, the chairman of New Party Yok
Muming also led a group of his party members to visit the mainland305. In his talks with Hu Jintao,
Lien Chan clearly stated that the KMT was against Taiwan’s independence and against those
pro-independence words and deeds, such as constitutional referendum, de-Sinification or “one
country on each side”, and wished to improve meaningful communication with the mainland
under the framework of the 1992 consensus, in order to establish an environment for peaceful
development of cross-strait relations. Both the CCP and these opposition parties agreed to
strengthen mutual trust and seek peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait, and made it clear that
upholding the 1992 consensus and opposing Taiwan’s independence was their common position.
By working with these opposition parties, Beijing reduced the possibility that Chen Shui-bian
could get cooperation from the pan blue camp to stabilize Taiwan’s economic and political
situation. In fact, this contact between Beijing and the pan-blue parties did lead to significant
changes in Taiwan’s political situation. More precisely, those pan-blue parties reached broad
consensus with Beijing and largely eased the cross-strait tensions, which enabled the people in
Taiwan to reevaluate the radical pro-independence stance and gradually adopt a more pragmatic
attitude towards the cross-strait relations. Of course, working with the mainland also meant to
enhance the chance for these opposition parties to win next legislative and presidential elections.
In 2008, the KMT defeated the DPP, regaining the power in the presidential election, which could
be regarded as the most important achievement made by Beijing’s cooperation with the pan blue
camp.
Beijing’s policy of improving cross-strait exchanges after 2008
305 Li C. Two-level games, issue politicization and the disarray of Taiwan’s cross-strait policy after
the 2000 presidential election[J]. East Asia, 2005, 22(3): 41-62.
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After the election, then chairman of the KMT Wu Poh-hsiung led a delegation to visit the
mainland again, discussing with Beijing over the issue of restoring the cross-strait dialogues
between the ARATS and the SEF as soon as possible. Within this context, the ARATS sent a letter
to invite the SEF to Beijing in June 2008, and the SEF immediately accepted306. Subsequently, the
two sides gradually established mutual political trust, making the cross-strait relations more
peaceful and stable than it was in past two decades.
During this period, high-level officials from the two sides interacted frequently. Many senior pan
blue party members started to visits the mainland, while officials from the mainland's National
People’s Congress, Chinese People’s Political Consultative Committee and ministries, as well as
provincial and municipal leaders, also led delegations to visit Taiwan. They set up “Cross-Strait
Economic, Trade and Culture Forum” and many other communication platforms to greatly
promote political exchanges between the two sides. In particular, Xi Jinping and Ma Ying-jeou
met in Singapore in November 2015, which was the first meeting between top leaders of the two
sides and had great symbolic value to the future development of cross-strait relations. Most
Taiwanese people agreed that this meeting was conducive to the peace and stability in the area and
even hoped that the two sides could establish a stable meeting mechanism307. Meanwhile,
Cross-strait consultations was also gradually institutionalized. The ARATS and the SEF
conducted eleven meetings and signed twenty three agreements, while China’s Taiwan Affairs
Office and Taiwan’s Mainland Affairs Council also established a communication mechanism,
setting up a hot line. After the realization of the “Three Direct Links” (san tong), Taiwan has
gradually reduced restrictions on the mainland’s tourists, students and investment, and therefore
the non-governmental exchanges between the two sides were also greatly improved308.
However, it should be pointed out that although Beijing’s policies in this period largely promoted
the development of cross-strait relations, there was only one thing could be regarded as its real
significant achievement, which was the Taiwan authorities’ adherence to the One China principle
and their clearly support to the 1992 consensus. In essence, cross-strait dialogues between the
ARATS and the SEF, and non-governmental economic and cultural exchanges were blocked by
pro-independence forces in Lee Teng-hui and Chen Shui-bian’s period, and what Beijing did was
only restoring the cross-strait relations back to its previous state rather than making any crucial
breakthrough. One proof is that the Ma Ying-jeou administration did not actively improve the
construction of military mutual trust mechanism between the two sides. In 2013, when Beijing
clearly expressed it hoped to build a military mutual trust mechanism with Taipei, Ma Ying-jeou
insisted that two sides should focus on economic issues first, stating that the time for negotiating
cross-strait political and military issues had not come yet
309
. In such a case, Beijing still did not
realize its desire before the Third Taiwan Strait Crisis, that was improving cross-strait relations
from the phase of discussing practical issues to the phase of formal political negotiations. In other
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words, there was no progress made by Beijing in promoting Chinese national reunification.
Under such circumstances, once the political situation in Taiwan was changed, there would be
only economic and cultural exchanges suffered the blow before the One China principle,
indicating that Beijing's policy did not create enough “protection zone” for Taipei’s stance on
opposing independence and insisting the 1992 consensus. If the DPP authorities regain the support
of Taiwan’s society for independence and believe that the relative power of its allies is sufficient to
protect Taiwan’s security, the core of Taiwan's mainland policy is likely to be changed again. In
such a case, the history may repeat itself.
Conclusion
Compared with the Taiwan authorities’ mainland policy which was adjusted for several times in
the process of political transformation, the core of China's policy towards Taiwan, which is
adherence to the One China principle and pursuing national unification, has never been changed.
However, because of the complicated environment across the Taiwan Strait, Beijing’s specific
policy towards Taiwan did experience a series of adjustments in the past sixty years. From the
military option of “we must liberate Taiwan” to the slogan of “peaceful liberation” for breaking
the US plot of manufacturing “Two Chinas”, until finally proposing the “one country, two
systems” in the early 1980s to pursue peaceful reunification, Beijing’s Taiwan policy has become
more and more mature and flexible to adapt to the changing environment. After accepting the
existence of the United States in the Taiwan Issue while facing the rise of Taiwan’s
pro-independence forces and increasing separatist activities, Beijing began to shift the focus of its
policy from achieving unification to curbing Taiwan’s de jure independence by credible military
intimidation and effective cooperation with anti-independence political and economic groups in
Taiwan, hoping to create favorable foundation for future development of cross-strait relations
based on the One China principle.
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Chapter IV China’s Perception of Relative Power and Its
Pursuit of National Interests in the Taiwan Issue
Chinese first generation leaders, such as Mao, believed it was necessary to achieve national
unification for reviving the country, and the main strategy was liberating Taiwan by force.
However, due to the changing situation at home and abroad, especially the end of the Korean War,
Beijing began to replace its tough policy with the idea of peaceful liberation310. This was the first
time that the mainland’s policy was adjusted. It should be pointed out that China's policy toward
Taiwan during that period was only related to the way of achieving unification rather than
provided clear definition of cross-strait relations. However, the United States began to impose
pressures on Chiang Kai-shek, hoping that the Taiwan authorities would abandon Kinmen and
Matsu, and therefore the US could build “Two Chinas” in the international community. Within this
context, Beijing on one hand used shelling to support Chiang’s opposition against the US plan,
while on the other hand, clearly stated the “One China” principle in the “Message to the
compatriots in Taiwan”311. Since then, Beijing repeatedly emphasized this principle in the core
level of its Taiwan policy.
The “peaceful reunification, one country two systems” made by the second generation leaders
abandoned the expression of “liberation” and made the peaceful approach as the major way for
achieving unification. Meanwhile, “one country, two systems” also provided a specific model for
reunification which Beijing could put into practice and gather experience after the return of Hong
Kong and Macao. On this basis, further adjustments made by Chinese leaders, such as Jiang
Zemin’s “eight-point proposal” and Hu Jintao’s “four-point guideline”, were to interpret and
improve this model to deal with new challenges appeared in the cross-strait relations312. In a word,
the core level of Beijing’s policy, which is insisting the One China principle and achieving
national unification, has never been changed, while the second level, which is the basic model of
unification, has been adjusted many times to adapt to the changing situation. All these situations,
such as the US military intervention in the Taiwan Strait during the Korean War, Taipei’s
insistence for the One China principle during Chiang Kai-shek and Chiang Ching-kuo’s period, or
the Chinese government’s focus moving to economic construction after reform and opening up,
are usually regarded as direct causes of Beijing’s policy adjustment. But in fact, the policy
evolution is not determined by these accidental events, but Chinese leaders’ perceptions of China’s
relative power and interests they wish to achieve.
China’s Perception of Relative Power in Different Periods
From the late 1940s to the mid-1950s, Beijing’s Taiwan policy was very tough, including various
degrees of military strikes. After defeating the KMT authorities and forcing it to retreat to Taiwan,
the CCP successfully controlled the mainland. As the winner with an advantage in military
310 Chen Songyou. (2000). From Liberating Taiwan by Force to Peaceful Liberation: Evolution of
Mainland's Taiwan Policy in 1950s. Over the Party History. 7 (7), p46-48.
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strength, the hypothesis that the CCP had no ambition but would be satisfied with its control over
the mainland and allow its old enemy to occupy Taiwan was clearly unreasonable. Within this
context, Beijing started its military action to liberate Taiwan. In June 1949, Mao Zedong made a
phone call to the PLA general Su Yu, requiring him to pay attention to Taiwan’s situation and build
front line headquarters while making specific plans for liberating the island313. In order to liberate
Taiwan, all of its peripheral islands needed to be taken first, that was why the military actions
during this period covered the Zhoushan Islands, Hainan Island, and Kinmen Island. As a result,
all Chinese coastal islands except Kinmen were captured by the PLA. From Beijing’s perspective,
using military force to liberate Taiwan was actually to achieve the final victory of the Chinese
Civil War, which means the Taiwan Issue during this period only involved the CCP and the KMT.
In other words, Beijing’s policy was formulated based on the power comparison between the two
sides across the strait.
The Change of Relative Power Caused by the US Intervention
However, after the outbreak of the Korean War, the United States formally started to intervene in
the Taiwan Issue314. This change forced the mainland to reconsider which level’s interest should be
pursued in the making of its policy toward Taiwan, because now power comparison was between
China and the US rather than between two sides across the strait. Even though the confrontation
with the Chinese People’s Volunteer Army (Zhong Guo Ren Min Zhi Yuan Jun) led Washington
not to achieve its original objective in Korea, the United States still had the power that was far
stronger than that of the PRC. In this case, the US behavior of dispatching fleet into the Taiwan
Strait at the beginning of the Korean War made Beijing’s previous plan of taking over Taiwan by
force too difficult to be realized. Meanwhile, with the US support, the KMT authorities began to
launch a series of military assaults in the coastal area of the mainland, not only damaging the
mainland’s maritime trade with other countries, but also posing a serious threat to the homeland
security of the PRC315. Apart from that, Chiang Kai-shek repeatedly vowed that the KMT would
retake the mainland316. Although he denied the KMT would need military support from other
countries, the fact that Chiang only made this tough statement after signing the “Mutual Defense
Treaty between the USA and ROC” has made it clear that Taiwan’s policy shift was based on the
changing power comparison across the strait caused by the US hardline intervention.
After the Korean War, there were two policies adopted by the United States in the Taiwan Issue.
The first was maintaining a long term split between the mainland and Taiwan like what happened
in Germany after the World War II, so that the US could eventually create “Two Chinas” in the
international community317. The other was using the slogan of anticommunism to unite its allies in
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the Aisa-Pacific region, to establish an encirclement around the PRC318. For achieving these goals,
there were voices from the US Congress and the military suggesting the government to use US Air
Force to launch air strikes on the mainland, but Washington rejected this plan319. In contrast, US
government officials suggested to send US troops to assist the KMT authorities in defending
islands such as Kinmen and Matsu rather than started an all-out war with China320. This revealed
the real target pursued by the US was not using its own military strength to help Chiang to retake
the mainland, but to avoid Taiwan to be liberated by the CCP. Compared with launching war with
China, the cost of maintaining the split between the two sides was obviously much lower. This
implied that US might not have sufficient power to overthrow the CCP regime by military action,
and Beijing therefore had no need to worry about its own fundamental interest such as national
survival, even though it was unable to continue its previous policy of liberating Taiwan by force.
Within this context, Chinese leaders realized they should reduce military pressure on Taiwan in
order to block the US attempt of creating Two Chinas in the international community and
therefore safeguard the principle that the two sides across the strait belonged to One China. For
that reason, Beijing’s Taiwan policy shifted to a moderate stance, highlighting the peaceful
approach for liberating Taiwan, which can be regarded as a positive response to Taipei’s adherence
to the One China principle. In fact, without fierce attack from the mainland, the Chiang Kai-shek
authorities would have sufficient reason to refuse the US advice about abandoning Kinmen and
Matsu321. But it was also important to notice that, while adjusting its policy, Beijing did not
completely abandon the possibility of using force to achieve unification, because the Taiwan Issue
involved Chinese fundamental interests.
The Rise of Beijing’s Perceived Relative Power and the “One Country, Two Systems” Policy
The fall of relative power prompted Beijing’s Taiwan policy to transform from the hardline
position of taking over Taiwan by force to a moderate “peaceful liberation”. However, the
seemingly more moderate “one country, two systems” policy should be regarded as the result that
the mainland’s perceived relative power was rising. In the late 1970s, the political ferment came to
an end and the Chinese government started the reform and opening up process, focusing on its
own economic construction. Meanwhile, the restoration of its legitimate seat in the United Nations
and establishing formal diplomatic relations with a growing number of countries also largely
improved China’s external environment322. All these changes implied that the country’s national
power was rising.
One example was the historic event of establishing the Sino-US diplomatic relations. Since
Brezhnev came to power in mid 1960s, the Soviet Union’s increasingly tough foreign policy and
behavior had made both the US and China feel threatened. Then US President Nixon once
admitted that the main reason to improve relations with China in the late 1960s was US worried
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about the Soviet Union’s threat to security of China and other Asian countries323. In the 1970s, the
development of Sino-US relations was directly affected by the US stance toward the Soviet Union.
When tensions between the two Superpowers was eased, the US attitude toward China would
become relatively tough, showing less ambition in establishing formal diplomatic relations with
China. But when US-Soviet relations deteriorated, which was the major feature of such relations
in late 1970s, the United States would give increasing weight to its relations with China324. In
these circumstances, when the Soviet expansion in the Third World eventually aroused strong
dissatisfaction from the US, making Washington believe the detente between the US and the
Soviet Union actually prompted the latter’s expansion, the US finally made its decision to largely
promote the process of Sino-US diplomatic normalization325.
During his visit to China in 1978, Brzezinski expressed clearly to Deng Xiaoping that the US
would abide the Shanghai Communique signed by the two countries in the Nixon’s era,
highlighting that US would insist the principle that there is only one China in the world and stating
that the Taiwan Issue is China's own affair326. To confront the Soviet expansionism, the United
States preferred to strengthen its relations with China by making concessions on the Taiwan Issue,
such as breaking diplomatic relation with Taipei, abolishing the Mutual Defense Treaty,
withdrawing US troops from Taiwan, defining US-Taiwan relations as unofficial relations, and
recognizing the PRC as the sole legitimate government of China while regarding Taiwan as a part
of China. All of these indicated that Chinese relative power in the Taiwan Issue was rising, and
Beijing could pursue interest at higher level when formulating its policy toward Taiwan. Of course,
no one will deny that during that period, Beijing had the pursuit of promoting economic
development and therefore needed to maintain a peaceful and stable international environment.
This was why then Chinese government adjusted its unification model from previous peaceful
liberation to “one country, two systems”,
Within this context, Chinese leaders made the policy of “one country, two systems”, wishing this
model would receive positive response from Taipei in formal political negotiations. More precisely,
the policy of peaceful liberation adopted by Beijing after the Korean War was more or less a
concession in order to oppose US attempt for building “Two Chinas” in the international
community, trying to safeguard Chinese fundamental interest such as sovereignty and territorial
integrity. By contrast, “one country, two systems” was more detailed as a unification model,
indicating that China had a strong confidence during that period for realizing the target of national
unification related to high level interests, although for achieving that target, Beijing also had to
make compromise with the reality perceived by itself, allowing Taipei to enjoy a high degree of
autonomy after reunification. But compared with realizing national unification, this small cost can
be accepted by then Chinese leadership.
The Third Taiwan Strait Crisis and Adjustment of Beijing’s Perceived Relative Power
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When facing dramatic changes in the international environment in the early 1990s, such as the
political transformation in Taiwan and the end of the Cold War, Beijing still maintained its
optimistic perception of relative power, accelerating its contact with Taiwan and expecting to
begin formal political negotiations for national unification. One of the most significant
achievement made by these cross-strait contacts is the 1992 consensus, which was reached by the
ARATS and the SEF when discussing the definition of One China327.
The importance of the 1992 consensus was beyond any doubt because it clearly stated that two
sides both insisted the One China principle and therefore became the foundation of all following
cross-strait dialogues. However, after making this progress, the cross-strait relations soon suffered
a series of setbacks. As described in previous chapters, Taiwan’s pro-independence forces were
growing stronger in democratization and localization during this period, gradually controlling the
political and social resources in Taiwan. Their perception of power comparison between the US
and mainland China determined Taipei’s mainland policy would not be consistent with Beijing’s
pursuit of unification. Meanwhile, the collapse of the Soviet Union also made China and the US
lose their common threat, indicating that the most significant factor which promoted their bilateral
cooperation did not exist any more. In such a case, the trend that US made compromise with
China on the Taiwan Issue in order to promote Sino-US relations began to be reversed.
In essence, all three actors’ perception of reality were inaccurate. Mainland China maintained its
optimistic perception of relative power, while the pro-independence forces in Taiwan began to
express discontent to the core level of Taiwan’s mainland policy, and the US recognized China as
a new target instead of the Soviet Union that US should curb by formulating hardline policies328. It
was not surprising that serious crisis could happen under such situation. In the cross-strait
dialogues between the ARATS and the SEF, mainland China wished the two sides to start the
formal political negotiations for unification329. But the closer relationship with the US made the
Taiwan authorities dare to abandon the One China principle. What made the situation worse was,
in the face of the growing tensions across the strait, the US government still approved Lee
Teng-hui’s visit to the US because the Clinton administration believed that mainland China lacked
sufficient power to challenge the US and therefore was unlikely to make a too fierce response330.
These perceptions made each actor overestimate its own relative power, and therefore prompted
them to pursue targets related to the interest at too high level, which finally led to the outbreak of
the Taiwan Strait Crisis in 1995.
This crisis forced three actors to reexamine their perceptions of relative power and behave in a
more pragmatic way, increasing prudence and rationality in their policy making process. In such a
case, peace and stability across the strait was promoted. For China, this more accurate perception
of relative power prompted Beijing to transfer the focus of its Taiwan policy from starting political
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negotiations and realizing national unification to a more pragmatic and urgent target of containing
the pro-independence forces and their separatist activities. This pragmatism can be found in
Beijing’s coping strategy for provocation made by pro-independence forces after the crisis, such as
Lee Teng-hui’s two state theory and Chen Shui-bian’s “one country on each side”. Facing these
two provocations, Beijing did not use the similar show of force during 1995 and 1996, but sent a
clear message to the US government and the Taiwan authorities, stating that mainland China
would never tolerate the pro-independence forces to split the country331. For the US, its previous
conviction that China lacked sufficient power to oppose US expansive policy toward Taiwan also
evolved into a more sober realization which better defined the US own interests involved in the
Taiwan Issue. In a word, Washington learned that although obstructing cross-strait unification was
a significant target, involving an all-out warfare with China for supporting Taiwan’s de jure
independence was definitely not consistent with the US interest332. This actually indicated that
China’s relative power was not enough to realize its target of national unification, but was
sufficient to safeguard fundamental interest by containing Taiwan’s de jure independence. That
explained why Beijing’s stance of opposing Taiwan’s pro-independence movements received a
positive response from Washington, which declared that the US government understood the
sensitivity of the Taiwan Issue and would adhere to its policy of One China, opposing Taiwan’s de
jure independence333. For Taiwan, the US reiteration of its One China policy was a heavy blow to
the pro-independence forces, making them realize they might have overestimated the power of
Taiwan’s allies. Meanwhile, the mainland’s “Anti-secession Law” also clearly defined Beijing’s
bottom line, forcing the pro-independence forces to pursue Taiwan’s creeping independence
instead of immediate independence334.
The Third Taiwan Strait Crisis has made the three actors become more rational and pragmatic in
perceiving relative power and formulating policy, but it is still very difficult to maintain peace and
stability in the area because conflict across the strait is rooted in different interests pursued by
each actor. In such a case, to understand China’s position and its potential reaction to other actors,
it is necessary to analyze its interests involved in the Taiwan Issue.
Chinese High Level and Fundamental Interests Involved in the Taiwan Issue
National Unification and Chinese High Level Interests
In the 21st century, as a regional great power whose comprehensive strength is still rising,
mainland China wishes to obtain greater political influence and military superiority, making itself
become a maritime power. The 18th CCP National Congress in 2012 proposed a new national
strategy which clearly stated that China should raise its ability to exploit marine resources,
safeguard its maritime rights, and promote the country to become a maritime power335. This
strategy is targeted at the fact that mainland China has an 18000-kilometer coastline but its naval
331 China Daily (overseas edition), 19th July, 2003.
332 Wu Xinbo. (2011). Response and Adjustment : Taiwan Strait Crisis of 1996 and US Policy
Concerning Taiwan. American Studies. 1 (1), p51-53.
333 China Daily, 26th October, 2002.
334 Yu Xiandeng. (2007). Solution of Taiwan Issue and International Law Basis of 'Anti-secession
Law'. Journal of Shantou University (Humanities & Social Sciences Edition) . 23 (5), p58-63.
335 Jintao H. Firmly march on the path of socialism with Chinese characteristics and strive to
complete the building of a moderately prosperous society in all respects[C]//A collection of
documents of the 18th CPC national congress. 2012.
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power is still relatively weak compared with its economic strength and political influence.
In the early days, the Chinese government’s limited financial input was mainly used to strengthen
the Chinese Air Force due to the demands of the Korean War, while the Navy was able to take
operations only in the offshore area336. In the 1980s, when Chinese government stabilized the
domestic political environment and promoted the nation’s economic construction, Chinese
admirals defined the country’s naval strategy as “offshore defense” in accordance with Deng
Xiaoping's advice337. Fighting in the offshore area meant to defend islands and the coastline from
an enemy’s aggression, which in essence was a homeland defense strategy, while this “offshore
defense” expanded the naval defensive scope to the sea area near the First Island Chain, including
the Yellow Sea, East China Sea, and South China Sea area. But Chinese naval power during this
period was still very weak, because in the face of three island chains controlled by the United
States, Beijing was even unable to break through the nearest one. However, when China’s
comprehensive strength was largely enhanced through the policy of reform and opening up,
Beijing started to expand the area of its naval operation from the offshore zone to the ocean, which
actually required China to break through the First Island Chain including the Japanese archipelago,
the Ryukyu Islands, Taiwan, the Philippines, Malaysia and Singapore. In July 2013, the Chinese
Navy passed through the straits near Japan, entering into the Western Pacific for training purpose,
which were interpreted as an effort to break the blockade of the island chain338.
In such a case, it is noteworthy that Taiwan is integral to China’s strategy of expanding its
maritime power from the offshore area to the ocean, because to a large extent it can determine
whether the Chinese Navy can successfully enter into the Pacific and Indian Ocean. Precisely,
Taiwan is located in the middle of the First Island Chain. North of it are the East China Sea, the
Yellow Sea, and the Bohai Sea, while the Second Island Chain lies 1,000 sea miles east of it.
Considering the fact that mainland China is only connected with the Pacific Ocean, and it is
blockaded by the US allies in its offshore area, Taiwan can be regarded as the only viable option
for mainland China to enter into the Pacific Ocean. In these circumstances, if Taiwan is controlled
by hostile forces, it can be used to prevent China from concentrating its navy in a potential
military conflict in the sea area339. But if Chinese unification is realized, Taiwan can be used as a
military base for China to break through the First Island Chain. After reunification, China can
effectively control those strategic channels in the East China Sea and South China Sea, and
therefore break through the First Island Chain and even impose its influence on those important
channels in sea area near the Second Island Chain. This will enable China to launch a deterrent
against Japan, provide efficient protection to the Nansha Islands on which China claims
sovereignty, and ensure the security of its maritime transportation in the Straits of Malacca. In
other words, unification is the fundamental premise for China’s strategy of expanding its maritime
336 Xu Q. Maritime geostrategy and the development of the Chinese navy in the early twenty-first
century[J]. Naval War College Review, 2006, 59(4): 46.
337 Liu Zhongming and Sang Hong. (2007). Positive Offshore Defense of PRC. Ocean World . 2 (2),
p40-44.
338 Chinese Navy. (2013). China-Russia Joint Military Exercise. Available:
http://navy.81.cn/zelhjsyx.htm. Last accessed 20th Aug 2015.
339 James R. Holmes and Toshi Yoshihara，Chinese Naval Strategy in the 21st Century: The Turn to
Mahan，Routledge，2009，p． 54．
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power340.
In addition, achieving reunification with Taiwan can also generate profound influence on China's
current economic modernization. Compared with its large land area, China’s coastline is relatively
short, and most islands controlled by the Chinese government without dispute are not far from the
mainland coastline, indicating that the Chinese Exclusive Economic Zone is very small. Among
the Chinese surrounding sea areas, the Bohai Sea is almost an inland sea, while the Yellow Sea is
shared with North and South Korea, and the East China Sea, although rich in resources, is located
between mainland China and the southern islands of Japan, which has caused serious disputes
over how to identify the Exclusive Economic Zone for each country. The bigger dispute lies in the
South China Sea, where mainland China has claimed sovereignty over all the islands, reefs, and
shallows in the sea area of the Xisha and Nansha Islands, but a similar claim is made by Vietnam,
while the Philippines and Malaysia also claim sovereignty over parts of the Nansha Islands341. The
main reason behind this complex situation is the rich natural resources in this region342. It is
estimated that in the sea area near the Zengmu Reef, there are almost 20 billion tons of oil reserves,
and approximately 20 trillion cubic meters of natural gas reserves. Meanwhile, the sedimentary
basins located within China's traditional boundaries have oil reserve of over 45 billion tons, and
more than 8 trillion cubic meters of natural gas343. Furthermore, the South China Sea is also rich in
mineral resources: for example, it is the world's most densely populated area of undersea
manganese nodules, and also has important minerals such as copper and tin. Moreover, the high
temperature in the South China Sea leads the plankton to breed rapidly in the region, making the
area very important for marine fisheries344.
With huge oil and gas reserves, and rich mineral and fish resources, there is no doubt that the
South China Sea has great significance for China's future resource demand in its economic
development. However, rich resources also made Chinese neighboring countries to be reluctant to
relinquish their own territorial claims. For example, from 1981 to 2002, Vietnam exploited 100
million tons of oil and more than 1.5 billion cubic meters of natural gas from the Nansha Islands,
gaining USD 25 billion and making the oil in the South China Sea become the largest pillar
industry of the Vietnamese national economy345. From Beijing’s perspective, such behavior clearly
constituted a serious obstacle to China's future economic development and therefore significantly
threatened China's rise. China may be rich in natural resources, but from the perspective of per
capita resources, it still can be regarded as a resource-poor country. More importantly, with the
rapid growth of Chinese economy, the consumption of resources is also rising quickly. In such a
case, a stable supply of resources is the necessary premise for maintaining Chinese rapid
340 Liu Hong. (2003). A Geopolitical Interpretation of Taiwan Issue. Journal of Yangzhou College of
Education . 21 (4), p47-51.
341 Zhu Feng. (2014). Behind Sovereign Disputes in South China Sea. China Today. 3 (3), p14-15.
342 Li Pengyuan and Tang Jinrong. (2014). Security of Mineral Resources in South China Sea
Disputes. National Land & Resources. 8 (8), p22-23.
343 Chen Jie, Wen Ning and Li Xuejie. (2007). Potential and Current Exploration of Oil and Gas in
South China Sea. Progress in Geophysics. 39 (4), p1285-1294.
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Management and Future Directions for Coastal Fisheries in Asian Countries, 2003: 51-62.
345 Chen Jie, Wen Ning and Li Xuejie. (2007). Potential and Current Exploration of Oil and Gas in
South China Sea. Progress in Geophysics. 39 (4), p1285-1294.
83
economic growth in the future346. This makes the Taiwan Issue have a special meaning for
mainland China’s economic development when China needs to establish its own offshore base to
secure the Nansha Islands in order to protect its interest in the Exclusive Economic Zone. If
national unification is achieved, Taiwan, according to its geographic position, is able to play this
important role with Hainan Island to enable China to efficiently control the relevant sea area. As a
few Chinese scholars have argued, without the return of Taiwan, the Nansha Islands cannot be
protected, and Chinese economic interests will be seriously damaged347.
By now, China has taken no military actions to force its neighbors to give up their control of those
islands in territorial dispute with China, or has damaged the security of the so called international
navigation. This again proves that Beijing’s coercive stance in the Taiwan Issue is not the case
here in the South or East China Sea, because unlike those separatist movements which involve
fundamental interests, territorial disputes are only related to high level interests. This is why
Beijing can formulate relatively moderate policy, promoting cooperation and trying to reach
compromise with its Asian neighbors without worrying such behavior will elicit domestic social
discontent. In fact, it can be argued that what Beijing tries to do is reducing its own vulnerability
in order to respond to the uncertainty of regional security situation rather than using its military
build up to establish an influential scope for seeking a great power status in regional affairs. In
such a case, compared with using military strength to threaten its neighboring governments, which
may lead Southeast Asian countries to strengthen their cooperation against China’s rise and
require more security from the US, cooperating with Taipei to defend One China’s sovereign claim
over those islands may be a more realistic option for Beijing.
Although the targets such as reunification or effectively protecting resources in the South China
Sea seems unlikely to be realized in the foreseeable future, Beijing’s passive position in territorial
dispute with neighboring governments will be largely improved if further development of
cross-strait relations leads to deeper cooperation between Beijing and Taipei in the South China
Sea issue. During the period of Chiang Kai-shek and Chiang Ching-kuo, the Taiwan authorities
clearly claimed sovereignty over the Nansha Islands, insisting the One China principle in any
territorial disputes involved the South China Sea. They not only made an official statement that
firmly opposed Vietnam’s sovereignty claim over the Xisha Islands, but also allowed the
mainland’s warships to pass through the Taiwan Strait in the 1970s when there was a military
conflict between mainland China and Vietnam in the Xisha Islands348. However, this kind of
cross-strait cooperation in opposing foreign country’s sovereignty claims in the South China Sea
rapidly decayed when the pro-independence forces grew stronger in Taiwan’s political
transformation. After 1995, the Taiwan authorities gradually abandoned its previous sovereignty
claim over the islands in the South China Sea, seldom protesting against Southeast Asian
countries’ occupation of these islands, and even withdrawing its troops from the Dongsha and
Nansha Islands in exchange for these countries’ support for Taiwan’s independence349. But after
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the KMT regained power in 2008, Taipei reiterated its sovereignty claim over islands in the South
China Sea and seriously protested against the behavior of Vietnam and the Philippines in this
area350.
At present, mainland China has established offices in the Nansha, Zhongsha, and Xisha Islands,
and has garrisoned on a few of these islands, while Taiwan exercises sovereignty over the
Dongsha and Zhongsha Islands, and has also garrisoned on the largest island of the Nansha
Islands.
Within this context, if Beijing and Taipei can cooperate more effectively based on the One China
principle, jointly safeguarding One China’s interests in the South China Sea, Beijing will be in an
advantage position in its disputes with neighboring countries, and China’s future resource demand
will be better secured.
Containing Taiwan’s de jure Independence and the Fundamental Interests of Mainland China
Compared with the future maritime power strategy and resource demand in the economic rise
which motivates Beijing to achieve cross-strait reunification, preventing Taiwan from moving
toward independence is a target more urgent and crucial to the Chinese leadership, because it is
related to state sovereignty and territorial integrity, which are obviously fundamental interests of
the country.
In the post-Cold War era, national independence movements became confused with ethnic
separatist movements, which made issues related to sovereignty and territorial integrity faced by
China become more complex. More precisely, the boundary between these two movements was
blurring, allowing the pro-independence forces to use national self-determination as an excuse to
promote Taiwan’s de jure independence.
No one could deny that most national independence movements in the end of the World War II
were struggles against the colonial rules constructed before the war351. A colony is a country that
has lost its independence in political and economic areas, and therefore suffered domination and
oppression from other countries352. It is noteworthy that this is often the result that an independent
country was invaded and occupied by another country, which explains why the rise of national
independence movements in Asia, Africa, and South America after the victory of the anti-fascist
war were regarded as justicial movements and widely supported by the international community353.
However, before the end of the Cold War, the situation was changed. There were a series of
movements under the banner of national independence appearing in many independent countries.
Many of them were ethnic conflicts inside multi-ethnic countries, leading minorities to pursue
separating from their original homeland and establishing a new sovereign country constituted
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mainly by minorities themselves. Unlike the colony, these minorities were usually not independent
sovereign states, and they were closely linked to the country from which they wished to separate
in terms of geography, history, culture, and even language. These differences to a large extent
distinguish this kind of movements from national independence against colonial rule, implying
their justice is controversial354. But the separatists and their external supporters were likely to
confuse their behavior with national independence in the propaganda, implying that movements
for overthrowing the colonial rule were equated with movements for splitting a sovereign country.
Consequently, the behavior of maintaining sovereignty and territorial integrity, the pursuit of
achieving national independence from colonial rule, and the separatist activities seeking to split a
country, may all be viewed as justicial actions in the international community and receive support
from foreign countries or organizations.
A recent example is Crimea. Although the referendum was held by an autonomous republic and its
slogan was joining Russia rather than its own independence, the whole event still can be regarded
as an ethnic separatist movement in which a group of people with the same background (77% of
the residents in Crimea use Russian as their native language) inside an independent sovereign
country wished to separate from that country through collective actions355. That explains why
China adopted a prudent attitude toward the referendum in Crimea, abstaining from voting for
relevant resolutions in the United Nations Security Council356. Considering the Taiwan Issue, the
Chinese leaders would only support the anti-colonial movements for national independence, but
definitely oppose any separatist movements in an independent multi-ethnic country. As a few
Chinese scholars argued, without the consent of Ukraine, a referendum held by residents in one
part of the country in pursuit of national self-determination has doubtlessly damaged the country’s
sovereignty, territorial integrity, and national unity357. Obviously, Beijing will never allow such an
incident to happen in Taiwan.
The smell of gunpowder across the Taiwan Strait is not as much as that in Crimea when the latter
clearly demonstrated serious confrontation between Russia and the west. But this is perhaps due to
the fact that major actors in the Taiwan Issue have preferred to carefully reexamine their perceived
relative power after the Third Taiwan Strait Crisis, temporarily reaching an agreement on
maintaining peace and stability across the strait. As long as Taiwan’s pro-independence forces
refused to abandon their separatist ambitions, it is hard to be optimistic about how long this
temporary stability can be maintained. In reality, there are no essential differences between
Taiwan’s pro-independence forces and the other post-Cold War ethnic separatist movements under
the banner of national independence. The basic model is first proposing the theory of popular
sovereignty, emphasizing that a region’s sovereignty belongs to people in that region and only the
government elected by these people can exercise this sovereignty. Subsequently, by arguing that
both sides across the strait have failed to exercise sovereignty over the whole of China, the
definition of “the region” is reduced from the whole of China to Taiwan. And finally, there is the
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conclusion that Taiwan's sovereignty should be decided by Taiwanese people, denying Beijing’s
sovereignty claim over Taiwan and planning to achieve Taiwan’s de jure independence through a
referendum358. It is worth to note when the boundary between ethnic separatist movements and
national independence movements became increasingly ambiguous, support for the pursuit of
Taiwan’s pro-independence forces gradually rises in the international community, which has
further raised the urgency for mainland China to safeguard its fundamental interest of state
sovereignty and national unity.
Moreover, it should be pointed out that if Taiwan’s de jure independence is achieved, the damage
on China’s fundamental interest will not be limited in Beijing’s sovereignty claim over Taiwan,
because other separatist forces in China such as the Tibetan separatists and the East Turkistan
separatists, will be encouraged by Taiwan’s example and are bound to take more audacious
activities. This will largely exacerbate the centrifugal tendencies of many Chinese ethnic
minorities and therefore seriously undermine social stability in the country359. Consequently, the
national interests pursued by mainland China will no longer be promoting economic construction
or obtaining great power status through maritime strategy, but rather fundamental interests such as
preserving the unity of its current territory.
In extreme cases, the Taiwan Issue can influence the most fundamental interest of China. In the
area within 600 kilometers radius around Taiwan, there are approximately one fifth of China’s
total population as well as a large number of Chinese industrial bases, agricultural bases, and
coastal economic development zones. In such a case, Taiwan is able to attack the most developed
areas of mainland China, which indicates that if a war breaks out across the strait, the security
threat faced by Beijing will be even severer than what it encountered in its past military conflicts
with neighboring countries in the 20th century360. Although the KMT’s old policy of “recovering
the mainland” has been completely abandoned, the military threat that Taiwan is able to impose on
the mainland is real and should not be ignored. In 2002, when the pro-independence forces was
becoming increasingly confident, Chen Shui-bian once ordered Taiwan’s Air Force to simulate air
strikes against the Three Gorges Dam (San Xia Da Ba) in the mainland, and the 2004 “Annual
Report to Congress: Military Power of the People's Republic of China” issued by the US
Department of Defense also noted that Taiwan could deter the mainland from taking military
actions against Taiwan’s security by attacking the Three Gorges Dam and other densely populated
areas in China361. When the two sides remain a stable cross-strait relations, it is very unlikely that
the Taiwan military force will launch direct attacks at the mainland’s civilian facilities. However,
taking into account of Taiwan’s geographical location and its military ties with the United States,
if there is growing military tensions across the strait, Taipei’s ability of posing a serious threat to
the most fundamental interest of mainland China can be utilized to force Beijing to make
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concession.
Beijing’s Major Targets in the Taiwan Issue determined by Its Interests Pursuit
According to above analysis, China’s interests involved in the Taiwan Issue have become very
clear. There are high level interests such as maintaining continuous economic growth and
increasing external influence by becoming a maritime power, and also fundamental interests
including sovereignty, territorial integrity, and even homeland security. In these circumstances, the
range of Beijing’s policy evolution is between two major target: containing Taiwan’s
pro-independence forces to safeguard China’s fundamental interests and pursuing national
unification to realize high level interests. Under current situation, Beijing gives more weight to the
first target.
The policy of containing the pro-independence forces can be divided into two parts. First, there is
hardline deterrence represented by the “Anti-secession Law”, which clearly states that China must
use non-peaceful approaches and any other necessary measures to defend its sovereignty and
territorial integrity if the pro-independence forces split Taiwan from China or the possibility of
achieving peaceful unification has completely disappeared362. This coercive strategy not only
creates a direct blow to the increasing separatist activities in Taiwan, but also prompts other actors
in the Taiwan Issue to avoid overstepping Beijing’s bottom line, because it makes China’s threat of
using force more credible and therefore reduces the likelihood that Taipei will receive sufficient
support from society and its allies to declare its independence363.
But the deterrence is not Beijing’s only option for opposing Taiwan’s independence. Although
credible military threat can prevent pro-independence forces from promoting Taiwan’s de jure
independence, it has little effect on the core level of Taiwan’s mainland policy. In these
circumstances, another significant part of Beijing’s policy is to reduce the influence of
pro-independence forces by promoting cross-strait relations in economic and cultural areas. Since
China proposed the idea of Three Links in 1997, there has been a rapid development in cross-strait
economic exchanges. The trade volume between the two sides was only USD 77 million in 1979,
but the number exceeded USD 129 billion by 2008364. Meanwhile, the amount of Taiwan’s
investment in mainland China is also rising. According to Chinese Commerce Department, the
mainland has approved 75,146 Taiwanese investment programs by the end of 2007, amounting to
USD 45.76 billion and making Taiwanese investment account for about 6% of the cumulative total
foreign investment received by the mainland365. Apart from that, mainland China has become
Taiwan's largest export market since 2007, while Taiwan also became the mainland's fifth largest
trading partner366. This growing economic exchanges gradually improve mutual trust between the
two sides, reducing political transformation’s impact on Taiwan’s society. Unlike political
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dialogues, economic exchanges are usually not viewed as official behavior and therefore provoke
less resistance from Taiwan’s society. This explains why the economic ties between the two sides
cannot be completely blocked even during the DPP’s period when Taipei changed the core level of
its mainland policy. In fact, benefit brought by economic exchanges increased Taiwanese people’s
resistance against the DPP’s policies, which finally became strong support for the pan blue camp’s
position and led the KMT to regain power in 2008367. According to the polling result offered by
Taiwan's “China Times” in December 2010, 67 percent of Taiwan’s total population believed that
“cross-strait relations has been improved”, while another survey commissioned by Taiwan's
“Global Views Monthly” magazine showed that more than 53 percent agreed that the DPP needed
to adjust its cross-strait policy368. This means Taiwan’s society still preferred to maintain good
relations with the mainland rather than completely cut off its ties with China as the DPP wished in
de-Sinification process.
However, it is noteworthy that military deterrence and cross-strait exchanges, which did prevent
Taiwan from moving toward immediate independence, cannot help Beijing to achieve national
unification. In fact, there has been no particular resolution for achieving unification pushed by
Beijing’s policy since the Third Taiwan Strait Crisis. What Chinese leadership now focus on is
how to deal with potential provocation made by pro-independence forces rather than start political
negotiations with the Taiwan authorities for reunification. Although it seems that Beijing hopes to
win the hearts and minds of most Taiwanese people, there is no statement or official document
made by Beijing that clearly describes how to achieve that end. Considering the fact that separatist
voices in Hong Kong has made “one country, two systems” less attractive to Taiwanese people,
Beijing is actually in an embarrassing situation. For the target related to high level interests, it
seems that Chinese leadership should either largely improve this “basic state policy” (Ji Ben Guo
Ce) or formulate a new unification model that can better adapt to the current cross-strait situation.
But the real reason Beijing does not formulate any specific policy toward Taiwan to promote
unification is that Chinese leaders have realized external influence from other actors is more
significant than Taipei’s position. Without necessary changes in the US and Japan’s behavior, it is
almost impossible for Taiwan to abandon its current de facto independence and become a special
administrative region of China no matter what policy Beijing formulates to impact Taiwan’s
behavior. In such a case, for achieving its high level interest, what Beijing needs is appropriate
interaction with the US and Japan, not simply development in cross-strait relations.
Conclusion
In general, the Taiwan Issue has involved China's sovereignty and territorial integrity, and the
urgency has been largely increased in the post-Cold War era. Meanwhile, it is also closely related
to China's homeland security, strategic influence, future economic development, and social
stability. Since the pursuit of high level interest must be based on the realization of fundamental
interests, it is not difficult to understand that if the target of containing Taiwan’s pro-independence
forces is achieved by military deterrence and development of cross-strait relations, mainland
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China will gradually give more weight to the target of achieving national unification. However, if
Chinese leaders believe China’s fundamental interests are still under serious threat, more hardline
policies towards Taiwan will be formulated and tensions across the strait will be raised again.
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Chapter V The Evolution of the US Policy toward Taiwan Issue:
From Swinging Back and Forth to Establishing the Double
Deterrence
In its official statement and propaganda, the Chinese government always emphasized that the
Taiwan Issue is China's internal affair. In the history, because of the purpose of preventing
Taiwan’s independence and promoting the reunification, Beijing firmly opposed any behavior to
internationalize the Taiwan Issue. From this perspective, a few scholars were inclined to limit their
analysis of the Taiwan Issue to the two sides across the strait, studying how those internal factors
of mainland China and Taiwan impacted the cross-strait relations. However, the influence of
external factors on the Taiwan Issue should not be ignored. As a matter of fact, the complexity of
the Taiwan Issue is to a large extent caused by the involvement of foreign countries with different
positions and different relative power, which therefore make Beijing and Taipei unable to fully
shape the future development of Taiwan Issue. As demonstrated in previous chapters, the
pro-independence forces has been using the relative power of the US rather than that of Taiwan
itself to determine the scope of its mainland policy, while Beijing also adjusted its policy many
times to respond to the US intervention in the Taiwan Strait. In these circumstances, as the most
influential factor in the Taiwan Issue, the role played by the United States needs to be
comprehensively examined in the research.
Change of Taiwan’s Status in the US Foreign Policy after the Korean War
The US policy toward Taiwan is even earlier than the emergence of “Taiwan Issue”. In the end of
the World War II, the US government started to cooperate with the KMT authorities to promote
construction in Taiwan369. After Japan surrendered in 1945, the US troops landed on Taiwan with
their KMT friendly forces and began to build military bases in the island. Meanwhile, the US was
also allowed by Chiang Kai-shek to run business, exploit mineral resources, and make investment
in infrastructure construction such as building hydro power stations in Taiwan370. It is noteworthy
that after the outbreak of the February 28 Incident in 1947, the pro-independence forces started to
contact with the US officials, hoping to obtain openly support from the US to realize Taiwan’s
independence or make Taiwan to be under the United Nations Trusteeship. Some of them even
suggested the US to recover Japanese rule over Taiwan371. But the US government refused to deal
with them because of the fact that pro-independence forces did not have any social or military
foundation and were completely dependent on the US to achieve their end. However, there were a
few officials in the US government that viewed the idea of making Taiwan under the US
trusteeship as a feasible option372. This desire of controlling Taiwan, to a large extent, explained
the strange behavior of the US government to obstruct Chiang Kai-shek’s plan of retreating to
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Taiwan and building the island as an anti-communist base within the context that the KMT was
almost losing the Chinese Civil War. In January 1949, the US government even publicly protested
the KMT authorities’ decision of retreating to Taiwan, while simultaneously contacting with then
Taiwan Province military commander Chen Cheng, promising that the US would provide financial
support to Chen for controlling Taiwan as long as he could separate the island from the rule of the
KMT Government373. Meanwhile, the Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers MacArthur and
then US Secretary of State Dean Acheson also put forward the theory of uncertainty of Taiwan’s
status on various occasions, arguing that before the peace treaty with Japan was signed, Taiwan
was still part of Japan and its final status would be determined by a contract, while the Chinese
government was only managing the island on behalf of the Allied Powers374.
Preventing Chiang Kai-shek from retreating to Taiwan, inducing then Taiwan military commander
to resist the KMT authorities, and spreading Taiwan's status was uncertain in the international
community, the real purpose of the US was to make Taiwan under its trusteeship375. This was
because Washington believed that Chiang Kai-shek was unable to defend Taiwan, which would
lead the island to be captured by the CCP and eventually become Soviet military base. According
to this view, the US State Department submitted a report in January 1949, clearly pointing out that
the US target was to prevent Taiwan and the Penghu Islands from falling into the hands of the
Communist Party, and the most effective approach to achieve that target was to separate these
islands from mainland China376.
At first, the US government tended to use political and economic means to realize this separation
between Taiwan and the mainland. But this plan faced a serious challenge caused by the changing
situation in the mainland. Through providing military support to the KMT in the Chinese Civil
War, the US government had hoped there would appear a pro-American government in China. But
the KMT lost the war and finally decided to retreat to Taiwan. Within the context that the PLA
occupied the ROC’s capital Nanjing in April 1949, and the PRC was then founded on 1st October,
liberating Taiwan became the next target of the PLA. In the face of the CCP’s preparation for
military attack against the KMT in Taiwan, the US government had to reevaluate its previous
policy option. There was little doubt that Taiwan would be captured by the CCP if the US only
used political and economic means rather than large scale military forces to assist the KMT. In
such a case, Washington had to make its choice between sending US troops to defend the KMT or
completely abandoning the island. During this period, regarding these two policy options, there
was a debate among US officials. The State Department preferred to give up the KMT, but the
military and a few congressmen insisted on providing direct military aid to Taiwan377. What these
officials disputed, which also determined the US stance in the Taiwan Issue, was whether Taiwan
had sufficient strategic value for the United States to take military actions against the CCP. In
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other words, what interests of US were involved in Taiwan.
Despite MacArthur put forward the famous metaphor of “unsinkable aircraft carrier”, the result of
such debate in the US government seemed to be abandoning Taiwan. In the early 1950, then
President Truman issued a statement, making it clear that the United States respected China's
territorial integrity and had no intention to occupy Taiwan or formulate any policy that would lead
the US to involve in the Chinese Civil War. Most importantly, the United States would not provide
military aid or advice to the Chinese army in Taiwan378. This announcement of abandoning Taiwan
was credible to a large extent. According to the State Department’s order, the US Consulate
General in Taipei warned that American citizens must evacuate Taiwan as soon as possible, and
also implemented relevant evacuation plan379. At the same period, Chiang Kai-shek suddenly
made a tentative statement to the CCP about carrying out peace talks. After being rejected, he even
made a plan of establishing a government in exile in the Philippines380. However, after more than a
month, the policy of abandoning Taiwan underwent a complete change. The US government
replaced its previous policy of “watching and waiting” with military intervention in the Taiwan
Strait. It was believed that this significant change was largely due to the Korean War. On June 26th
1950, Truman issued a new statement, declaring that the communism was starting an invasion to
an independent state, and the occupation of the Communist Party on Taiwan would threaten the
security of the Pacific region381. The US government then stated that Taiwan’s status was uncertain,
and sent the Seventh Fleet to blockade the Taiwan Strait, which actually prevented mainland
China from carrying out any military action to achieve reunification382. Since then, the US policy
towards Taiwan has been shifted from abandoning the island to direct intervention.
To impose pressure on Beijing and therefore influence the war in the Korea Peninsula, the United
States urged the Chiang Kai-shek authorities to start military attacks against the coastal areas of
the mainland, while simultaneously maintaining public debates in the US society about whether
the US should use nuclear weapons to strike China383. The change of US policy also meant the
enhancement of the US-Taiwan relations. In July 1950, MacArthur and a few US generals went to
Taiwan to discuss with Chiang Kai-shek about how the United States and the Taiwan authorities
could jointly defend the island384. Since the end of August, Taiwan had received military supplies
from the United States with the total value of USD 165 million. In May 1951, the US Military
Advisory Group was established to improve Taiwan’s military integration and training385. In a
word, Taiwan began to be incorporated into the US strategy in Asia.
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It is noteworthy that those measures adopted by Washington, including deterrence against the
mainland and military cooperation with the Taiwan authorities, were maintained in the following
US policy and became its major way for dealing with the Taiwan Issue. But the target of this
coercive policy was to prevent mainland China from taking over Taiwan, rather than starting an
all-out war with Beijing to realize Taiwan's objective of recovering the mainland. Considering
about the military attack from the mainland, Taiwan began to seek a mutual defense treaty with the
United States and ultimately met with the approval386. But in 1958, when the PLA started to attack
the KMT vessels, the US warships which were sent to the Taiwan Strait to assist the KMT
transport preferred not to engage with the PLA387. This revealed the US position in the Taiwan
Issue was to protect Taiwan through strengthening military cooperation with Taipei and imposing
great pressures on Beijing, while simultaneously avoiding direct military conflict with the
mainland. This explains why the following US policies to Taiwan can be regarded as a pendulum
swinging back and forth between different positions of Taipei and Beijing.
The Swinging of the US Policy in the Taiwan Issue
Three Joint Communiques and the TRA: the Swinging of Taiwan policy before the End of the
Cold War
After the Korean War, the US maintained its hardline policy toward mainland China while
continuing to improve its relations with Taiwan. However, the US international and domestic
environment gradually changed when Brezhnev came to power in the mid-1960s. Faced by the
Soviet expansionism while suffering from the Vietnam War and an internal economic crisis, the
US was forced to shrink its power in Asia. Meanwhile, China also concluded that compared to the
US whose strategic focus was in the west, the Soviet Union was becoming a bigger threat to
China’s security. Within this context, the two countries started to contact with each other, trying to
improve their bilateral relations388.
With the changing relative power, easing tensions with mainland China and establishing formal
diplomatic relations with Beijing became the Nixon administration's appropriate choices. But
Chinese leaders such as then Premier Zhou Enlai stressed that the Taiwan Issue was the key for
normalizing Sino-US relations when they gave positive response to Washington’s signals about
improving bilateral relations389. This meant if Washington could not change its previous position
on the Taiwan Issue, maintaining its political and military relations with Taiwan, it would be
impossible for the United States to reach a settlement with China. For that reason, the US
government expressed it could adjust its previous military ties with Taiwan, implying to withdraw
its troops from the island390. Meanwhile, through active contacts with the Chinese embassy staff
stationed in Poland, the US successfully resumed bilateral talks at the ambassadorial level in
Warsaw, in which the US officials expressed that the US would gradually reduce its military force
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in Taiwan and would not hinder Chinese people on two sides across the Taiwan Strait to
peacefully resolve the Taiwan Issue391. Within this context, in February 1972, then US President
Nixon visited China, and the Taiwan Issue was included in his talks with Chinese leaders. The two
countries signed the Sino-US Joint Communique, in which the US officially stated that “there is
but one China and Taiwan is a part of China”, abandoning its previous position that “Taiwan's
status remains unresolved” and adopting an ambiguous expression that can be accepted by both
sides across the strait. More precisely, the “One China” here can be understood not only as the
PRC, but also as the ROC. In other words, the PRC was not regarded as the only legitimate
government of China in this Communique. Apart from that, the US insisted that peaceful solution
to the Taiwan Issue was the precondition for US to withdraw its troops from the island, indicating
that the US still tried to keep its intervention in the Taiwan Issue by maintaining the US-Taiwan
military ties392.
The real change in the US position on Taiwan Issue happened after Washington established
diplomatic relations with Beijing. When Carter took the office, the US began to actively promote
the process of normalizing its relations with China. In 1978, then National Security Assistant
Zbigniew Brzezinski visited China, accepting China’s three conditions for normalizing diplomatic
relations. These conditions were that the US must break off diplomatic ties with Taiwan, abrogate
the US-Taiwan mutual defense treaty, and withdraw all military forces from Taiwan393. On the
1979’s New Year's Day, the formal diplomatic relations between the US and China was established,
and the Sino-US Diplomatic Relationship Establishment Communique was published, indicating
that the US policy to Taiwan has experienced a fundamental change394. The previous ambiguous
statement that “Taiwan is a part of China” was replaced by officially acknowledgment that “the
PRC is the sole legal government of China”, while the US-Taiwan relations was defined as
“cultural, commercial, and other unofficial relations”395. This was, for the first time, that the US
Taiwan policy swung to the position of the mainland.
Because of fundamental conflict between Beijing and Taipei in defining the cross-strait relations,
the swinging of US policy to one side’s position is almost bound to damage the other side’s
interests. In essence, as long as the fundamental contradiction in the cross-strait relations is not
resolved, the swinging of the US policy in the Taiwan Issue will be perceived by Beijing and
Taipei as a zero-sum game, in which one side’s gains must follow the other side’s loss. That is
why every time when such a swing occurred, the side whose position was being ignored by the
policy always generated a strong reaction, requiring a new swinging of the US policy . Therefore,
the formal establishment of diplomatic relations between China and the United States led to a
strong dissatisfaction from Taipei. In the meantime, US politicians in the Congress with a
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pro-Taiwan position also expressed their opposition to the US government, stating that they would
take actions to pose an end to the White House’s behavior of making serious change in the US
policy towards China and Taiwan without discussing it with the Congress396. Within this context,
in March 1979, the House and the Senate voted respectively in two days to pass the Taiwan
Relations Act (TRA), which defines relations between the US and Taiwan after breaking off the
diplomatic ties397. According to the Taiwan authorities and the US pro-Taiwan politicians, the
most significant content of the TRA is the US commitment to Taiwan's security and the definition
of Taiwan's international status. The TRA to a large extent negated the Sino-US Diplomatic
Relationship Establishment Communique by restoring the previous mutual defense treaty and
maintaining the US military alliance with Taiwan, while simultaneously treating Taiwan as an
independent political entity with the status of a sovereign state. Thus, the TRA provides legal basis
for the US further involvement in the Taiwan Issue, and should be regarded as a swinging of US
policy towards Taiwan’s position.
Based on the TRA, the US government gave a clear primacy to supporting Taiwan in the early
days of the Reagan administration. During his election campaign in 1980, Reagan stated on many
occasions that he would rebuild the official US-Taiwan relations if he won the election. After
taking the office, the Reagan administration firmly promoted arms sales to Taiwan, insisting to sell
advanced weapons to the KMT authorities and declaring that China had no say in the US Taiwan
policy398. In April 1981, then Assistant Secretary of State Holdridge said that the weapons that
United States preferred to provide to Taiwan was entirely based on US own judgment about
Taiwan’s demand for defense. In May, then President's Counsel Edwin Meese also claimed that
the United States would fully implement the TRA, especially the terms of arms sales to Taiwan399.
The US policy’s swinging elicited a protest from mainland China. Beijing argued that arms sales
to Taiwan should not be regarded as an ordinary commodity trade, and it was not in line with the
non-governmental relationship between the United States and Taiwan, requiring the US to reduce
its arms sales year by year and to ensure the sale would not exceed the size in the early days of the
Carter administration. Recognizing that the Sino-US relations would experience a serious setback
if the issue of arms sales was not resolved, Washington began to negotiate with the Chinese
government on this topic. After long bargaining, the two countries both made appropriate
compromise, signing the “August 17 Communique” in August 1982. Among all three joint
communiques, this is the only one that focuses on the problem of US arms sales to Taiwan400. In
this communique, the US emphasized the importance of its relations with China and reiterated it
had no intention to threaten China's sovereignty and territorial integrity or to build “two Chinas”
or “one China, one Taiwan” in the international community. And for the first time, Washington
declared that it would gradually reduce its arms sales to Taiwan.
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The August 17 Communique largely eased the tension in the Sino-US relations caused by the US
arms sales to Taiwan. However, it should be noted that Reagan added an attachment to explain the
content of this communique when he signed it, expressing the reduction of the US arms sales was
completely dependent on China’s commitment of realizing a peaceful settlement of the Taiwan
Issue. In other words, as long as mainland China continues its military threats against Taiwan, the
US arms sales to Taiwan will not be stopped but remains as a significant part of the US Taiwan
policy401. To a certain extent, the signing of the August 17 Communique can be regarded as the
result that US swung towards the mainland's position in the Taiwan Issue, but the degree of this
swinging was not as much as that in the establishment of Sino-US diplomatic relations. Precisely,
the United States did not abandon Taiwan or completely stop arms sales when it swung to
Beijing’s position, but only took a pragmatic response to the sensitive problem which might
seriously affect its future bilateral relations with China, while the trend of strengthening
US-Taiwan relations did not change too much in this round of policy swinging.
The Third Taiwan Strait Crisis: the Severe Consequence caused by US Policy Swinging in the
post Cold War era
When the United States and the Soviet Union agreed to end the Cold War in 1990, the
international situation was dramatically changed, and Washington believed there was no need to
maintain its alliance with China to defeat the Soviet military threat. Therefore, China was
devalued in the US global strategy, which led Washington to formulate tough policy toward China.
In November 1991, then President George H. W. Bush made a speech in New York that accused
Beijing, Pyongyang, and Rangoon as roots of Asia's instability402. After that, then Secretary of
State Baker also published an article in Foreign Affairs, criticizing China in areas of human rights,
freedom, and nuclear weapon proliferation403. Within this context, the US policy continued to
swing to Taiwan’s position. In 1993 and 1994, the Senate approved a series of amendments,
deciding the status of the TRA especially the content regarding types and numbers of weapons
being provided to Taiwan was prior to that of the August 17 Communique404. Meanwhile, the level
of US contacts with the Taiwan authorities was also raised compared with previous stage.
Washington began to publicly support Taiwan to join in the international organizations whose
members were not limited to nation states and allowed the US officials to meet their counterparts
from Taiwan405. This swinging of US policy to Taiwan’s position obviously harmed the interests of
mainland China in the Taiwan Issue and damaged Beijing’s diplomatic achievements after
establishing diplomatic ties with the US. However, Washington still defined its relations with
Taipei as unofficial, indicating that the bottom line in US Taiwan policy and also the most
important cornerstone of Sino-US diplomatic relations remained unchanged. For example,
according to the TRA, the American Institute in Taiwan (AIT) is an institution dealing with this
unofficial relations, and the United States will not support Taiwan’s participation in any
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international organizations such as the UN that requires its members to be sovereign states406.
This unofficial relations determined that Taiwan's top leader’s visit to the United States, from the
perspective of Beijing and even some US officials, should not be allowed by the US government.
However, the Congress supported the request from the Taiwan authorities for Lee Teng-hui's visit
to the US, lobbying then President Clinton to change his previous stance and approve such visit407.
In March 1995, after the Cornell University sent an invitation to Lee, a few senators even put
more pressure on Clinton, stating that if the government disregarded their request, the Senate
would start a new round of discussion about the TRA and therefore create an overall change in the
US policy to Taiwan408. The State Department, however, opposed to Lee Teng-hui's visit, believing
Taiwan's top leader’s visit to the United States was against the Three Joint Communiques and the
TRA, and was not consistent with the unofficial US-Taiwan relations409. There was little question
that what the State Department concerned was the potential reaction from the mainland if the US
approved Lee’s visit, which revealed that the US policy was based on Washington’s consideration
of both the US-Taiwan and the US-China relationship. Thus, any change in these two relations
would certainly lead to changes in the US policy. Within the context that changing international
security environment in the post-Cold War era had influenced the Sino-US relationship, as long as
there was no significant incident to raise the status of China in the US global strategy, it would not
be surprising that US policy further swung to the Taiwan’s position, even though there were voices
of disapproval inside the US. In May 1995, the US government announced that then President
Clinton decided to approve Lee Teng-hui’s “unofficial and private visit” to the US in the first week
of June, ending the history that no top leader of Taiwan was allowed to visit the US for nearly 20
years410.
Although Washington realized this behavior would trigger a strong response from the mainland, it
did not expect any radical actions such as breaking off two countries’ diplomatic relations,
believing the reaction might be recalling Chinese ambassador back to China411. In essence, from
US perspective, allowing Lee Teng-hui's visit would not result in any grave damage to the US
national interests because China’s relative power could not enable Beijing to take any dangerous
actions. However, the US behavior was perceived by Beijing as supporting for the
pro-independence forces inside Taiwan, which might eventually lead the cross-strait relations to be
defined as “two Chinas” or “one China one Taiwan”. Therefore, the mainland decided to take
coercive actions in order to respond to the US behavior and to threaten Taiwan’s pro-independence
forces encouraged by such US behavior.
On July 18th 1995, Chinese official Xinhua News Agency announced that the PLA would test
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surface-to-surface missiles firings on July 21st to 28th in the East China Sea. In mid-October, the
PLA Naval Force did military exercises in the Yellow Sea, focusing on landing operations. In
March 1996, the PLA did missile firings again in the water area near Taiwan’s Keelung harbor and
Kaohsiung harbor, and then held another round of military exercise in the East China Sea and the
South China Sea, still focusing on the landing operations412. Unsurprisingly, the United States
blamed the PLA’s missile firings and military exercises, stating this did not help for maintaining
stability across the strait. In addition to this criticism, the US also sent two aircraft carrier battle
groups to waters near Taiwan, declaring that the US military force was located in a position from
which the US Navy could offer help413. However, it is noteworthy that with growing tensions in
the region, the US and China had some kind of tacit understanding, avoiding any behavior that
might lead to direct military conflict or any tough policy that might lead to further deterioration of
the situation. In March 1997, marked by the retreat of the US aircraft carrier fleets, the tension
across the strait was largely eased414.
This was the Third Taiwan Strait Crisis, which generated the highest tension in the Taiwan Strait
since the end of the Cold War. It should be noted that China's military deterrence posed a big blow
on Taiwan’s pro-independence forces. The DPP candidate lost the election in 1996, which led to
the outbreak of the DPP’s internal conflicts. Many radical forces preferred to leave the DPP to
establish new parties but with far less influence. Meanwhile, the DPP also adjusted its cross-strait
policy, replacing its previous radical pursuit of Taiwan’s immediate independence with a more
moderate position of maintaining Taiwan’s de facto independence under the name of the ROC415.
More importantly, this crisis largely influenced the US following policies of dealing with sensitive
issues such as Taiwan's top leader’s visit or US support for the pro-independence forces in Taiwan.
There was no doubt that Chinese military exercises reminded the US of the sensitivity of the
Taiwan Issue and the serious dangers caused by the pro-independence activities on peace and
stability across the Taiwan Straits. Consequently, the Clinton administration began to reevaluate
its previous policy swinging to Taiwan’s position and reexamine Chinese relative power,
promoting pragmatic adjustment in the US policy.
The US Taiwan Policy in the Post Crisis Era
The Taiwan Strait Crisis let the US to be aware of the danger that it might be involved in a direct
military confrontation with China once there was a serious conflict between the two sides across
the strait. In such a case, the United States began to change its previous indifferent attitude toward
the development of cross-strait relations, expressing its support for the cross-strait political
dialogue in order to ease the tension between the two sides. Apparently, promoting cross-strait
dialogues were in favor of Beijing’s position. When then Chinese President Jiang Zemin visited
the US in 1997, Clinton clearly expressed that he wished the two sides across the strait to start
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dialogues. In March 1998, during his visit to Taiwan, the former US National Security Adviser
Lake also publicly claimed that the US government strongly supported the cross-strait dialogue,
and he even urged Lee to reopen the channels in cross-strait negotiations from which both sides
could benefit416. The US support for cross-strait political dialogues had specific content than
simply making statements. For example, Washington suggested the two sides to sign a interim
agreement, which believed by the US could form a 50-year transition stage. During that period,
both sides should adhere to the One China principle, and the mainland should clearly claim not to
use force to resolve the Taiwan Issue while Taiwan identifies itself as a part of China and would
not pursue de jure independence, leading the two sides to eventually start their political
negotiations regarding unification417. However, this seemingly constructive proposal did not
generate any real positive results, because the Taiwan authorities was still fully controlled by Lee
Teng-hui. The pro-independence forces wanted to end the hostility between the two sides while
firmly opposing the One China principle to become the premise of peaceful dialogue. This
indicated that Taipei required mainland China neither to continue its military deterrence nor to
force Taipei to make any promise to uphold anti-independence position. Thus, it could never
accept the US suggestion, but rather created a serious response to the US policy. In July 1999, Lee
Teng-hui made the “special state to state relationship” statement in an interview of Deutsche Welle,
publicly denying the One China principle and destroying the foundation of cross-strait dialogues
promoted by the US policy418.
Apart from promoting cross-strait political negotiations, the swinging of US policy towards the
mainland's position in the post crisis era was mainly reflected in the Clinton administration’s
efforts to strengthen the Sino-US relations. One example was Clinton’s announcement of the US
“Three No’s” policy. After the Taiwan Strait Crisis, the US government promoted high level
exchanges between the US and China, and supported China's participation in the international
affairs, believing the US disagreements with China should be resolved by contact and dialogue419.
These meant US previous position during the post Cold War era was largely changed. More
precisely, the US policy swung to Taipei’s position in the 1980s was mainly because the external
threat from the Soviet Union was weakened, making Washington believe there was no need to
take further cooperation with China. But after the Taiwan Strait Crisis, the United States realized
that even in the post Cold War era, there were still many common objectives pursued by the two
countries in the global security and economic affairs. Thus, In 1996, Clinton proposed that China
and the US should build the “Constructive Partnership”, publicly stating that the two countries
shared common interests on many issues and should establish a good partnership to deal with
those issues420. When Jiang Zemin visited the United States in 1997, two leaders issued the
US-China Joint Statement, declaring that the two countries would work to establish the
416 Wu Xinbo. (2004). Response and Adjustment : Taiwan Strait Crisis of 1996 and US Policy
Concerning Taiwan. Contemporary China History Studies . 4 (4), p51-53.
417 Zhao Yong. (2000). An Analysis of Interim Agreement,. Taiwan Research Quarterly . 8 (1),
p53-56.
418 Ye Youhua. (1999). Taiwan Issue and Lee Teng-hui's 'Two States Theory'. Journal of the Central
Institute of Socialism . 11 (11), p39-41.
419 Su Ge (1998). American China policy and the Taiwan issue. Beijing: World Affairs Press. p252.
420 Qi Lemuge. (2009). The Clinton administration's China Policy. Journal of Inner Mongolia
University for Nationalities (Social Sciences). 3 (2), p12-15.
100
constructive strategic partnership421. Within this context, Clinton expressed his “Three No’s”
policy, clearly stating that the US did not support Taiwan’s independence, did not support “two
Chinas or one China, one Taiwan”, and did not support Taiwan to join in any international
organization limited to sovereign countries422. In June 1998, Clinton publicly reiterated this
position during his visit to China423. This “Three No's” policy made a satisfactory answer to
Beijing’s concern of the Taiwan’s pro-independence movements, and could be regarded as the
maximum swinging of the US policy towards the mainland’s position after the normalization of
Sino-US relations, forming a serious blow to the provocations made by Taiwan’s
pro-independence forces.
However, a very significant fact that must be noted in this round of policy swinging was that
Washington did not completely ignore the demand of Taiwan when it realized the importance of
the mainland, attempting to satisfy two sides at the same time by improving the US-China
relations while simultaneously further strengthening its ties with Taiwan. This was because the
Taiwan Strait Crisis proved Washington’s worry that Taiwan’s military strength was not sufficient
to counter military threat from mainland China, making the US believe that whether Taiwan was
able to effectively curb a military attack from the mainland was completely dependent on how
much assistance it could obtain from the US. Consequently, Washington began to deepen its
military cooperation with Taipei, regularly inviting Taiwan’s military officials to discuss
cross-strait situations and Taiwan’s armament with their US counterparts, and incorporating
Taiwan into the US Theater Missile Defense System (the TMD)424. The Taiwan authorities, at first,
was not very positive for joining in the TMD because of the concern of huge financial investment,
but its attitude soon changed when Clinton publicly declared his “Three No’s” policy in 1998.
After Lee Teng-hui made his special state to state relationship statement in 1999, the Taiwan
authorities showed increasing interest in joining in the TMD, offering a detailed plan for
establishing the system in the island and believing the TMD was consistent with the fundamental
interest of Taiwan425.
In addition to deepening the US-Taiwan military cooperation, there were other US behaviors also
proved that Taiwan’s pro-independence forces did not need to worry too much about the US policy
swinging to Beijing’s position. In fact, although repeating this “Three No’s” policy, the US
government did not launch any direct condemnation to Taiwan’s pro-independence movements
such as Lee’s statement, because what the US government pursued was to ease the tension in the
area, preventing Beijing from taking more military threat against Taiwan. After visiting Taiwan to
discuss Lee’s statement with the Taiwan authorities, then AIT chairman Richard Bush publicly
declared that he had understood the true meaning of this statement and his respect for Taiwan’s
leader was increasing, emphasizing that there was no change in the US government's policy
421 Xi Laiwang. (1998). Promoting the Establishment of Sino-US constructive Strategic
Partnership. Contemporary International Relations . 5 (5), p2-7.
422 Kau M Y M. Clinton's" Three No's" Policy: A Critical Assessment[J]. The Brown Journal of World
Affairs, 1999, 6(2): 15-22.
423 Peterson A. Dangerous games across the Taiwan Strait[J]. Washington Quarterly, 2004, 27(2):
23-41.
424 Sun Yan (2009). Taiwan Issue and Sino-US Relations. Beijing: Peking University Press.
P277-278.
425 Jia Chaowei. (1999). Why Taiwan Is Longing for Theatre Missile Defense
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towards Taiwan and that US would faithfully execute the TRA426. Compared with this friendly
statement, the US attitude toward Beijing was much tougher. Instead of using military exercises or
missile firings, Beijing made a fierce criticism against Lee’s statement and promulgated a White
Paper called “the One China Principle and the Taiwan Issue” in 2000 as a deterrence against
Taiwan’s pro-independence forces. However, the United States accused Beijing of using
inflammatory rhetoric in this White Paper and reiterated the US position that the Taiwan Issue
must be resolved by peaceful means, declaring that the mainland’s attack on Taiwan would cause
incalculable consequences427.
Refusing to condemn Taiwan’s pro-independence statement but criticizing the strong reaction
from the mainland even though there was no military exercises or missiles firings, the US has
proved that its policy would not swing too much to Beijing’s position even there were common
targets between the US and China. Compared with previous policy swinging, the US government
was attempting to find a balance between avoiding to provoke mainland China in those sensitive
issues and firmly safeguarding Taiwan’s interests. Therefore, Washington had to reduce the degree
of its policy swinging between different positions of Beijing and Taipei. However, as long as the
two sides have not reached any agreement on the definition of cross-strait relations, the swinging
of the US policy to one side’s position, no matter how small it is, will still damage the interest of
the other side. For this reason, the US had to clearly define the priority of its own targets in the
Taiwan Issue, in order to guide the formulation of its policy responding to different requests from
the two sides. In other words, whether the US policy should swing to one side’s position should be
determined by the US own interests at different levels involved in the issue.
The US National Interests involved in the Taiwan Issue and Its Policy Evolution:
From Swinging to Double Deterrence
The US Interests and its Perceived Relative Power in the Taiwan Issue
The fact that US policy towards Taiwan repeatedly swung between different positions of Taiwan
and mainland China actually indicated that the US did not clearly defined what interests should be
pursued in its policy. But pursuing inappropriate interest does not mean that the US government
had no idea what interests were involved in the Taiwan Issue. In fact, American political elites had
already confirmed one significant interest was involved in this issue when they shifted position to
incorporate Taiwan into the US Asia-Pacific regional strategy, and Washington’s concern about
this interest was not shaken by subsequent changes in the US domestic and international
environment. In these circumstances, this interest should be regarded as the bottom line of US
policy towards Taiwan, and therefore can be used to interpret certain US behaviors in the area.
Before the end of the Chinese Civil War, despite realizing Taiwan would fall into the Communist
hands if the KMT was defeated, the US did not take effective military actions to defend Taiwan
but decided to withdraw itself from Chinese Civil War and wait for the dust to settle. Considering
the CCP had obvious advantage in the war, this US policy could be regarded as approving the
mainland to liberate Taiwan by force, which completely differed from its previous pursuit of
making Taiwan under the US trusteeship. A reasonable explanation for this change was that
426 Sun Yan (2009). Taiwan Issue and Sino-US Relations. Beijing: Peking University Press. P283.
427 Campbell K M, Mitchell D J. Crisis in the Taiwan Strait[J]. Foreign Aff., 2001, 80: 14.
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interest related to controlling Taiwan was at a too high level. This change in US interest pursuit
basically matched US social opinion that there was no need to waste US human and material
resources to assist a corrupt and defeated KMT regime, especially when such an intervention
might lead the US to be involved in an all-out warfare428. Although the Congress and the military
were opposed to the policy of withdrawing military support from Taiwan, repeatedly emphasizing
the significance of Taiwan in the US strategy, policy makers such as then President Truman and
then Secretary of State Dulles still refused to adopt coercive actions to contain the CCP’s attack429.
This indicated that US government had a different perceived relative power compared with the
military. Precisely, according to the US policy makers, the US relative power was not sufficient to
start a war with the CCP for defending Taiwan. Considering the military strength of the United
States was much stronger than that of the CCP, this conclusion seemed implausible.
Nevertheless, according to the neoclassical realism, national interests should be divided into
different levels, and realizing a high level interest must be based on the achievement of
fundamental level interests. This indicates that a country may have enough strength to achieve a
certain target, but should not take action to pursue that target if there are other targets related to
relatively fundamental interests have not been realized. For example, a great power may be able to
influence the outcome of a small country’s election, but if this small country locates in another
continent and has nothing to do with the pressures that great power is facing in regional and global
affairs, manipulating election in this small country will be meaningless. In other words, it may be
possible but not worth to realize a high level interest if there are other interests still under threat.
From the US government’s perspective at that moment, Taiwan was not related to any important
fundamental interests of the US. In such a case, the cost of involving in military conflict or even
an all-out war with the CCP only for defending an island which could hardly bring benefit to the
US was too high to be accepted, even though the US could eventually achieve military victory.
Meanwhile, consuming military power and American human and material resources to intervene
in the Taiwan Strait would even lead most countries in the Asia-Pacific region to have negative
impression of US, because they only realized their national independence in recent years and were
difficult to accept any foreign force’s involvement in their neighbor’s internal affairs. This implied
that a coercive intervention would be even opposed by the US own allies in the region. In these
circumstances, the US government concluded that the US power was not sufficient to realize this
particular objective.
This policy changed in June 1950 when the Korean War broke out. Since mainland China became
an enemy to the US in the Korean peninsula, the US decided to block Beijing’s pursuit of
achieving national unification, in order to influence the CCP’s military operation in the Korean
War. Nevertheless, this policy of blocking Chinese unification was remained by the US
government even after the Korean War, which revealed that the US government had reexamined
its interests involved in the Taiwan Issue and formed a new conclusion that preventing mainland’s
unification with Taiwan was related to significant US interests. It is worth to note that the Korean
War made it clear that the PRC was not as weak as some people had expected, implying that
428 Qiao Zhaohong. (2005). The Korean War and Taiwan Issue.Contemporary China History
Studies . 12 (5), p94-102.
429 Jia Yan, Xin Qiang. (2005). From 'Chinese Bloc' to 'Taiwan Bloc': the Pro-Taiwan Congressman
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Washington’s perception of China’s power should be raised. Within this context, instead of making
a compromise, the US insisted on using coercive actions to intervene in the Taiwan Issue. The
reasonable explanation is that US policy makers redefined which interests were involved in this
issue and gave Taiwan a higher status in the US strategy.
More precisely, US attention was paid to the CCP and its relationship with the Soviet Union when
Taiwan was viewed by Washington as lacking strategic significance. In 1950, the Sino-Soviet
alliance was still not established, prompting the US to conclude there was a problem in the
Sino-Soviet relations because the Soviet Union tried to separate the northern provinces from
China430. The Truman administration, which believed the CCP was unwilling to be controlled by
the Soviet Union, issued a statement in 1950 that the US respected China’s territorial integrity and
had no intention to intervene in China’s internal affairs or occupy Taiwan, hoping to further
alienate the CCP from the Soviet Union by abandoning Taiwan431. However, the signing of the
Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and the outbreak of the Korean War confirmed the failure of the
US attempt, and forced Washington to adjust its military presence in Asia. It is obvious that what
US worried about was the Soviet threat, and in order to reduce the influence of Soviet Union,
Washington would accept the CCP to take over Taiwan as long as Beijing was not allied with
Moscow. Moreover, according to the US, the Korean War was actually caused by the Soviet
expansionism, and this war sent a clear signal that if the US did not take effective military actions
to contain this expansionism, a domino effect might be triggered throughout the whole of Asia,
seriously damaging the US leadership in the Western camp432. In such a case, Taiwan was related
to significant interests of the US, because Washington believed that the Soviet Union started the
Korean War as its first step towards occupying Taiwan and the whole Indochina region. Moscow’s
real purpose was to use Taiwan as an “unsinkable aircraft carrier” in its offensive strategy,
containing the US potential counterattack from Okinawa and the Philippines433. All these revealed
that in the view of US political elites, what mattered was not Taiwan’s geographical location but
rather the force which ultimately controlled the island. This was the reason why the US could
abandon Taiwan when Washington believed the CCP would prefer diplomatic policy that was
different from Moscow’s position and therefore the island would not become a military base that
might threaten US security interests in the area. In that situation, engaging with the PLA to make
the island under US control was regarded as a high level interest. However, within the context that
the CCP adopted the policy of “leaning to one side” (Yi Bian Dao Zheng Ce), allying with the
Soviet Union, the Korean War made Washington believe that Taiwan was bound to be used by the
Soviet Union to threaten US security interest and contain US military influence in the Asia-Pacific
region if it was taken by the CCP. Thus, in order to prevent Taiwan from falling into the hands of a
force hostile to the US, taking military actions to intervene in the situation across the strait was no
longer a waste of American human and material resources, but was closely related to safeguarding
the US regional security and political influence. In a word, the US policy of blocking Chinese
reunification could not be changed as long as Washington believed mainland China would use
430 Tao Wenzhao (2003). File Set of US China Policy. Beijing: World Affairs Press. p186.
431 Teng Shuai. (2008). Truman's Strategy of Alienating China's Relations with Soviet Union. Shidai
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Taiwan to threaten the security and other interests of the US and its allies in the region.
Thus, the importance of Taiwan was determined by the degree of confrontation between the US
and mainland China. Because of its fear that Taiwan would be controlled by the hostile CCP, the
US once preferred to completely split the two sides by forming “two Chinas” or “one China, one
Taiwan” in the international community. But on the other hand, once the tension between the US
and China was eased, there would be a corresponding decline of Taiwan’s status in the US strategy,
which led to those concessions made by Washington to Beijing on the Taiwan Issue. This did
happen when the US and China both faced security threat from the Soviet Union. Since China was
not viewed as a major hostile force, the US policy was adjusted to meet several requests from
China, which finally generated three joint communiques. These concessions made by the United
States were the result of a decline in its relative power, so its previous target of containing both the
Soviet Union and mainland China was unable to be achieved. However, it was significant to point
out that decline of US relative power did not affect some certain part of its Taiwan policy. All
three joint communiques only satisfied Beijing’s specific requests such as breaking US diplomatic
relations with Taiwan, but for the mainland’s pursuit of realizing national unification, the US
government did not make any real concession. Instead, it issued the TRA to reaffirm its
commitment to Taiwan’s security. This proves that the US bottom line in the Taiwan Issue is to
maintain Taiwan’s de facto independence, because Washington still believes that Beijing is hostile
to the US and will threaten US security and other interests in the region if Chinese unification is
achieved. This bottom line will not be relinquished unless there is dramatic change in US relative
power or US political elites no longer recognize mainland China as a potential threat.
No Unification, No Independence, and No Use of Force: Targets for Safeguarding US Interests
Except for maintaining Taiwan’s de facto independence to safeguard its security and political
influence in the region, are there any other interest at relatively high level that the US wishes to
realize in the Taiwan Issue? The answer is positive. But US policy makers’ inaccurate perceived
relative power once prompted them to pursue a target that US power was not sufficient to achieve,
leading to the outbreak of the Third Taiwan Strait Crisis. Based on the lessons learned from this
crisis, Washington’s perception of relative power and its interest pursuit became more accurate,
which finally led to the formulation of three major targets in the Taiwan Issue: No Unification, No
Independence, and No Use of Force434.
The action of sending aircraft carrier battle groups into the Taiwan Strait clearly showed that the
US tried to help Taiwan to deal with Beijing’s military pressure. However, Washington did not
clearly describe what help its warships would provide for Taiwan, refusing to answer the question
that whether US military forces would engage with China to protect Taiwan's security if the island
was under attack435. In fact, the TRA is very ambiguous about whether the United States has a
duty to protect Taiwan, and Washington obviously wishes to maintain this ambiguity. On one hand,
if the US is unambiguous about coming to Taiwan’s aid if it is attacked by the mainland, the worst
case may be an all-out warfare between the US and China; while on the other hand, if Washington
434 Xin Qiang. (2009). Interests, Strategy and US Taiwan Policy's Dilemma.Peace and
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declares its intervention will be moderate or even completely abandons its security commitment to
Taiwan, it will likely lead to an outcome determined by force while making US Asian allies feel
insecure and lose confidence in the US. It is noteworthy that in order to maintain its ambiguous
position in defending Taiwan, the US has to prevent any serious military conflict from taking
place across the strait, which becomes its another significant target known as “No Use of Force”.
It also should be pointed out that compared with this target, blocking Chinese unification is related
to more significant interests. This implies that the US will still use coercive military intervention
in the strait as long as it believes that mainland China will achieve its unification with Taiwan,
even though this can lead to serious military conflict between US and China.
In those historical events such as the Taiwan Strait Crisis, when the mainland started military
deterrence against Taiwan, it seems that the US always preferred to avoid direct military conflict
with China, maintaining its position of “No Use of Force”. But no one can deny that most of those
Chinese deterrence were responses to provocation made by Taiwan or external forces with a
pro-independence stance. Precisely, Beijing’s pursuit behind these actions was not taking over
Taiwan by force but preventing Taiwan from moving toward independence, which did not threaten
US fundamental target of “No Unification”. In such a case, avoiding direct conflict with China
also indicates that US should refuse to use its human and material resources to realize its ally’s
audacious ambition. Indeed, the crisis has let Washington understand that threat to its target of
“No Use of Force” is usually from Taiwan’s pro-independence activities rather than the mainland’s
coercive policy. If the US sends its troops to intervene in the Taiwan Strait, the pro-independence
forces will recognize it as an encouragement and therefore creates more provocations against
Beijing, which may force Chinese leaders to upgrade its deterrence. Once Beijing’s response
reaches a certain level, such as shelling Taiwan, the US will have to face the risk of involving into
an all-out war with China. Thus, to realize its target of “No Use of Force”, the US government has
to take necessary measures to curb separatist activities of Taiwan’s pro-independence forces. This
is why “No Independence” becomes another important target of US Taiwan policy.
It is noteworthy this “No Independence” should not be taken literally. Under the premise of
absolutely opposing Chinese unification, the US only conditionally opposes Taiwan’s
independence. More precisely, this target is against any unilateral steps by Taipei to change the
status quo, because Taiwan’s unilateral declaration of its de jure independence is bound to cause
strong reaction from the mainland to Taiwan and therefore threatens US own security and other
interests in the region. In other words, if the US government believes its relative power can deter
Beijing from taking military actions against Taiwan’s independence or is sufficient to successfully
defeat China’s action with minimal costs, Taiwan’s unilateral declaration of its de jure
independence may be regarded by Washington as acceptable.
Double Deterrence: The Ultimate Version of the US Taiwan Policy
Based on these three targets, the US policy toward Taiwan was improved into its final version
during the period of the George W. Bush Administration. This version insisted the US One China
policy but containing any tough words and deeds from the mainland in the Taiwan Issue, while
simultaneously deepening US-Taiwan relations in both political and military fields but resolutely
curbing any radical behavior to promote Taiwan’s de jure independence. Rather than simply
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repeating previous policy swinging between positions of Beijing and Taipei, this policy not only
takes both side’s view into account, but also imposes deterrence on Beijing and Taipei at the same
time, making it clear that Washington will not tolerate any unilateral action to change the status
quo.
The deterrence imposed on the mainland focuses on opposing Beijing to take any military action
against Taiwan, even there is provocation made by pro-independence forces. Chinese steady
military build up in recent years indicates that Beijing is preparing a non-peaceful approach to
achieve unification, which leads the US to pay increasing attention to China’s military threat to
Taiwan’s security. The report of “The Military Power of the PRC” published by the US Defense
Department in 2005 formally stated that the military balance in the Taiwan Strait was disturbed
because mainland China had become more powerful436. The 2006 report reiterated this view,
declaring that the pace and scale of China's military modernization had endangered the regional
military balance, and therefore, according to the TRA, the United States needed to take necessary
measures such as arms sales to correct this imbalance in military power and maintain peace and
stability in the region437. Meanwhile, the US also started to adjust its military deployments in the
Asia-Pacific region in order to reduce the influence of China’s growing military capabilities over
Taiwan, and to ensure that US forces could act in a timely manner to respond to the potential
Taiwan Strait contingency. In 2007, the US Navy announced that it would add the “Carl Vinson”
aircraft carrier into the Pacific Fleet, thereby doubling the number of US aircraft carriers patrolling
in the western Pacific region. In the meantime, four B-2 long-range strategic bombers were also
deployed to the US Andersen Air Force Base in Guam, significantly strengthening the US ability
to deal with regional military conflict438.
On the other hand, considering that separatist activities could cause severe damage to peace and
stability in the Taiwan Straits, and the United States was likely to be involved in a serious military
confrontation with China once the pro-independence forces overstepped Beijing’s bottom line, the
Bush Administration also imposed pressure on Taiwan to curb such dangerous activities. After
Chen Shui-bian proposed a referendum to largely promote Taiwan’s de jure independence in May
2003, the US government repeatedly expressed its serious concerns about the referendum,
reminding the Taiwan authorities that the vote was likely to overstep the red line set by Beijing.
On June 23rd 2003, the US State Department spokesman publicly declared that the US hoped each
side across the strait would not take any action or make any statement that might further increase
cross-strait tensions or add more difficulties in the dialogue, expressing the US opposition to
Taiwan’s referendum439. Subsequently, as Chen was reluctant to abandon the referendum and
continued to provoke the mainland, the US government reiterated its One China policy several
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times, stating that it would not support pro-independence activities440. These increasingly tough
statements imposed considerable pressures upon the Chen Shui-bian authorities and Taiwan’s
society, forcing Taipei to change the sensitive topic of referendum, and contributed to the ultimate
failure of the referendum. The US government also paid close attention to Taiwan’s constitutional
amendment promoted by Chen. In January 2006, after Chen mentioned constitutional amendment
in his New Year Address, the State Department announced that the US would uphold its One
China policy and oppose any action to change the status quo441. In June 2006, then AIT chairman
Raymond F. Burghardt traveled to Taiwan and expressed the US concern over Taiwan’s future
political decisions, compelling Chen to promise that he would comply with his “Four Noes and
One Without” pledge442. When Chen Shui-bian continually promoted Taiwan’s constitutional
reform, the State Department deputy spokesman Tom Casey reiterated in September 2006 that the
United States wanted Chen to comply with his promise, and highlighted that the US opposition to
Chen’s constitutional reform on sensitive sovereignty topics such as redefining the ROC territory
was serious, expressing US dissatisfaction and imposing more pressure upon Chen443. Within this
context, in March 2007, the activities of Taiwan’s constitutional reform were stalled.
Through imposing deterrence on both the mainland and Taiwan, the United States has to a large
extent maintained the status quo across the Taiwan Strait444. It is noteworthy that the purpose of
this policy was to ensure that US interest in the region would not be threatened. Preventing
Taiwan’s pro-independence forces from provoking Beijing, the US can effectively reduce the
possibility that the mainland adopts military approach to threaten Taiwan, thereby avoiding to
involve in a cross-strait military conflict. On the other hand, criticizing Beijing’s coercive policy
towards Taiwan, arranging US own military deployment, and enhancing Taiwan’s military
strength through arms sales have significantly raised the cost of taking over Taiwan by force,
thereby reducing the likelihood that Beijing will use military approach to resolve the Taiwan Issue.
In essence, constraining Taiwan realizes “No Independence” while deterring the mainland
achieves “No Use of Force”. Together, these policies ensure that the two sides across the strait will
achieve “No Unification”.
The US Potential Target related to High Level Interest in the Taiwan Issue
When the policy of double deterrence has improved peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait
while maintaining Taiwan’s de facto independence, a few details of this policy also provides clues
that the US government has a target that is related to a higher level interest. The Korean War has
let the US recognize that its regional security and other interest are involved in the Taiwan Issue,
but the double deterrence finally achieves “No Independence” and “No Use of Force”, which
maintains “No Unification” and therefore ensures those interests will not be under threat. However,
within this context, Washington still repeatedly emphasizes that Taiwan Issue must be resolved by
440 Xiu Chunping. (2004). The US Constraint on Chen Shuibian's Pro-independence
Activities. Relations Across Taiwan Straits . 2 (2), p30-32.
441 Wang Gonglong. (2006). An Analysis of US Response to Taiwan's Pro-independence
Rethorics. Party & Government Forum. 3 (3), p39-40.
442 Guo Jianping. (2007). Review of Bush Administration's Response to Taiwan's
Pro-Independence behaviors. Tai Sheng. 1 (1), p50-53.
443 Guo Jianping. (2007). Review of Bush Administration's Response to Taiwan's
Pro-Independence behaviors. Tai Sheng. 1 (1), p50-53.
444 Su Ge (1998). American China policy and the Taiwan issue. Beijing: World Affairs Press. p811.
108
a peaceful approach, implying that the US expects a particular resolution of the Taiwan Issue.
On April 22nd 2004, then Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Daley made a speech in Singapore,
reiterating US support for the One China principle, but also stating that the US would not oppose
the status quo in the Taiwan Strait being changed, as long as this change was peaceful and
accepted by both sides across the strait445. Nevertheless, if Taiwan still refuses to abandon its
pursuit of de jure independence or tries to maintain its de facto independence, which means it has
no desire to achieve unification with the mainland, this “peaceful change” mentioned by US
official can only refer to Taiwan’s peaceful independence, because mainland China is forbidden to
use force against Taiwan. Further proof about the US real purpose in the Taiwan Issue appeared in
2005. Within the context that cross-strait dialogues between the ARATS and the SEF was not
restored, Taiwan's opposition leaders started to visit mainland China and largely improved the
communication between the CCP and Taiwan’s opposition parties. But Washington did not show
any positive support for this progress, reminding Beijing to give more weight to dialogues with the
Taiwan authorities led by the pro-independence Chen Shui-bian who had already raised huge
tensions across the strait through separatist activities446. Even when Chen Shui-bian proposed
constitutional amendments in September 2006, the United States still pressed mainland China to
start dialogue with Taiwan's elected leader, showing no interest in Taiwan’s opposition leaders
who shared One China principle with Beijing. This clearly revealed what US truly supported was
the dialogue between Chinese leadership and the pro-independence party which attempted to
overstep the mainland’s bottom line447. It is noteworthy that this support for the DPP was not
because Chen Shui-bian was then top leader of the Taiwan authorities, because the KMT had
largely eased the cross-strait tension and won an increasing public support, showing that it was
likely to regain power in the coming election in 2008. In such a case, the US support for dialogue
between the mainland and Taiwan’s pro-independence forces was actually motivated by its hope
that Beijing might make compromises with Taiwan’s pro-independence forces, thereby enabling
the US to further approach its ultimate goal of Taiwan’s peaceful independence.
According to analysis in previous chapters, maintaining the status quo by preventing the mainland
from achieving national unification means that Beijing cannot break the island chain to send its
military forces into the Pacific Ocean, which implies mainland China will never become a
maritime power, thereby ensuring that US political influence and security interests in the
Asia-Pacific region will not face any strong threat from China. This indicates that if China is
curbed to achieve its high level interests, the United States can effectively safeguard its regional
security and political influence. Similarly, the target of realizing Taiwan’s peaceful independence,
which is related to the highest level US interest involved in the Taiwan Issue, will seriously
damage China’s most fundamental interests such as sovereignty, territorial integrity, and even
homeland security.
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The situation can even further deteriorate if CCP regime’s legitimacy is questioned, because
Beijing’s inability to safeguard China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity will be viewed by
various domestic and international anti-communist forces as a signal that they can incite social
discontent against the rule of the CCP. This may lead to the collapse of the PRC and establishment
of a new regime which has no strength or ambition to challenge US power and influence in Asian
and world affairs. Apparently, for the United States, a China that is beset with a variety of internal
and external problems is much better than a China that fails to become a maritime power but still
keeps its national strength rising. If CCP regime’s legitimacy is seriously challenged, the US can
even promote a peaceful evolution in China, making US own values and ideologies become the
consensus of Chinese society, which will doubtlessly enhance the US global hegemony. It is
noteworthy this target related to US high level interest is to a large extent based on Washington’s
judgment that mainland China ruled by the CCP is a hostile force that threatens US interests.
Because of this judgment, preventing Taiwan from falling into CCP’s hands is necessary, while the
target of transforming the mainland into a pro-American state after the collapse of the hostile PRC
is also understandable.
Conclusion
In general, since recognizing Taiwan’s strategic status, the US policy towards the Taiwan Issue
had swung between different positions of Beijing and Taipei for several times as the international
environment was changing. This swinging was due to the fact that Washington had to take into
account of Chinese potential response when handling its Taiwan Issue, trying to find a balance
point that could maximize the US interests. However, this swinging between different positions is
only a passive reaction. Once Washington’s perception of relative power is inaccurate, leading the
degree of its policy swinging to be too large, the side whose interest is harmed will make a strong
response and therefore shake cross-strait stability, damaging US own interests in the region. In
these circumstances, based on the lessons learned in the Third Taiwan Strait Crisis, the United
States began to revise its Taiwan policy, replacing previous policy swinging between different
positions of Beijing and Taipei with a more efficient policy of double deterrence to realize three
important targets, which are “No Unification, No Use of Force, and No Independence”. Although
Washington opposed any unilateral change in the status quo, its high level interest in the Taiwan
Issue has determined that it actually pursues not only the continuous separation between the two
sides across the strait, but also the eventual peaceful de jure independence of Taiwan. Another
important fact needs to be noticed is that none of US interests involved in the Taiwan Issue
belongs to the fundamental level. Even after redefining Taiwan’s strategic value, those US
interests threatened by the cross-strait unification are neither the nation’s homeland security, nor
the country’s sovereignty or territorial integrity. More precisely, the security interest concerned by
Washington when it largely raised Taiwan’s status in the US regional strategy, is not US own
homeland security, but the security of US military bases and US allies in the Asia-Pacific region,
which indicates that the US intervention in the Taiwan Strait is to protect its regional influence. In
these circumstances, for the United States, the interests under threat and the interests to be
achieved are all at the high level, which makes it different from other three actors in the Taiwan
Issue.
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Chapter VI The Role of Japan in the Taiwan Issue
Compared with the United States which paid little attention to Taiwan’s strategic value until the
outbreak of the Korean War, Japan’s concern about Taiwan appeared much earlier. After the
Sino-Japanese War between 1894 and 1895, the defeated Qing Dynasty was forced to sign the
“Treaty of Shimonoseki” (Ma Guan Tiao Yue), ceding Taiwan to Japan448. Since then, Japan has
kept its colonial rule over Taiwan for fifty years until Tokyo surrendered in the end of the World
War II. This long colonial rule not only made Japan have a far reaching influence on Taiwan that
no other country can match, but also generated a strong emotion in Japan’s elites and society about
Taiwan, which is rarely found in other cases of colonist and its colony. Moreover, Japan and
Taiwan are both in East Asia, which has determined that Japan will deal with the Taiwan Issue
from a perspective that may be essentially different from the US.
Evolution of Japanese Policy towards Taiwan
Japan's Taiwan Policy during the Cold War: Following the US Strategy and Maintaining
Japanese Own Ambitions
After Japan surrendered in 1945, according to the Cairo Declaration and the Potsdam
Proclamation, Taiwan and the Pescadores were returned to China, ending Japanese fifty years
colonial rule in the area. But Japan’s relations with China became complex when the PRC was
founded in 1949 while the KMT retreated to Taiwan. In such a case, Japan had to concern that
how to deal with its relationship with the mainland and Taiwan in the post-war era449. However, its
identity as a defeated nation constrained Tokyo’s foreign policy option. Although Beijing sent
signals that it wished to establish economic and cultural cooperation with Japan, Tokyo was
unable to give any positive response because it was under US military occupation and could not
decide its own foreign policy making450. Precisely, Japan's only choice was following American
strategy of supporting Chiang Kai-shek and opposing the CCP. In 1951, the US and Japan signed
the “Treaty of Peace with Japan”, so the US military control was ended and Japan returned to the
international community451. Then Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida sent a letter to the US envoy
Dulles, saying that Japan was prepared to establish political relations with the ROC government
and had no intention to sign any bilateral treaties with the CCP regime on the mainland452. In April
1952, the Japanese government signed a peace treaty with the Taiwan authorities, which was
criticized by Beijing because the latter believed this behavior violated the Cairo Declaration and
the Potsdam Proclamation by ignoring that Taiwan belonged to China453. In such a case, this treaty
can be regarded as the beginning of “Taiwan's status remains unresolved” theory maintained by
Japan in its following policies toward Taiwan. In 1960, the “Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and
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Security between the United State and Japan” was signed in Washington, which allowed the US to
use Japan's facilities and territory454. It is noteworthy that the geographical scope covered by this
treaty included all areas ruled by the Taiwan authorities, so this was the first time that Japanese
government showed its position in the Taiwan Issue, which was cooperating with the United States
to intervene in those issues related to Taiwan’s security. During his visit to the US in 1961, then
Prime Minister Ikeda told then US President John F. Kennedy that preventing a country with a
large population like China from joining in the UN was not realistic, suggesting that US and Japan
should promote PRC’s participation in the UN under the premise that Taiwan’s status would not be
influenced455. This suggestion actually meant Japan wished to build “Two Chinas” in the
international community, which therefore received strong protest from both Beijing and Taipei.
Consequently, Japan failed to establish political connection with the mainland because Tokyo had
already recognized Taipei as the official regime of “China”. In such a case, Japanese policy
makers preferred to separate political and economic issues, comprehensively enhancing
Japan-Taiwan relations while simultaneously improving Japanese economic ties with mainland
China456. In the following period, the Japanese government continued this policy, attempting to
gradually establish formal diplomatic relations with mainland China as long as it would not
damage Japan’s relations with Taiwan. This implied that Japan-Taiwan relations was always put in
the first place when Japanese political leaders formulated their policy towards mainland China,
because this was consistent with the US position.
Since establishing diplomatic ties with Taipei, for nearly 20 years, Japan's policy seemed to have
been following the US strategy, recognizing the Taiwan authorities as China's legal regime,
maintaining close political and economic relations with Taiwan, supporting Chiang Kai-shek's
offensive policy against the mainland, and openly supporting the US intervention in the Taiwan
Strait to block Chinese reunification. It should be noted that, the fact that Japan was unable to
formulate its foreign policy independently but had to follow the US regional strategy does not
mean that Tokyo’s Taiwan policies during this period were contrary to its real position, because it
has never abandoned its ambition for Taiwan. For example, the anti-communist political forces
inside Japan not only strongly supported the hostile policies promoted by the US to blockade the
mainland, but also wished to realize their wildest ambition of taking Taiwan back under Japanese
rule through continually deepening Japan-Taiwan relations. Before Sino-Japanese normalization, a
few Japanese politicians even publicly declared that Taiwan should return to the Japanese territory
in the form of a Japan-Taiwan federation or a united kingdom of Japan and Taiwan, restoring the
situation in the colonial era457.
In the 1970s, the international situation experienced significant changes. The US began to contact
with mainland China and normalize the two countries’ diplomatic relations, in order to cope with
the security threat from the Soviet Union. Nixon's visit to China shocked the world, forcing the
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Japanese government to immediately adjust its foreign policy and start negotiation with Beijing,
which effort finally led the two countries to establish formal diplomatic relations in 1972458. Like
what happened in the process of normalizing diplomatic relations with the US, the Taiwan Issue
was also an important part in Beijing’s talks with Tokyo, implying that accepting the One China
principle was the premise for establishing diplomatic relations. In such a case, the Japanese
government seemed to abandon its previous pursuit of building two Chinas in the international
community, but did not completely accept the One China principle like what the US did. For the
PRC’s declaration that “Taiwan is a part of Chinese territory”, the response of the Japanese
government was “Japan fully understands and respects Chinese position”, rather than conceding or
accepting this position459. Obviously, this attitude was not as good as the US statement that
“Chinese people on both sides of the Taiwan Strait believe that there is but a single China, and
Taiwan is a part of China”, which accepted the One China principle and was only ambiguous
about whether this “China” meant the PRC or the ROC. This subtle difference between Tokyo and
Washington’s response to the One China principle revealed that Japan was clear about its own
interests involved in the Taiwan Issue and preferred to pursue its own targets rather than simply
following the US policy. More precisely, Japan’s behavior seemed to be consistent with the US
strategy only because Tokyo believed its own interest pursuit would be achieved by US policy,
otherwise the policy made by Tokyo would be more or less different from the US.
Japan’s Taiwan Policy in the Post Cold War era
Japan began to upgrade its relations with Taiwan in the post Cold War era. After breaking their
diplomatic relations, Japan still maintained information exchanges with Taiwan and strengthened
political ties through non-governmental organizations like the Japanese Interchange Association
and Association of East Asian Relations, which consisted of government officials and
politicians460. In the 1990s, the Taiwan's Association of East Asian Relations was renamed as the
Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office in Japan, exercising the function of an
embassy although its identity was still an unofficial institution461. Meanwhile, the Japanese
Association in Taiwan also made itself more like an official agency, largely promoting
communications and sharing information between Japanese and Taiwan’s politicians462.
Consequently, the relationship between Japan and Taiwan was greatly improved when their
politicians’ formal and informal visits became more frequent463.
Meanwhile, there were also increasing contacts between political parties from Japan and Taiwan.
Since the 1990s, the ruling and most opposition parties in Japan all established their pro-Taiwan
political organizations to keep close contacts with Taiwan’s political parties, playing significant
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role in promoting Taiwan's “pragmatic diplomacy” and resolving the political problems between
Japan and Taiwan. Among these organizations, the Japan-Taiwan Parliamentary Friendship Group
established by the Democratic Party of Japan in 2000 was relatively moderate in the formulation
of Japan’s policy towards Taiwan. Its main purpose was to support Taiwan’s return to the
international community. By contrast, other organizations such as the Japan-Taiwan Parliamentary
Friendship Alliance which consisted of the Liberal Democratic Party members, not only negated
the One China principle, but even improved their contacts with the pro-independence forces and
provided openly support to separatist activities like referendum promoted by the DPP464. It is
noteworthy that Japanese government never publicly opposed any of these pro-Taiwan
organizations’ behavior. Considering the fact that members of these organizations came from both
ruling and opposition parties which had sufficient influence to lobby the government, the behavior
of these organizations actually reflected Tokyo’s true position in the Taiwan Issue.
Compared with the development in its relations with Taiwan, Japan’s ambiguous position of
“respects and understands” One China principle did not experience any change after the Cold War.
In the Third Taiwan Strait Crisis, China once wished that Japan could make a clear declaration that
it did not support Taiwan’s independence, but the Japanese government's response was that Japan's
position was always based on “the Sino-Japanese Joint Statement”, which indicated that Tokyo
refused Beijing’s demand and still maintained its “respects and understands” position465.
Considering the fact that the Japanese government continually deepens its relations with Taiwan
while Japan’s domestic political forces have directly or openly negated the One China principle,
this “respects and understands” position actually reveals that Tokyo does not support Beijing’s
pursuit but rather wishes Taiwan can achieve its de jure independence. But Japan also understands
once there is a serious military conflict in the Taiwan Strait, its own interests are bound to suffer
huge damage and Taiwan’s de facto independence may be ended. This is why Japan also
emphasizes that Taiwan Issue should be resolved by peaceful approach. The former Prime
Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone once proposed five principles to guide Japanese policy making,
which focused on opposing China to use military actions to resolve the Taiwan Issue466. Faced by
the Chinese Anti-secession Law, the Japanese government also expressed its opposition, arguing
that Beijing should use peaceful solution such as dialogue to deal with Taiwan Issue467. Obviously,
this position of opposing any military pressure from mainland China against Taiwan is nearly
identical to the US target of “No Use of Force”, attempting to avoid Japan’s own fundamental
interests to be damaged.
Two Significant Features of Japan’s Taiwan Policy
Like the United States, Japan's interests are involved in the Taiwan Issue, and its Taiwan policy
can create profound impact on the cross strait situation. However, it is noteworthy that Japan’s
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Taiwan policy has some unique features that are different from the US.
First of all, unlike the United States, Japan's Taiwan policy is relatively stable, rarely showing any
obvious swinging. In the post Cold War era, with the changing international situation, Japan
started to formulate Taiwan policy based on its own interest pursuit. Even though these policies
often seemed to follow the US strategy in the Asia Pacific region, they should be regarded as
Japan's own choices. One proof is that Japan usually did not follow US steps when the latter’s
policy was swinging to Beijing’s position. More precisely, compared with its burgeoning
relationship with Taiwan, Japan almost never formulated any policy that could be regarded as
favoring the mainland’s position while damaging Taiwan’s interest. This stability in Japan’s policy,
which doubtlessly makes Tokyo’s position more hardline than the US in the view of Chinese
leadership, is due to fact that Japanese fundamental interests are involved in the Taiwan Issue. In
other words, refusing to make compromise with Beijing while insisting on effective intervention
in the Taiwan Issue only because Tokyo believes its fundamental interests are threatened by
Chinese unification.
Secondly, compared with mainland China and the US which both make their positions on the
Taiwan Issue very clear, Japan’s policy usually attracts much less attention from the international
community. Beijing’s pursuit of national unification and opposition to Taiwan’s independence are
always clear and have never changed since the end of the Chinese Civil War, causing widespread
concern in the international community. The swinging of US policy is also very obvious and
Washington rarely hides its real intention, which makes it possible to identify the US position
through analyzing its policy evolution. By contrast, Japan’s policy entirely followed the US steps
during the Cold War, and when Tokyo gradually obtain autonomy in foreign policy making, its
Taiwan policy still seems to be consistent with the US strategy in significant events. In such a case,
it is often regarded by the international community as a part of US strategy. Moreover, Japan’s
Taiwan policy is relatively moderate compared with US influential behavior in the Taiwan Strait.
In the post Cold War era, although its domestic political forces often explicitly supported Taiwan’s
pro-independence forces, the Japanese government has never publicly negated the One China
principle, and it has no policy like arms sales that can directly affect the security situation in the
Taiwan Strait. Even during the Third Taiwan Strait Crisis when Japan’s own safety was influenced
by Chinese military deterrence, the Japanese government still did not take any coercive
intervention such as sending warships to the strait468. This seemingly moderate stance cannot
easily arouse Beijing’s serious concern and also leads the international community to pay little
attention to Japan’s Taiwan policy. Consequently, the role played by Japan in the Taiwan Issue
sometimes seems to be ambiguous.
To understand Tokyo’s targets in the Taiwan Issue, one should examine Japan’s cooperation with
the US. Precisely, if Japan closely follows the US steps, it can be concluded that the target pursued
by Washington also more or less meets Tokyo’s interest demand. But if there is a subtle difference
between US and Japan’s policy, Tokyo’s words and deeds should be carefully analyzed because
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this difference usually indicates that US policy may not achieve Japan’s target and Tokyo has to
take certain behavior to safeguard its own fundamental interests. Meanwhile, according to the
analysis in the previous chapter, the reason that US opposes mainland China’s pursuit is that
Washington believes China is a hostile force and thus Taiwan will be utilized to threaten American
political influence and security interest in the Asia-Pacific region if Beijing achieves unification.
Similarly, to understand Japan’s own interests involved in the Taiwan Issue and its real targets
which often hide behind its cooperation with the US, it is also necessary to analyze Japan’s
attitude towards China. In fact, its official “respects and understands” and its domestic political
forces’ openly support for the pro-independence movements in Taiwan have revealed Japan’s
serious concern about its neighbor’s rapid economic growth and increasingly military capabilities.
This concern as well as potential and real conflicts in the Sino-Japanese relations are keys to
explain what interests Tokyo believes are involved in the Taiwan Issue and therefore what policy it
should formulate.
Japanese Strategy of Normal State and Its Conflicts with the Rise of China
Specialists have recognized there are a large number of conflicts between Japan and China when
the two regional powers try to achieve their targets in various regional and global affairs in
economic, political, and security areas, which makes a few scholars believe that Japan and China
are actually in a “structural contradiction”469. Considering the fact that most of these conflicting
targets pursued by the two countries are included in their national strategies, this “structural
contradiction” may indicate that Tokyo and Beijing are playing a zero sum game. In fact, from
Japanese political leaders and scholars’ perspective, China’s growing power is threatening Japan’s
strategy and Tokyo thus should take effective measures to contain its neighbor’s rise470.
Before the Meiji Restoration, the external environment concerned by Japan's national strategy was
the East Asian regional order dominated by China. But when this environment was dramatically
changed because of the decline of China and the rise of the Western powers, Japan chose a new
strategy of external invasion, wishing to destroy the old East Asian regional order and replace it
with the so called “Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere” dominated by Japan471. But its
invasion failed when the Allied Forces won the Second World War in the mid-1940s, and Japan
became a defeated country which could not decide its own policy making but had to follow the US
strategy during the period of the Cold War. In the post Cold War era, Japan's external environment
faced another round of changes. As the only superpower, the United States began to adjust its
strategy in the Asia-Pacific region, while mainland China rose rapidly after adopting the reform
and opening up policy, regaining its status as an important regional power472. It is not difficult to
realize that before the Meiji Restoration, the country Japan concerned most when making its
strategy was China, and this country became the United States until the end of the Cold War. But
the new situation in the post-Cold War era forced Japan to take both countries into account in its
strategy making. Meanwhile, Japan's internal situation especially its economic strength was also
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quite different from that in the previous period. In these circumstances, it is not surprising that
Japan wished to make a new strategy.
This new strategy is to transform the country into a “Normal State”, which means the Japanese
government should dominate its internal affairs and enjoy equal rights as other countries in the
international community, particularly the right of self-defense against aggression473. The concept
of Normal State was put forward in 1993 by Mr Ozawa, who believed that Japan had already
become a world economic power and should become an international great power in the future,
and for that reason, the country should be transformed into a Normal State474. This concept was
soon widely accepted by most Japanese politicians and supported by the society, becoming the
mainstream political view of most Japanese people and therefore dominating the country’s policy
making in the post Cold War era475. According to Japanese elites, becoming a Normal State means
that Japan will play a more significant role in maintaining world peace, requiring Tokyo to change
its passive defense strategy and break the constraints imposed by its post-war system, while
simultaneously promoting multilateral diplomacy in the Asia Pacific region to safeguard regional
security and prosperity476.
In fact, the reason that Japan has such a strong will to become a Normal State is it lacks many
significant rights enjoyed by other countries because of the constraints imposed by both the Article
9 of the so called “Peace Constitution” and the “Enemy State” clause of the UN Charter. Therefore,
breaking these constraints is the major content of its Normal State strategy477. More precisely, the
strategy consists of two aspects: maintaining and enhancing Japanese current economic strength,
and obtaining political and military strength that Japan has lacked since the end of the World War
II. Both aspects are directly related to mainland China.
Economic Strength of Japan
During the period of the Cold War, Japan maintained a rapid economic growth and became the
most developed country in Asia. In the 1970s, Singapore, South Korea, Hong Kong and Taiwan
also experienced fast economic development and became the so called Newly Industrial
Economies (NIEs) known as the “four Asian tigers”478. In the 1980s, China and the Southeast
Asian countries such as Thailand also started their process of economic modernization, which
differed from Japan and the NIEs because of different industrial foundations and economic
development levels. In the view of Japanese experts, the situation that Japan and its Asian
neighbors were in different stages of economic modernization formed an ideal model for the
international division of labor in East Asia. In this model, Japan was the leading force and the
NIEs were at the second level that closely followed Japan, while China and the ASEAN countries
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were considered to be the most backward countries that could only accept technology transfer
from the more advanced Japan and NIEs, concentrating on labor-intensive industries479. This was
the famous “Flying Geese” model, which emphasized the leadership position of Japan in leading
the entire Southeast Asian economic development. However, the rapid economic rise of China in
the 1990s broke this model and ultimately challenged the leading position and future plans of
Japan in East Asia480. In fact, the viability of this Flying Geese model greatly depended on the
hypothesis that countries in the model would stay in different stages of economic modernization.
But when China maintained a long term rapid economic growth, while its huge domestic market
and cheap labors attracted considerable foreign investment, it could no longer be regarded as a
small “goose” following Japan. Instead, with increasing economic strength, China was viewed by
more and more countries as the new leading force in the region's economic affairs. This situation
was clearly contrary to Japan’s expectation of using its remarkable economic growth and
advanced technology to gain a great power status and even leadership in East Asian political and
security affairs, and therefore caused a serious anxiety in Japanese society, especially when
Japan's own economic development entered a period of stagnation after the burst of its economic
bubble in the 1990s481.
Apart from that, Japan’s identity as a maritime state also indicates its pursuit of leadership position
in Asia is likely to be influenced by China’s rise. The pattern of a maritime state’s economic
development is quite different from that of self sufficient continental countries such as mainland
China. Due to its limited resources, the maritime state usually needs to seek and maintain overseas
supplies of raw materials through expansion, and sell its products to overseas markets, which
means that Japan must import cheap resources from other countries and then sell its expensive
industrial products to the international market482. Obviously, this pattern of economic development
such as the Flying Geese model, requires the Japanese government to ensure the safety of the
country’s marine trade. That is why according to Japanese officials and scholars, the safety of
Japan's sea route is a matter of life and death for the nation’s prosperity and development483. In
fact, there are a large number of strategic commodities needed by Japanese economic development,
such as oil, natural gas, and iron ore are largely dependent on imports, while shipping is Japan’s
major way of importing raw materials and exporting its manufactured goods484. Therefore, any
long-term interference on Japan’s sea lanes will seriously harm Japan's industrial production,
leading to economic recession and even weakening the government's ability to provide public
services, which may cause social unrest.
Among Japan's maritime transport routes, the most important one may be that connects Japan with
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Europe, the Middle East, and Southeast Asia, because a large part of oil imports to Japan are
transported through it485. This route, however, also passes through some narrow waterways which
are close to areas with political instability or even serious regional conflict, such as the South
China Sea and the Taiwan Strait. Considering the territorial disputes in the South China Sea and
the potential cross-strait conflict, China as the regional great power with growing political and
economic influence and increasingly military capabilities, is viewed by Japan as the potential
biggest threat to Japanese maritime transportation.
Map 1 Oil shipment routes and volumes through Maritime Southeast Asia.
Source: Graham E. Japan's Sea Lane Security: AMatter of Life and Death?[M]. Routledge, 2005, p30.
Japan’s anxiety is understandable, especially when China has also realized the significance of
those channels for its own economic development and maritime strategy. As detailed in previous
chapters, China wishes to transform itself into a maritime power, expanding its defense zone into
the Pacific Ocean. Former Deputy Commander of the Chinese Navy Zhang Xusan once declared
that Chinese naval operations should cover areas from Sea of Japan to the Strait of Malacca, and
emphasized that the Chinese maritime defense zone should incorporate the First Island Chain,
which consists of Indonesia, the Philippines, Japan, and Taiwan486. This indicates that Beijing will
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take great effort to break the First Island Chain to open its route into the ocean. But this behavior
is bound to influence sea areas where all those maritime channels pass through such as the Bashi
Channel and the Strait of Malacca. In these circumstances, China’s pursuit of becoming a great
maritime power is in conflict with Japan’s Normal State strategy when both countries seek to
control those significant maritime channels. In other words, it is very difficult for Tokyo to accept
its powerful neighbor to become a maritime power because Japan’s maritime lifeline will be under
mainland China’s control.
Tokyo’s Pursuit of Increasing Japan’s Political Influence
Compared with maintaining and raising its economic strength, Japan's strategy of Normal State
pays more attention to Tokyo’s demand for political and military power, trying to transform the
country into a influential political power in the international community with sufficient military
strength that can dominate regional and some global affairs.
In the post Cold War era, the fact that Japan had become a great economic power but without a
matched political status in the international community prompted the Japanese government to
adjust its relations with foreign countries and improve its capabilities to intervene in regional and
global affairs. It should be noted that, although it seemed that Japan wished to become a global
political power, its policies to a large extent still focused on East Asia, trying to promote its
relations with its neighboring government.
Within the context that China signed the “Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia”,
which was perceived by some scholars as an attempt to reshape the regional order, Japan also
formulated a series of policies to increase its influence on Asian countries487. In 2002, then Prime
Minister Junichiro Koizumi proposed to establish the “East Asia Community” which included
Japan, China, South Korea, the ASEAN, Australia, and New Zealand, hoping to largely improve
Japanese cooperation with the ASEAN and therefore weaken China's economic influence over
these Southeast Asian countries488. In 2008, Japan signed Free Trade Area agreement with ASEAN
countries and also joined in the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia489. Meanwhile,
a few Japanese scholars suggested that Japan should unite with maritime states in the Western
Pacific region such as the Philippines, Indonesia, and Australia to form a “strategic arc” led by
Japan490. The idea was soon supported by political leaders like then Foreign Minister Aso Taro
who argued in 2006 that Japan should establish an “Arc of Freedom and Prosperity”, which was
written in Japanese “Diplomatic Blue Book 2007” as a “new Japanese diplomatic pillar”491.
According to Aso, in order to promote universal values such as human rights, freedom, democracy,
and market economy in the international community, it was necessary to strengthen Japanese
relations with democratic countries in Southeast Asia, Central Asia, and Eastern Europe,
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promoting these countries’ exchanges with Japan. This plan of building an “Arc of Freedom and
Prosperity” indicated that Japan was seeking to increase its political influence in Asia and even
Eastern Europe through assisting local countries’ economic development and promoting universal
values. If this plan worked, it would form a stable international environment for Japan's economic
development, and might even bring Japan a leadership position in regional affairs492.
This kind of policies which are targeted at the leadership position in regional affairs will inevitably
arouse serious concern from mainland China even other regional powers may not generate strong
response. Precisely, the United States is the only super power and it is not an Asian country, so it
may not be directly threatened by regional unrest, which makes it less fragile than Asian countries
when facing changes in regional political and security situation. Russia, which spans two
continents, believes its core security and development issues center on Europe, and therefore pays
relatively less attention to East Asia. Although South Korea plays an irreplaceable role in dealing
with issues related to the DPRK, there is little doubt that its influence on Asia is still limited
compared with those great powers. Similarly, despite the active role played by the ASEAN in
regional economic cooperation, its relatively weak economic and military strength have
determined it cannot obtain dominant power in regional affairs. By contrast, China and Japan are
both great powers in East Asia with significant influence on regional affairs, while their
development and security are also largely dependent on their relations with neighboring countries
and regional stability. In these circumstances, it is not a surprise that the two countries are
sensitive to the policy and behavior of each other which may change the regional political or
security situation. In fact, most scholars agree that Japan and China are engaging in a competition
for regional leadership position493.
In the view of Japan, a rising China doubtlessly has undermined its target to become the leading
country in regional affairs and a global political power. Through economic cooperation with
Southeast Asian countries, actively dealing with the DPRK nuclear issue494, holding the Boao
Forum495, replacing the United States as Africa's largest trading partner after holding the
China-Africa Cooperation Forum496, and participating in multinational military operations fighting
against Somali pirates497, China has proved its great power status in the political, economic, and
security areas. Its growing international influence further raises its confidence in dealing with
regional and global affairs. In September and October 2013, Chinese President Xi Jinping put
forward a new economic cooperation plan known as “the Silk Road Economic Belt” (“the Belt”)
and “the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road” (“the Road”), which would use multilateral
cooperation between China and countries along the roads to develop Chinese economic
partnership with these countries, and therefore build a community of shared interests, destiny, and
492 Hosoya Y. The Rise and Fall of Japan's Grand Strategy: The “Arc of Freedom and Prosperity”
and the Future Asian Order[J]. Asia-Pacific Review, 2011, 18(1): 13-24.
493 Terada T. Forming an East Asian community: a site for Japan–China power struggles[J].
Japanese Studies, 2006, 26(1): 5-17.
494 Zhu Feng. (2006). Chinese Mediation and the Six-Party Talks. Journal of Foreign Affairs College.
2 (2), p23-30.
495 Howard J. Transcript of the Address to the Boao Forum, China[J]. 23rd April, 2005.
496 Wenping H. The balancing act of China’s Africa policy[J]. China Security, 2007, 3(3): 23-40.
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121
responsibility, featuring mutual political trust, economic integration, and cultural inclusiveness498.
More than 60 countries and international organizations have already given positive responses to
this plan, which indicates that the Belt and the Road may become the world's longest economic
corridor499. In such a case, this ambitious plan is regarded as a Chinese version of the Marshall
Plan by many western scholars500.
By contrast, Japan’s plan of expanding its political influence in Asia and Europe through
multilateral economic cooperation, such as the “Arc of Freedom and Prosperity”, received little
positive response. Its suggestion for building an East Asian Community even backfired because
this concept reminded Japan’s neighboring countries which had suffered Japanese invasion during
the World War II of then Japanese slogan: “the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere”501. For
Japan which achieved economic modernization much earlier than China, these different results in
pursuing regional leadership position are hard to accept and makes Tokyo believe that China’s rise
has become a major obstacle for Japan’s target of obtaining more political influence and becoming
a great political power. Within the context that these two countries lack mutual trust, this
competition for greater influence in the international community and dominance in regional affairs
leads to intensified rivalry between Japan and China in various political and security issues.
Consequently, Japan prefers to contain rather than cooperate with China when Tokyo is seeking
political influence.
Changing the post War System and Obtaining Military Power
Compared with its pursuit of political influence which received few positive response from the
international community, Japan’s effort to amend its Peace Constitution in order to acquire
military power has aroused more serious concern of the United States, China, and other
neighboring countries in East Asia.
The Constitution was established when Japan was occupied by the US after World War II. Its
major aim was to transform the fascist Japan into a peaceful democratic country. According to this
Constitution, the right of belligerency is not recognized and only a narrowly defined Self Defense
Force (SDF) rather than traditional military is allowed. In Article 9 of the Second Chapter, the
Constitution clearly stated that “Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and
order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or
use of force as means of settling international disputes” and “In order to accomplish the aim of the
preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be
maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized”502. Under these
restrictions, Japan preferred to leave its security issue to the United States, focusing on its own
economic development in the post war era and eventually becoming an economic power.
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Although this Peace Constitution contributed a lot to Japan’s rapid economic growth after the
World War II, from right wing politicians’ perspective, it undoubtedly prevented Japan from
becoming an influential military power. These politicians started to challenge the Peace
Constitution in the 1950s, but due to the strong domestic and international pressures, their
activities of amending Constitution did not achieve the end503. However, when Japanese
international and domestic situations both changed in the post Cold War era, Tokyo began to
believe its Constitution should be amended, trying to remove those constraints imposed by its post
war system on its defense policy making.
This actually implies that the Constitution should match the country’s strategy. Precisely, the
Peace Constitution was completely consistent with Japanese strategy in the post war era which
focused on economic construction rather than security issues. In other words, those restrictions
imposed by the Constitution helped Tokyo to better achieve its target of becoming an economic
power. But if these restrictions are no longer appropriate for the strategy in the new period,
political leaders and elites will tend to reevaluate the Constitution and try to amend certain
clauses.
Before Mr. Ozawa formally proposed the concept of Normal State, then Yasuhiro administration
had already argued that Japan should become a political power, seeking a political status matched
to the country’s increasingly economic power in the 1980s. The major method was to strengthen
the power of the Prime Minister and the Cabinet through internal political reform, while
improving US-Japan relations to raise Japan’s status in the international community504. This was a
significant adjustment in Japan’s previous strategy of focusing on economic issues, although its
target was ambiguous and gave more weight to the US-Japan alliance rather than clearly defining
what kind of path Japan would follow in the future. This adjustment, including the rearmament
promoted by the Yasuhiro administration, soon faced restrictions of Japan’s Three Non-Nuclear
Principles and its “Special Defense” policy based on the Peace Constitution505. This made
Japanese politicians realize if they wished to transform the country into a political power or a
Normal State, they needed to amend the Constitution first. This explained why there were a large
number of constitutional amendments which were promoted by different political parties and
covered almost all issues related to the Constitution, such as Article 9 and the security issues
emphasized by the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), the human rights clause advocated by the
New Komeito, and more broad topics raised by the Democratic Party506. These amendments,
which not only focused on the country’s sovereignty and security, but also involved issues in
legislative, administrative, local autonomy and other areas, were efforts to transform Japan into a
Normal State.
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No matter how many areas were involved, the core of these amendments was whether Article 9’s
restrictions on the Self Defense Forces could be removed. In November 2004, then LDP Secretary
General Taku Yamasaki proposed an amendment that was targeted at Article 9, stating that in order
to maintain international peace while defending the country's sovereignty, independence, and
homeland security, Japan should keep its navy, army, air force, and other related organizations
under the high command of Japanese Prime Minister507. On November 22nd 2005, the LDP held its
50th anniversary and officially announced its amendment bill, which declared that Japan should
break those restrictions of the existing Constitutional system and become a political and military
power, arguing that Japan's military strength must be clearly defined and improved by new
development508. This actually indicated that Japan should maintain an army with the Prime
Minister as the supreme commander. On this basis, the LDP further suggested that Japan could use
military power to achieve its political goals in the regional and global affairs, promoting Japanese
Self Defense Forces’ overseas operations.
In order to obtain military power, the US-Japan alliance is bound to be further strengthened,
because domestic Constitutional Amendment alone is unlikely to raise the country's military
influence in a relatively short period of time. In 1951, the US and Japan signed the “Security
Treaty between the United States and Japan”. In 1960, the two countries signed the “Treaty of
Mutual Cooperation and Security between the United States and Japan”, which clearly stated that
the US forces could use facilities and areas in Japan509. This treaty subsequently became the
significant foundation on which Tokyo formulated its security policy, but it is in conflict with the
Constitution. For example, if the United States is attacked outside the Japanese territory, should
Japan defend its ally? According to Article 9’s prohibition of overseas military operations, the
answer should be negative. However, the treaty implies that Tokyo may be able to remove this
restriction on Japan’s collective self defense, which is doubtlessly consistent with Japan’s new
strategy of Normal State. This explains why the US-Japan alliance rather than the Peace
Constitution is playing an increasingly fundamental role in the formulation of Japan’s security
policy.
Recognizing that Constitution’s restrictions can be weakened by Japan’s military cooperation with
the US, Japanese political leaders have taken more efforts to strengthen the US-Japan alliance. In
April 1996, the two countries made the “US-Japan Joint Declaration on Security Alliances for the
21st Century”, emphasizing the necessity of maintaining their military alliance and declaring they
would further develop the alliance in the post Cold War era510. On this basis, in September 1997,
Tokyo reached an agreement with Washington by forming the “The New guidelines for Japan-US
Defense Cooperation”511. Within this context, while continuously promoting the Constitutional
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Amendment inside the country, then Koizumi administration began to send the SDF troops to the
Indian Ocean and to Iraqi territory after 2001, raising the status of military power in achieving
Japan's political targets512. In May 2003, the Japanese National Diet passed three bills about how
to deal with possible military attacks from abroad. Since then, Japan will respond not only to an
actual attack but also to an “anticipated” attack, while the SDF will be deployed more efficiently
in those contingencies513. All of these changes largely eased restrictions on the SDF, transferring
Japan’s role in its military cooperation with the US from defending itself to supporting US
overseas military intervention by directly participating in combat alongside US troops. Meanwhile,
Japan's Constitutional Amendment was also promoted by the development of US-Japan alliance.
After Japan began to send its troops overseas, the US requested Tokyo to further exercise
collective self defense that was clearly banned by the Constitution. But Prime Minister Abe gave a
positive response, declaring it was necessary for Japan to research the definition of collective
self-defense514. In a conference, Abe repeated that Japan should discuss how to exercise collective
self defense because this was very important for improving the US-Japan alliance515. This showed
that Tokyo wished to utilize the US pressure on improving two countries’ security alliance to
promote its own Constitutional Amendment, removing more restrictions of its post war system and
therefore increasing its military power.
However, this close relationship between increasing Japan’s military strength and improving the
US-Japan alliance also means that the Normal State strategy in the security area is quite different
from that in economic and political areas. Precisely, Japan’s dependence on this military alliance
will forces Tokyo to remain consistent with US behavior in security area, which obviously
contradicts Normal State’s feature of independent policy making. In fact, it is difficult to believe
the targets pursued by a Normal State will be always the same as those of another country. This
explains why a few scholars described Japanese behavior of simultaneously pursuing both
independence and dependence as schizophrenia516. During the post Cold War era, Japan and the
US had common targets on many issues, but there was still subtle difference in their policies when
Tokyo thought its own interest would be damaged if it followed the US steps. In such a case, once
the behavior of US-Japan alliance fail to realize or even threaten Japan’s interest, Tokyo will have
to make a choice between following US steps to further increasing its military strength and
independently formulating policy to better safeguard its own interest.
The Contradiction in the Sino-Japanese Relations and Its Impact on the
Japanese Position in the Taiwan Issue
The conflict between Japan’s Normal State strategy and China’s rise in the economic and political
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domains are relatively obvious because Tokyo’s policies in these areas reflect its own ideas. By
contrast, Japan’s behaviors in the field of security is usually regarded as a product of the US-Japan
alliance. Thus, the security conflict between Japan and China sometimes hides behind the
Sino-American conflict in East Asia. However, whether these conflicts between Japan and China
are obvious or not, they all can influence the Taiwan Issue.
In the economic field, the failure of Flying Geese model is irreversible, and China’s pursuit of
controlling Japanese maritime lifeline cannot be accepted by Japan. If maintaining the Flying
Geese model is related to high level interest such as leading the whole East Asian economic
development, maritime channels falling into the hands of a neighboring country which does not
have a harmonious relationship with Japan is doubtlessly related to fundamental interests, because
it may determine whether Japan can continue its economic construction and maintain its social
stability. This indicates that Japan is unlikely to make concession on the issue but will definitely
oppose China to control the relevant sea areas. It is noteworthy that although these maritime
channels are significant for both countries, China’s situation differs from that of Japan because of
the First Island Chain. Precisely, Japan's maritime lifeline is to a large extent under the control of
it allies, which implies that Japan’s fundamental interest is safeguarded as long as the situation is
not changed. By contrast, China’s economic, political, and even security interests may be easily
damaged under the current situation, like what happened in 1993 when the Chinese cargo ship
“Galaxy” was stopped by US warships in the Indian Ocean for three weeks517. In a word, China
tries to change the current situation while Japan firmly opposes such behavior. Once Beijing
believes Chinese relative power is sufficient and tries to break the First Island Chain, there may be
a serious confrontation between the two countries.
Within this context, Taiwan is involved in the conflict because China will obtain its route to the
Pacific Ocean and can take effective actions to resist the potential military threat from the US and
its allies if it achieves national unification. In other words, if Beijing tries to change the situation,
it will have to take over Taiwan. In such a case, it is almost impossible that Tokyo will have a
positive attitude towards Beijing’s pursuit of cross-strait reunification. It is also noteworthy that
Taiwan Strait is in the Japan transportation lane, which indicates that the mainland’s coercive
behavior in this area can still threaten Japan’s maritime lifeline even Beijing is trying to prevent
Taiwan from declaring independence rather than taking over the island by force. For example, the
mainland’s missile firings during the Third Taiwan Strait Crisis aroused serious concern of Japan,
especially when some missiles fell in the waters only 60 km away from Japan518. In such a case,
Japanese security analysts and the SDF officials explicitly expressed their worries about the the
Taiwan Issue, highlighting that Chinese military actions near Taiwan would seriously affect the
safety of Japanese territory and its significant sea lanes519. Despite arguing that the Chinese
Navy’s technical strength is weak compared with that of Japan, the SDF still worries about
China’s increasingly missile capability, especially when this capability is more and more used in
517 Yang Zhen and Zhou Yunheng. (2011). US-China Conflict in Maritime Power. Contemporary
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Beijing’s policy toward Taiwan. Kyorin University professor Hiramatsu Shigeo further argued that
even though China might not use the similar show of force during 1995 and 1996, it still had the
ability to impose indirect military pressure on Japanese ships or blockade maritime routes in the
South China Sea to create a serious blow to both Japan and Taiwan520. In these circumstances,
some Japanese scholars declared that China's rising military power and various aggressive actions
in disputed areas would definitely damage Japan and Taiwan’s interests, and in order to deal with
this threat, Japan should strengthen its military cooperation with Taiwan to establish a joint
defense system because neither Japan nor Taiwan could ensure its security alone521. All these
concerns and statements indicate that in the view of Japanese political leaders and elites, Chinese
unification will seriously threaten Japan’s fundamental interests and must be obstructed.
Compared to its involvement in Japanese fundamental interests such as safeguarding maritime
lifeline, maintaining social stability, and protecting homeland security, the role of the Taiwan Issue
seems relatively unimportant in the conflict between Japan’s pursuit of becoming great political
power and China’s rise. However, maintaining Taiwan’s de facto independence and even helping
the island to realize its de jure independence is the best option for Japan to contain China’s rise. If
it successfully blocks the cross-strait unification, Japan will not only safeguard its fundamental
interests, but also weaken China’s political influence, because without breaking the First Island
Chain, China can hardly become a maritime power while its coastal area will be still under threat,
and Beijing will be at a disadvantage in territorial dispute with neighboring countries.
More importantly, the Taiwan Issue is related to China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity,
which implies China's status in regional and global affairs will suffer a serious blow if Japan can
help Taiwan to realize independence. Indeed, a country that fails to protect its own sovereignty
and territorial integrity is very unlikely to earn respect from the international community, and
therefore can never become the leader in regional or global affairs. Moreover, no matter what
outcome it will eventually achieve, Tokyo’s intervention in the Taiwan Issue is an active
participation in regional affairs and therefore can raise its political status in the view of other
Asian countries. In such a case, the Taiwan Issue has become an effective tool utilized by Japan to
pursue more political influence in East Asia, and thus Tokyo’s targets are not only obstructing
unification, but also promoting Taiwan’s independence. According to the military strength of the
US-Japan alliance, using active intervention to block Chinese unification and maintain Taiwan’s
de facto independence may not be too difficult, but realizing the island’s peaceful independence is
impossible to be achieved in the short term522. Considering it is related to Japan’s high level
interest such as political influence, promoting Taiwan’s independence should be regarded as a
target that Tokyo wishes to achieve rather than its bottom line.
The fact that the Japanese pursuits of maintaining economic power and increasing political power
are in conflict with the rise of China has made Japan prefer to utilize the Taiwan Issue to curb
520 Euan Graham. (2006). Japan's post-Cold War SLOC security. In: J. A. A. Stockwin Japan’s Sea
Lane Security 1940-2004: A Matter of Life and Death?. New York: Routledge. p173-201.
521 N. Tanaka and H. Takase, ‘Piracy and Ship’s Safety: A View from the Shipping
Industry’, in Hamzah and Ogawa (eds), op. cit., p. 173; and Kawamura, ibid., p. 152.
522 Ding Zhaozhong. (2008). Changes of Japanese Pro-Taiwan Politicians after the Normalization
of Sino-Japan Relations. International Forum . 10 (4), p46-49.
127
China’s development. This implies that Japan may first focus on its conflict with China in
economic and political areas before realizing that the Taiwan Issue is a part of this conflict.
However, in the military area, the US-Japan alliance through which Japan promotes its military
buildup and expands its military influence is directly linked to the cross-strait situation from the
very beginning. In February 1960, the US and Japan made adjustments to their security treaty,
adding the clause that Japan had a duty to provide facilities for US military actions in the Far East
Area523. According to the official explanation, the “Far East” was the area from the north of the
Philippines to Japan and its surrounding areas, including the South Korea and the ROC. This
means that the US-Japan military alliance would take actions to protect the Taiwan Strait, which
was clearly targeted at the mainland’s pursuit of taking over Taiwan by force524. In the 1970s, after
normalizing diplomatic relations with China, the United States and Japan abandoned this clause of
“Far East Area”. But when facing Chinese rapid economic growth and increasing comprehensive
strength, Washington and Tokyo formed a new version of Far East clause in their security treaty in
response to potential military threat from China.
In September 1997, the Guidelines for US-Japan Defense Cooperation clearly stated that the
alliance would exercise defense cooperation in the event of “peripheral situation”525. The
definition of this “peripheral situation” was quite ambiguous and Japan refused to clarify whether
it included Taiwan, only declaring that the “peripheral situation” was not a geographical concept
and would be identified according to the situation526. However, this expression could not cover
Japanese domestic political forces’ attempt to intervene in the Taiwan Issue and cause a permanent
split across the Taiwan Straits. In 1997, then Chief of the Cabinet Kajiyama Seiroku publicly
declared that the application scope of US-Japan defense cooperation doubtlessly incorporated
Taiwan, and even argued that once a conflict occurred between the Chinese mainland and Taiwan,
Japan should not refuse to provide support when the US started to intervened527. In the following
years, Japanese politicians, including senior officials from the ruling party, stated on various
occasions that the scope of “peripheral situation” included Taiwan. At first, the Japanese
government usually preferred to reiterate that “peripheral situation” was not a geographical
concept when facing these statements, but this attitude was rapidly changed in recent years. In
2005, then foreign minister Nobutaka Machimura made a speech in the United States, declaring
that the Taiwan Issue was always a significant part of the US-Japan security treaty, and Japanese
policy towards Taiwan has never been changed since the establishment of the US-Japan alliance528.
In these circumstances, as long as the military alliance exists, Japan will have to be involved in the
potential conflict across the Taiwan Strait if it continues to increase its military power by
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strengthening this alliance.
Conclusion
Obstructing unification is not only the target of Japan’s policy in the Taiwan Strait, but also the
bottom line of the United States, implying that joint military actions taken by the US-Japan
alliance in the Taiwan Strait may be Japan's major way of intervening in the Taiwan Issue.
Considering the Japanese government’s ambiguous position of “respects and understands” to the
One China principle and its domestic political forces’ openly support for Taiwan’s
pro-independence forces, it can be concluded that the US target of “No Independence” is not
accepted by Japan. In such a case, the repeatedly emphasis made by Japan that the Taiwan Issue
must be resolved peacefully is not entirely equated to the US target of “No Use of Force” which
pursues stability across the strait, but should be regarded as Tokyo’s attempt of creating
appropriate foundation for Taiwan’s de jure independence. It is noteworthy that Japan’s relative
power is lower than that of the US and even may be not sufficient to safeguard its own
fundamental interests alone. This indicates that Tokyo’s attempt to achieve the target related to
high level interests while not worrying that its bottom line will be overstepped is probably based
on the similar reason that Taipei dares to provoke Beijing, which is comparing power of the
US-Japan alliance rather than that of Japan itself with that of China. In other words, it is the
perception that fundamental interests are safeguarded by its powerful ally leads Japan to give more
weight to promoting Taiwan’s independence. However, there is still a possibility that US policy
will not realize Japan’s target but even damage some of its interests, and Tokyo will have to make
a difficult choice between achieving its target alone and contracting its interest pursuit.
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Chapter VII The Future of the Taiwan Issue: Perception of
National Interests and Internal Restriction
By analyzing the policy evolution of all four actors in the Taiwan Issue, it is clear that each actor
has its own expectation about how the issue will be resolved, while at the same time trying to
ensure its bottom line will not be overstepped.
Table 7.1 Each actor’s targets and relevant interests in the Taiwan Issue
Actor in
Taiwan
Issue
Interest under
Threat
Bottom Line Interests to be
Realized
Eventual Target
Mainland
China
Homeland
security,
sovereignty,
territorial
integrity
Preventing
Taiwan from
claiming de jure
independence
Becoming a
maritime power,
increasing political
influence
Achieving
national unification
and breaking
through the First
Island Chain
Taiwan current de facto
independence
Opposing
cross-strait
unification
Recognized by the
international
community as an
independent
sovereign state
Realizing its de jure
independence
The United
States
Security (of its
base and allies),
and political
influence in the
Asia-Pacific
region
Opposing
cross-strait
unification
Enhancing global
hegemony and
containing potential
challenges
Helping Taiwan to
realize de jure
independence, and
promoting peaceful
evolution in
mainland China
Japan Homeland
security, social
stability, and
economic
interests related
to its maritime
lifeline
Opposing
cross-strait
unification
Obtaining regional
leadership position
and increasing its
military power to
become a Normal
State
Helping Taiwan to
realize de jure
independence, and
incorporating it into
Japan’s sphere of
influence
The relationship between relative power and these targets related to certain interest pursuit clearly
defines each actor’s real position in the issue, interpreting their behavior in the system level.
However, in order to predict possible changes across the strait, especially how the mainland can
achieve its national unification with Taiwan, it is necessary to analyze each actor’s potential
reaction to certain external pressure, which requires to pay more attention to the domestic level,
examining actor’s domestic state apparatus and its relations with the surrounding society. It should
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be noted from the table 7.1 that each actor’s interests involved in the Taiwan Issue are not at the
same level. For the mainland and Taiwan, if their bottom line are overstepped, fundamental
interests such as sovereignty are bound to be seriously damaged, causing a series of disastrous
consequences to the authorities and society. Compared with the two sides across the strait, Japan’s
situation may be a little better. Although its fundamental interests will be also threatened if Beijing
achieved unification, there is still some room for maneuver before the worst case taking place. At
least, China’s breaking the First Island Chain or obtaining more influence on significant maritime
channels is not equated with directly damaging Japanese homeland security. But the US is the one
in the most advantageous position, because none of its fundamental interest is under obvious
threat. Considering that Chinese Navy is still unable to challenge US military presence in the
region, it seems that the US military base and its allies are facing very limited dangers as long as
the status quo is maintained. In these circumstances, attitudes of these actors’ elites and society
toward potential changes in the Taiwan Issue will be quite different. This actually implies that
appropriate situations under which Beijing may realize unification will not appear unless these
attitudes experience certain changes. For that reason, a comprehensive analysis about how each
actor’s authorities and society respond to the external pressure is necessary.
Figure 7.1 Each actor’s interests in the Taiwan Issue are not at the same level
Identity Construction and Political Competition
To interpret state external behavior by analyzing its internal factors is the major research method
of neoclassical realism, and some scholars have argued that this method is very suitable for
researching the situation across the Taiwan Strait, believing that internal factors can explain why
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serious security tension can break out within the context of increasing interactions among
mainland China, Taiwan, and the United States529. For example, to refute the argument that
maintaining the economic interdependence between countries can bring peace, scholars such as
Jennifer Sterling Folker have noted that there are other variables of more importance in affecting
bilateral relations, especially the joint function of state internal political competition and identity
construction530.
The identity construction and domestic level’s political competition are related to each other.
Establishing an identity actually means to draw a border between a particular person and others,
and a number of people share one identity means to form a group531. Within a group, the most
important thing is how the group’s resources are allocated, because controlling allocation of
resources is equivalent to controlling the group’s decision making. Meanwhile, considering the
fact that one group can be divided into several subgroups, it can be inferred that the most common
phenomenon inside a group is the competition among its subgroups for the power of allocating the
group’s resources. Similarly, inside a country or a political entity, there are competitions for the
power of national decision making among diverse political forces532. The more intensive this
competition for controlling the resource allocation is, the worse the cohesion of the group will be.
This is why the group has to constrain its own internal competitions. The most effective way is to
strengthen the identity, improving the group’s internal unity. Recognizing there are other groups
which have evident difference compared with this group can largely promote the construction of
this group’s identity, implying that a group’s establishment and behavior are inseparable from the
existence of other groups and their behaviors533. In these circumstances, the group’s identity
construction, competition for power within the group, as well as the interaction between different
groups are linked together, explaining why there are conflicts between two countries with
economic interdependence.
According to this view, whether the Taiwan Straits can maintain peace and stability depends on
the competition of internal subgroups for national decision making and the construction of identity
in each actor involved in Taiwan Issue, rather than the development of economic and trade
relations between any two actors. This makes the analysis of the Taiwan Issue more simplistic.
There are two subgroups inside each actor, which may be not two political parties or the
government and the Congress, but should be two political forces with opposite positions on the
formulation of foreign policy. From David Sanger’s point of view, one of these two subgroups is
the so called “Boeing camp”, who takes a moderate position and focuses on the economic benefit,
hoping to promote economic interdependence with other countries. The other subgroup is the
containment camp, who believes the former is too naive to notice the potential threats created by
529 Jennifer Sterling-Folker. (2009). 4. In: Lobell S E, Ripsman N M, Taliaferro J W. Neoclassical
realism, the state, and foreign policy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. p99.
530 Jennifer Sterling-Folker. (2009). 4. In: Lobell S E, Ripsman N M, Taliaferro J W. Neoclassical
realism, the state, and foreign policy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. P104.
531 Franke Wilmer, The Social Construction of Man, the State, and War: Identity, Conflict, and
Violence in the Former Yugoslavia (New York: Routledge, 2002), p. 69.
532 Jennifer Sterling-Folker. (2009). 4. In: Lobell S E, Ripsman N M, Taliaferro J W. Neoclassical
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other countries, suggesting that government should take necessary actions to curb those threats534.
When there are fluctuations in the bilateral relations, the subgroup with hardline position is likely
to exaggerate the external pressure, obtaining more support from society to win the internal
competition. This process is often accompanied with the reconstruction and strengthening of the
national identity, which will reinforce social stability and unity, paving the way for the formulation
of more tough foreign policies. It should be noticed that changes in the external situation,
according to Folker, is the result of internal competition in another country, indicating that internal
competition in one country will not only decide its own foreign policy making, but also affect
other countries’ external behavior535.
This kind of argument has two problems. First, it ignores the fact that the effect of external
pressure has already existed inside countries when political competition and identity construction
are influencing the formulation of the country’s foreign policy. In essence, the internal factors are
constrained by external pressures rather than determine the policy making alone. Another problem
is that the argument assumes that the Taiwan Issue only has two situations, which are peace when
there are economic exchanges among each actor, and military confrontation when internal
situations of one or more actors are changed. This means that it is either status quo or serious
conflict, which has almost completely ruled out the possibility of finding appropriate conditions
for cross-strait unification by analyzing domestic factors.
Internal Situations that Determine Each Actor’s Position: An Analysis Based on
Schweller’s Theory of Four Domestic-Level Factors
This idea of using identity construction and its impact on domestic subgroups’ political
competition to interpret the formulation of foreign policy and even the state interaction does not
examine all aspects of a country’s internal situations. Indeed, identity and political competition are
only parts of domestic political and social situation. By contrast, Schweller’s theory for
interpreting unbalancing can provide a more comprehensive analysis. This theory divides internal
situations into four factors, which are elite consensus, elite cohesion, social cohesion, and
government / regime vulnerability536. Elite consensus and cohesion can be regarded as the
domestic political situation, and social cohesion covers most situation of society related to policy
making, while regime vulnerability examines the relationship between state and society. Although
Schweller’s study seems to focus on external threats which are not appropriately balanced, these
four factors have incorporated almost all international situations that can influence state behavior.
Therefore, if analyzing elites and society’s perception and reaction for various forms of external
pressures, it is possible to explain most rational or irrational behavior of each actor in the Taiwan
Issue in the post Taiwan Strait Crisis era.
Elite Consensus
This factor examines whether elites have the same perception of external pressure. Specifically,
534 David Sanger, “Interview,” Frontline Special: Dangerous Straits, Exploring the Future of
US–China Relations and the Long Simmering Issue of Taiwan. First aired October 2001, available
at: www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/ china/interviews/sanger.html
535 Jennifer Sterling-Folker. (2009). 4. In: Lobell S E, Ripsman N M, Taliaferro J W. Neoclassical
realism, the state, and foreign policy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. P124-125.
536 Schweller, Randell (2015). Unanswered Threats: Political Constraints on the Balance of Power.
Beijing: Peking University Press. p13-15.
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elites need to consider about the following questions:
Is there any external threat?
Do they have the same perception about the degree of this threat?
Can they reach an agreement about what measures should be taken to deal with the threat?
Can they accept the domestic political risks and costs caused by these measures537?
These questions can be summarized as whether elites can reach agreements on how to define and
deal with external pressure.
According to previous chapters, it is clear that China's position on the Taiwan Issue is always
opposing the separatist movements and promoting national unification. It is, therefore, hard to
believe that Chinese political elites have any serious differences in their perception of such issue.
Considering that almost no sign of unification has appeared by now, most elites agree that
fundamental interests are doubtlessly facing serious threat from pro-independence forces in
Taiwan and foreign intervention. Regarding the degree of these threats, Chinese elites’ perception
has evolved with changing international and domestic situation, which can be found in Beijing’s
policy evolution from seeking to take over Taiwan by force to focusing on containing separatist
movements538. This change indicates that the degree of threat perceived by the elites has been
raised, causing the government to take more effective measures to safeguard its interests. In
essence, elites have realized that they should give more weight to fundamental rather than high
level interests, and adopted a series of coercive policies such as promulgating the Anti-Secession
Law as credible deterrence. This clearly shows that the mainland will take all necessary actions to
oppose Taiwan’s pro-independence movements539. It is noteworthy that the Anti-Secession Law
also defines Beijing’s bottom line, so the mainland will have almost no room to retreat if Taiwan
formally declares its de jure independence. This means political elites have also reached consensus
to accept the possible cost of tough measures.
Attitude of American political elites toward the rising China is complex. Primarily, many
politicians believe that the United States should take a tough stance to curb the threat from China
against the US global hegemony. But there are also many political and business elites who believe
that the two countries can achieve a win-win cooperation because they have common interests in
economic and security fields540. In such a case, disagreement between the US internal containment
camp and the Boeing camp is quite obvious. However, it should be noted that when facing the
Taiwan Issue, the US political elites have a clear consensus on opposing Beijing’s pursuit of
national unification because they all agree that if Taiwan falls into the hands of a hostile regime, a
number of US interests in the region is bound to be seriously threatened541. US elites also have
adjusted their perceived degree of the potential threat posed by the mainland’s pursuit, realizing
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Beijing: Peking University Press. P54.
538 Tung C. An assessment of China's Taiwan policy under the third generation leadership[J]. Asian
Survey, 2005, 45(3): 343-361.
539 Ji Y. China's anti-secession law and the risk of war in the Taiwan Strait[J]. Contemporary
Security Policy, 2006, 27(2): 237-257.
540 Montgomery E B. Contested primacy in the Western Pacific: China's rise and the future of US
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that Beijing’s determination and strength against Taiwan’s independence are both stronger than
Washington once expected. This new recognition prompted the elites to identify their targets in the
Taiwan Issue as “No Unification, No Use of Force, and No Independence”, avoiding to use
military intervention while strengthening US security ties with Taiwan, such as arms sales, to
contain the mainland’s pursuit542. This implies that US elites refuse to accept the cost of involving
in a full scale military conflict with China. By contrast, on the premise of “No Use of Force”,
current measures to maintain Taiwan's de facto independence and to prudently promote Taiwan’s
de jure independence are rarely opposed by the mainstream of politicians, indicating that there is
no dramatic disagreement among American elites on these measures’ costs.
Like mainland China and the United States, it seems that Japan's political elites also have clear
consensus when dealing with the Taiwan Issue. As detailed in the previous chapters, most
Japanese politicians share a common position on recognizing Taiwan as a sovereign state while
the Japanese government insists on respecting rather than accepting Beijing’s One China
principle543. In essence, compared with Washington’s clear anti-independence rhetoric, Japanese
elites are more inclined to see the realization of Taiwan’s de jure independence. It should be noted
that, because of the Normal State strategy, mainland China will be regarded by Japan’s elites as a
threat to Japanese fundamental and high-level interests even without the Taiwan Issue544. However,
Tokyo’s measures to deal with external pressures are almost all realized through the US-Japan
alliance, which implies that elites’ perception about the degree of such threat may be dramatically
changed under certain circumstance545. Precisely, the military alliance with US has made elites
more confident in defeating external threats, which may lead them to underestimate the degree of
threat; meanwhile, dependence on the alliance also largely reduce the dangers and costs that the
Japanese government may have to undertake. Within this context, elites that represent different
classes or interest groups are more likely to reach a consensus. But once the alliance’s behavior is
not consistent with Tokyo’s targets, the current consensus on the degree of threat, measures, and
the cost will face serious challenge.
Compared with elites of other three actors, Taiwan's politicians are far from reaching any
significant consensus. In this island, elites can be divided into two opposing groups: the pan blue
camp represented by the KMT and the pan green camp represented by the DPP. Although both
camps more or less agree that there is a pressure from the mainland, it is clear that they did not
accurately realize the degree of this threat until the Third Taiwan Strait Crisis. Within the context
of developing cross-strait contact and strengthening security ties with the US, Taiwan’s elites had
a consensus before 1995 that the mainland could not be an urgent threat. This perception was
completely changed by Beijing’s missiles firings and military exercises, and now most elites have
to admit that certain decisions made by Taipei will provoke Beijing and lead Taiwan to face
542 Freeman Jr C W. Preventing War in the Taiwan Strait: Restraining Taiwan: And Beijing[J].
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serious threat546. However, there remains difference between two camps regarding the degree of
such threat. This is mainly because Taiwan’s politicians prefer to use the strength of the US rather
than Taiwan itself to compare with that of mainland China, believing that the US will not sit by if
Taiwan suffers a military attack from the mainland547. The problem is that US tries to avoid its
own involvement in a military conflict with China, so it is ambiguous about to what extent it will
defend Taiwan. This is where difference emerges. More precisely, the pan green camp, especially
those hardliners, tends to believe that no matter what change happens in the core level of Taiwan’s
mainland policy, the US will always keep its commitment to Taiwan’s security, defending the
island by using its powerful military forces in a timely and effective manner548. By contrast, the
pan blue camp elites’ attitude is relatively more cautious and pragmatic, emphasizing that
Taiwan’s security is bound to be seriously damaged once Taipei oversteps Beijing’s bottom line,
because the US is not willing to engage in a full scale warfare with mainland China to support
Taiwan’s de jure independence549. In essence, the degree of threat perceived by pan blue elites is
higher than that perceived by the pro-independence forces.
This differences on threat’s degree indicates that elites are difficult to reach consensus on how to
deal with the threat. Most elites agree that Taiwan should continually strengthen its security ties
with the US, preserving Taiwan’s status in the US Asia-Pacific strategy. But elites from the pan
blue camp also emphasize that Taiwan should not provoke the mainland, and according to the
ROC Constitution, Taipei should support the One China principle and oppose Taiwan’s de jure
independence550. This measure will never be accepted by the pan green camp not only because
they are confident of US military aid, but also because they cannot afford the cost of such measure.
For the pro-independence forces, accepting One China principle and abandoning their separatist
pursuit is equivalent to requiring the pan green parties, such as the DPP, to exercise self-denial.
According to its party platform, realizing Taiwan’s de jure independence is the key element of
constructing the DPP’s identity. Without this position, the DPP will find it has no essential
difference from the KMT551. Obviously, such a huge cost has determined that the pan green parties
will never accept the measure proposed by the KMT. Similarly, for the pan blue camp, completely
accepting the pro-independence forces’ measure and abandoning the One China principle will also
lead to serious divisions inside the pan blue parties as their own identity are almost destroyed. In
general, Taiwan’s elites have very limited consensus on the threat and coping measures, unlikely
to reach any further agreement because their different position on One China principle is
irreconcilable.
Elite Cohesion
For elite cohesion, there are two extreme situations. One is that elites are divided into two
completely opposing camps, which are defined by Schweller as the camp with extreme
546 Christensen T J. Posing problems without catching up: China's rise and challenges for US
security policy[J]. International security, 2001, 25(4): 5-40.
547 Swaine M D. Trouble in Taiwan[J]. Foreign Affairs, 2004: 39-49.
548 Dumbaugh K. Taiwan-US political relations: New strains and changes[C]. LIBRARY OF
CONGRESS WASHINGTON DC CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, 2006.
549 Ross R S. Taiwan's fading independence movement[J]. Foreign Affairs, 2006: 141-148.
550 Chu Y, Lin J. Political development in 20th-century Taiwan: State-building, regime
transformation and the construction of national identity[J]. The China Quarterly, 2001, 165: 102-129.
551 Wu Y S. Taiwanese elections and Cross-Strait relations: mainland policy in flux[J]. Asian Survey,
1999, 39(4): 565-587.
136
nationalism and the camp in league with a foreign enemy552. The other is that most political elites
belong to one dominant party, so they share same identity and work for the same target. The
former situation means there is no possibility for elites to reach any compromise, while the latter
situation implies that there may be no dissenting voice in the policy making process. Schweller
believes that elites’ situation in most countries lies somewhere between these two extremes, which
means elites may be in different camps but they are still able to reach a compromise.
To analyze elite cohesion, following five questions should be taken into account:
Is there any competition for political power among elites?
Will some elites cooperate with external forces that is threatening the country to enhance
their power?
Do elites have consensus on the degree of threat faced by different interests?
Do elites differ over the question which country they should ally with?
Do elites can reach a consensus that which target is worth for them to use scarce
resources?553.
This concept does look like elite consensus, but it is noteworthy that there is a very significant
difference between them. For elite consensus, the key question is whether elites agree there is
external threat, and on such basis, they can debate about how to deal with the threat. In other
words, their consensus is established by their perception of the reality. But for elite cohesion, the
point is whether domestic political competition is given higher priority compared with that
external threat. This implies elites may agree there is an external threat, but when discussing how
to deal with that threat, they will consider whether certain measures can help them to obtain more
power or whether using scarce resources will be only beneficial to their opponents’ victory in the
election. Thus, a strong elite cohesion means the government tens to take effective measures to
respond to international challenges while a weak cohesion among political elites usually implies
the policy options for the government are very limited.
Mainland China's stance on the Taiwan Issue has never changed, indicating that there is no
dissenting voice among elites against Beijing’s pursuit of national unification. Although there is
political competition among Chinese elites, this competition usually has little impact on Beijing’s
Taiwan policy, because the Taiwan Issue is related to the most fundamental interest of the country
and can even affect the CCP regime’s legitimacy and survival. Thus, no elite dares to abandon or
question the pursuit of national unification554. Some western scholars even argue that Chinese
political competition can lead Beijing to give more weight to coercive measures rather than
peaceful exchanges because hardline policy will receive more support from the society555. In these
circumstances, it is almost impossible for Chinese elites to cooperate with external forces which
seek to block unification, because that will weaken rather than raise their power. It is also clear
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that as long as the pro-independence forces refuse to abandon their separatist pursuit, the threat
facing Chinese fundamental interests such as homeland security and national unity is hard to be
ignored. According to China’s increasingly strong response to provocations made by the DPP, this
threat has obviously prompted elites to reach a consensus on how to use scarce resources556.
Furthermore, elites also have little disagreement on who can be regarded as Beijing’s ally in the
Taiwan Issue, because there is a basic request that the country or group must support the One
China principle and oppose Taiwan’s independence. Many countries may meet the request and
have created a seemingly appropriate international environment for Beijing to safeguard its
interests, but they usually cannot provide any effective aid to China for opposing Taiwan’s
independence. For other three actors, Taiwan’s pro-independence forces and Japan cannot meet
this request, while the US double deterrence policy contains pro-independence forces’ dangerous
behaviors, making Washington become a temporary ally of Beijing under certain circumstances.
By contrast, the pan blue camp, which publicly support One China principle, is doubtlessly the
most reliable ally of Beijing when Chinese elites try to safeguard fundamental interests, but it is
also noteworthy that this ally shows little interest in promoting national unification557. In essence,
if each actor maintains its current situation, Beijing actually has no ally for achieving its eventual
target.
Compared with China, political competition among American elites is more obvious, and this
competition does influence the US policy regarding the Taiwan Issue. One example is the Clinton
Administration’s compromise with the Congress to allow Lee Teng-hui to visit the US, which is
viewed as an effort to reduce resistance against his own reelection558. However, a more important
reason that Clinton made that decision is then US government’s inaccurate perception of relative
power made it underestimate Chinese potential reaction towards Lee’s visit559. In other words, the
role played by internal political competition in formulating hardline policy toward China may be
not decisive. Meanwhile, the fact that Washington never openly supports Taiwan’s de jure
independence but tries to avoid involving in any direct military conflict with China has indicated
that the US does not have sufficient power to realize its eventual target and still needs necessary
support from its allies to deal with potential pressures caused by Chinese military deterrence560.
There is little question that US efforts in strengthening its military alliance with Japan and in
improving political and security ties with Taiwan has shown who are the US allies in the Taiwan
Issue. Considering that Chinese national unification may damage US security interests and
political influence in the Asia-Pacific region and even threaten US global hegemony, elites should
have little disagreement on how to use the country’s scarce resources. The problem is those threats
are often caused by Taiwan’s pro-independence forces’ activities that oversteps Beijing’s bottom
line, which implies that Washington may have to make its choice between deterring the mainland
from attacking Taiwan and curbing Taiwan’s audacious behavior of promoting its de jure
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independence. In other words, if certain behavior seemed harmless enough by US is proved to be
changing the status quo, American elites may have disagreements on which target should be given
priority.
In recent years, the political competition in Japan was fierce, which has led to frequent changes of
Prime Minister in the government561. However, this competition seems to have little impact on
Japan’s position on the Taiwan Issue. According to the content of Constitutional Amendments
promoted by most political parties and the words and deeds of various pro-Taiwan organizations,
political competition has caused no obvious disagreement among elites on Japan’s Taiwan policy,
and the situation that some elites may make a huge compromise with Beijing to obtain power is
very unlikely to happen562. No one will deny that a few politicians have been maintaining a
relatively friendly stance toward China, wishing to develop bilateral economic exchanges and
trying to ease current tensions between the two countries. But there is no evidence that these
politicians’ position on Taiwan Issue is different from those who are more hostile to China’s rise.
In fact, like the situation facing American elites, abandoning support for Taiwan’s independence
and cooperating with Beijing cannot help Japanese politicians to win their political competitions.
Meanwhile, threat to most Japanese interests involved in the Taiwan Issue is caused by the
mainland’s pursuit of achieving national unification. The more influence that mainland China has
on Taiwan, the more seriously that Japan’s fundamental interests are threatened. In such a case,
elites have no need to debate on the usage of the country’s scarce resources but just focus on
opposing China’s policy and behavior for prompting unification. Apart from that, continuously
strengthening the US-Japan alliance proves that Japanese elites have no disagreement on choosing
their ally563. And it is noteworthy that the powerful ally has reduced the possibility of using too
much Japan’s own scarce resources, which is also beneficial to the country’s elite cohesion.
The cohesion of Taiwan’s elites is much “lower” compared with other three actors. First of all,
internal political competition has direct and serious influence on Taiwan authorities’ mainland
policy making, especially the definition of cross-strait relations. In the political transformation
process, the pan green politicians usually used mainland policy as a prime subject for campaign
manipulation, obtaining high support rate by promising to promote Taiwan’s independence, while
the pan blue politicians were criticized by these pro-independence forces for “betraying Taiwan”
because they upheld the One China principle564. This intense competition leads Taipei’s position to
be seriously changed when the power is transferred between these two opposing camps, which
doubtlessly creates huge negative impacts on the stable development of cross-strait relations565.
According to the DPP, the KMT and other pan blue parties’ cooperation with the mainland should
be regarded as bartering away Taiwan’s sovereignty. In fact, this kind of cooperation did enhance
the KMT’s chance to win the 2008 and 2012 elections, which made Taiwan look like the first
561 Zhao Yuanping. (2012). Research on the Frequent Change of Japanese Prime Minister. China
Foreign Affairs University. 1 (1), p24-41.
562 Blumenthal D. The Revival of the US-Japanese Alliance[J]. AEI Asian Outlook, 2005.
563 Xinbo W. The security dimension of Sino-Japanese relations: warily watching one another[J].
Asian Survey, 2000, 40(2): 296-310.
564 Lin C. The political formation of Taiwanese nationalism[J]. Memories of the Future: National
Identity Issues and the Search for a New Taiwan, 2002: 219-241.
565 Wu Y S. Taiwan's domestic politics and cross-strait relations[J]. The China Journal, 2005 (53):
35-60.
139
extreme case mentioned by Schweller. However, it is noteworthy that the KMT is also constrained
by the electoral system, which means all their concessions to Beijing have to be tested by the
ballot box. In such a case, they cannot meet Beijing’s demand for reunification, because if they
satisfy Beijing on that point, they will lose the majority of Taiwanese people and therefore suffer a
defeat in the election. Moreover, the argument that KMT's true position is in line with Beijing’s
pursuit is inaccurate and even misleading because there is only limited consensus between Beijing
and the KMT on opposing DPP’s pursuit of Taiwan’s de jure independence. For example, the
KMT has a different interpretation of the One China principle, insisting that One China means the
ROC and its legal representative is the ROC government566. In these circumstances, it is almost
impossible for KMT to accept Beijing’s “one country, two systems” because that will transform
Taipei into a local government. This is why the KMT showed little interest to start political
negotiation with Beijing but focused on maintaining peace and stability across the strait during the
period of the Ma Ying-jeou administration. In a word, no matter as the ruling party or the
opposition, the KMT prefers to cooperate with the mainland mainly for opposing the
pro-independence forces’ words and deeds. It may benefit from this cooperation in its political
competition with the DPP, but such cooperation has never overstepped Taiwan’s bottom line of
maintaining its current de facto independence, and whether this cooperation can help KMT to win
political competition is also seriously questioned after the DPP won Taiwan’s presidential election
in 2016567.
This intense competition does not hamper two opposing groups in Taiwan to reach a consensus on
choosing Taiwan’s ally. Both the KMT and the DPP agree that US-Taiwan relations is the most
significant part of Taiwan’s diplomatic issues, and the formulation of Taiwan’s mainland policy
should be based on the power comparison between the US and China, believing that US will
defend Taiwan568. Meanwhile, Taiwan’s interests which are under threat, such as de facto
independence and security, are all fundamental interests. As a political entity that has not realized
its own de jure independence and is not recognized by the international community as a sovereign
state, there is no high level interest that Taiwan needs to concern. But even within this context,
Taiwan’s elites still have not reached agreement on how resources should be used because of their
different opinions about the degree of threat to different fundamental interests. Obviously, the pan
green camp tends to spend more resources on seeking Taiwan’s de jure independence, while the
KMT insists that more efforts should be taken to maintain a stable cross-strait relations. However,
regardless of how much resources are used in safeguarding Taiwan’s security, what actually
contains the mainland’s threat is the US military intervention. This implies that Taiwan’s elite
cohesion may be largely raised if Washington adjusts its commitment to Taiwan’s security.
Without the powerful ally’s effective protection, elites from different camps will eventually reach
a consensus on the degree of threat to Taiwan’s security and agree to spend Taiwan’s scarce
resources in maintaining peace and stability across the strait.
Government Vulnerability
The government / regime's vulnerability, according to Joe D. Hagan’s view, refers to the
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possibility that the government leader has to step down569. This factor examines, as Schweller
noted, the relationship between the state and the society in a particular moment, especially the
social cost the government has to face when making tough foreign policy. More precisely, this cost
determines whether political leaders can receive broad support from society in the policy making
process, extracting and directing enough national resources to put their foreign policy into practice.
The extreme situation is a hardline policy that requires huge material and human resources arouses
strong social discontent and finally leads the current leader to step down.
According to Schweller, the analysis of the relationship between regime and society should focus
on three important issues: the society’s perception of regime’s legitimacy, the degree of social
support to the government’s policy, and the regime’s ability to resist social constraints or
interference.
After Beijing adopted the policy of reform and opening up in the late 1970s, several western
scholars believed that the legitimacy of the CCP regime was facing seriously challenge570.
However, there are also studies suggesting that the current Chinese government enjoys “a
moderately high level of affective support”, which means that citizens’ support for the regime’s
legitimacy is not declining571. Compared with them, a more common view is that challenges facing
the CCP regime’s legitimacy have been moderated by the strong nationalist sentiment in China’s
society, which is closely linked with the government’s ability in maintaining rapid economic
development and improving people’s standard of living572. This view implies that once the
economic growth slows down, the social support for the government will also decline and
therefore the regime’s legitimacy will be more and more questioned. The reality may be even
more complex. For example, it is clear that Chinese economic fluctuation is not the reason why
there are dissidents who seem discontent with the rule of the communist party and separatist
forces which are planning ethnic separatist activities. However, although there are voices
questioning the regime’s legitimacy, it seems that society remains firm support for Chinese
government’s hardline policy of opposing Taiwan’s independence. This may be because the strong
nationalism in Chinese society can never tolerate Taiwan’s de jure independence and maintains a
high expectation for achieving unification573. Within this context, most tough measures adopted by
569 Hagan J D. Regimes, Political Oppositions, and the comparative analysis of foreign policy[J].
New directions in the study of foreign policy, 1987: 346.
570 Ding X L. The decline of communism in China: legitimacy crisis, 1977-1989[M]. Cambridge
University Press, 2006.
571 Chen J, Zhong Y, Hillard J, et al. Assessing political support in China: Citizens’ evaluations of
governmental effectiveness and legitimacy[J]. Journal of Contemporary China, 1997, 6(16):
551-566.
572 SCHUBERT* G. One-Party Rule and the Question of Legitimacy in Contemporary China:
preliminary thoughts on setting up a new research agenda* Gunter Schubert, Ph. D., is Chair
Professor of Greater China Studies at the Institute of Chinese and Korean Studies, University of
Tuebingen, Germany. His research focuses on political and social developments in Greater China,
local governance reform in the PRC, cross-Strait relations, Chinese and Taiwanese nationalism
and East Asian regionalism. He can be reached at gunter ...[J]. Journal of Contemporary China,
2008, 17(54): 191-204.
573 Friedman E. Chinese nationalism, Taiwan autonomy and the prospects of a larger war[J].
Journal of Contemporary China, 1997, 6(14): 5-32.
141
the government to deal with the Taiwan Issue can easily receive positive responses from the
society. This is why some western scholars with a pro-Taiwan stance have argued that Chinese
nationalism will threaten Taiwan’s political independence and undermine peace and stability in the
region574. Apart from this high social support for Beijing’s Taiwan policy, it is also noteworthy that
when facing natural disasters or major accidents, the Chinese government can always react in a
timely manner by sending troops to perform rescues without assistance from the society. This
phenomenon indicates that the government’s control of social resources is so strong that there is
almost no need to conduct large scale social mobilization. Considering CCP's absolute leadership
over the PLA, as well as state owned enterprises’ control of the country's economic lifeline, it can
be concluded that the Chinese government is not vulnerable to social interference when
formulating tough foreign policy.
However, there is also negative impact created by society on Chinese government’s Taiwan policy
making. Although many scholars believed that economic growth has replaced communist ideology
as the foundation of maintaining social support, Chinese leaders still emphasized their regime is
legitimate because the party is the representative of most Chinese people and defender of Chinese
national interests. This indicates that the regime’s legitimacy will be seriously damaged if the
society believes Beijing fails to safeguard significant interest. In such a case, the government is
forced to take necessary actions to prevent Taiwan from declaring independence, rather than
constrained by society in extracting human or material resources. Faced by rising nationalism,
Beijing does not need to use Taiwan to strengthen social support, but has to concern uncontrolled
nationalist behaviors which can constrain its policy options. This is often ignored by western
scholars who believe that Beijing has promoted and benefited from the development of
nationalism575. For example, Christensen once argued that since the Chinese Communist Party is
no longer “communist”, it must be more “Chinese”576. Allen S. Whiting also stated that whether
Chinese nationalism would be confident, assertive, or aggressive, is dependent on the Chinese
government's perception of its own vulnerability577. But the fact is that society plays a more
significant role than government in the rise of nationalism. Whenever the society believes that
China’s national interest or dignity is damaged, it will generate and promote a strong protest,
without considering whether the movement is consistent with government's target. This usually
makes Beijing in a dilemma when dealing with the Taiwan issue. If the government does not
respond positively to nationalist behavior, it will face the risk of being perceived by the society as
too soft. But satisfying the nationalist demand by formulating tough policy toward Taiwan and its
allies is likely to intensify the conflict and create more tensions across the strait. Neither will
promote Beijing’s pursuit of national unification.
As a country that has tried to prompt other countries to copy its own democratic political system,
the US government's legitimacy is very unlikely to be questioned by its domestic society, although
its foreign policies are usually tougher than those of other actors. When analyzing the degree of
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social support for US hardline policy, it should be mentioned that unlike the mainland, Japan, or
Taiwan, the US is the only actor in the Taiwan Issue that has experienced warfare with other
countries in past decades. These coercive policies have doubtlessly consumed many social
resources and even caused a large number of casualties, which finally led to a decline in approval
rating of then US government578. But in the face of increasing social protest, Washington did not
withdraw its troops until realizing its target of overthrowing those hostile regimes, which
seemingly indicated that the US government was not restricted by the social pressure. However,
when examining how much burden a hardline policy can impose on society and how strong a
social restriction can be aroused by that burden, the relative power still needs to be taken into
account. Precisely, those enemies’ strength have been proved to be far weaker than that of the
United States, so the government’s demand for social resources did not reach the degree that
would cause fierce opposition from US society. In other words, the government could afford the
cost to achieve its targets in those wars and therefore did not impose too much burden on the
society. But the situation will be completely different if the US decides to take military actions
against China to defend Taiwan, which will force the US government to extract far more social
resources compared with what it needed in previous warfare and is bound to raise the degree of
social protest. According to the history that Washington has always tried to avoid to involve in any
direct military conflict with China since it began to intervene in the cross-strait situation in the
1950s, it seems that US elites are not sure about the government’s ability to resist such fierce
social constraint. In a word, the US government is not vulnerable to the social constraint when
making tough foreign policies, but this is mainly because it can afford the cost of achieving those
targets which did not impose tremendous burden on the society.
For Japan, the situation is only slightly different. As one of the earliest Asian countries that have
accepted the western democratic system, the legitimacy of Japanese regime has never been
questioned by its domestic society in the post war era. But the public does not seem to support the
government’s security policy related to constitutional amendment. Every time when Tokyo
preferred to abandon its Peace Constitution by taking various efforts to promote Japanese overseas
military actions, there was always strong protest from the Japanese society579. But these protests
did not pose any substantial effect on the relevant government decisions, which seemed to indicate
that Tokyo’s policy making was not constrained by the domestic social pressure. However, the fact
is that almost all Japanese hardline policies were put into practice through the actions of US-Japan
alliance, which means that most cost has been imposed on Japan’s powerful ally rather than its
own government or society. In these circumstances, the Japanese government did not need to
conduct any social mobilization, which explained why those protests were not strong enough to
become serious constraint580. This means as long as the US-Japan alliance exists, the Japanese
government will not be vulnerable to domestic social interference. In other words, without
US-Japan alliance, the Japanese government’s tough foreign policies are bound to arouse stronger
social protest because elites will have to use large scale mobilization to extract more resources
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from the society, which may provide more opportunities for the society to constrain the state’s
external behavior.
After the 1980s, Taiwan successfully established its own democratic political system in the
political transformation, which made the authorities’ legitimacy face few problems compared with
previous authoritarian regime. To a certain extent, Taipei even has a better situation than Tokyo
because political transformation has led most Taiwanese people to abandon their Chinese identity
and wish to maintain Taiwan’s de facto independence, which means society usually supports the
authorities’ stance on opposing Beijing’s pursuit of unification581. The problem is, within the
context that Taiwan relies on US military intervention rather than its own social resources to
contain China’s pressure, the current situation that Taiwan’s society has not created any serious
constraint on Taipei’s stance is not very meaningful. In fact, considering that social forces
especially undergraduate students have forced the government to make concessions in several
domestic policies by large scale demonstration or even intruding into government building, the
Taiwan authorities is actually very vulnerable to social constraints582. Even though the democratic
political system has been established for years, its authority is not fully respected by the society.
Social forces seem to believe they have the right to refuse the outcome of democratic government
voted by themselves, which means they can challenge or oppose policies made the government as
long as they are not content with these policies. And social forces, especially young people of new
generation tend to use large scale of manifestations rather than patiently choosing a representative
to propose certain policy in the congress to achieve their end, forcing the government to make
concession by adjusting or even abandoning its previous policies to satisfy the society. This is why
then KMT authorities’ policy for developing cross-strait economic cooperation faced so strong
opposition that the Ma Ying-jeou administration had to give up the negotiation with Beijing about
cross-strait service trade agreement583. Taiwanese people argued that they did not benefit from this
kind of policy, criticizing that the current distribution of economic benefit in society was unfair
and therefore they had no motivation to support Taipei to promote cross-strait economic
exchanges. Furthermore, the society also worried that these cross-strait economic cooperation will
raise the influence of the mainland on Taiwan’s economy, making Taiwan more dependent on the
mainland and therefore seriously damaging Taiwan’s de facto independence. In the face of this
strong social opposition, most policies made by then KMT authorities for promoting economic
exchanges with the mainland such as cross-strait economic cooperation framework agreement
(ECFA) cannot be completely put into practice, and this also implies Beijing’s effort for raising its
influence on Taiwan’s economy only generated very limited effect for winning over hearts and
minds of Taiwanese people. But this strong social restriction does not mean the society provides
sufficient support to pro-independence forces’ pursuit of realizing Taiwan’s de jure independence.
Compared with those hardliners in the pan green camp, most Taiwanese people are relatively
pragmatic about the security threat from the mainland, and the only reason that no political leader
has stepped down due to his or her dangerous provocation against Beijing is that Washington does
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not adjust its commitment to Taiwan’s security. In such a case, there is little question that the
society is able to force Taipei, even when it is controlled by pro-independence forces, to make
significant change in its definition of cross-strait relations if Washington changes its position. In
essence, for both Japan and Taiwan, regardless of whether there is true social support for their
tough policies, the relationship between the authorities and society has not been severely tested.
Therefore, both regimes’ abilities to resist social interference are questionable.
Social Cohesion
The last factor is social cohesion, reflecting the ease with which individuals or subgroups within
the society can be united. It is usually believed that this factor will be largely enhanced when there
is external threat584. Precisely, when facing serious external threat such as an invasion, people will
tend to put aside their conflicts with each other and their discontent with the government, uniting
together to resist the aggression. This implies that even if there is no real external threat, the
authorities can still reduce social discontent and therefore stabilize political situation by “creating”
a foreign enemy through propaganda585.
However, external threat does not always play the role of increasing social cohesion. Sometimes
they may exacerbate existing conflicts within the society, leading to more disagreements among
different subgroups and even serious social unrest. Therefore, whether an external threat can
enhance social cohesion is conditional on certain situations. In the view of L. A. Coser, the first
situation is the degree of social cohesion before the external threat appears586. In other words,
whether the identity construction in this country is stable. Although subgroups in the country
have their own group identity, members of those subgroups must agree that national identity is
their most significant and supreme identity, otherwise the social cohesion will be very weak if
people first identify themselves as members of a subgroup rather than citizens of the country. For
example, members of ethnic minorities or from the bottom layer of society who believe that they
have been treated unfairly or even oppressed, may regard a serious external threat as their
opportunity to improve their own situation. Consequently, these people may openly oppose the
government to take active measures to balance the external threat, making it difficult for elites to
conduct social mobilization. Meanwhile, a few subgroups are reluctant to actively resist external
threat also implies there is another situation should be taken into account before arguing whether
the external threat can enhance social cohesion, which is the influence area of external threat in
the society. It is not difficult to understand that an external threat influencing the whole society or
parts of the society or only a few certain subgroups, will lead to different reactions from
subgroups in the society. If it is confirmed that the enemy's purpose is to destroy the whole
country or enslave everyone in the society, most subgroups including those who believe they have
been treated unfairly will have no alternative but rise up against the enemy for everyone’s own
survival587. By contrast, if certain subgroups believe the threat has no direct impact on them, or
their own situation is unlikely to become worse if the country fails to defeat the aggression, they
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may give no positive response to state’s mobilization. And finally, the relationship between the
external threat and the social cohesion is also influenced by society’s confidence in defeating this
threat588. If the enemy is too powerful and makes most people believe their resistance is useless,
the society may not oppose a temporary surrender as long as the cost is acceptable. But excessive
confidence in defeating an external threat is also not good for enhancing the social cohesion. The
prospect that the threat will be easily defeated can hardly prompt subgroups to put aside their
disputes and unite together to fight against the enemy. This is similar to the situation in
international relations: without common security threat, reaching compromise and promoting
cooperation with other countries will become less necessary. In such as case, the state may wish to
maintain the social confidence in defeating external threat at an appropriate degree in order to
enhance the social cohesion.
For China, its humiliating history of suffering foreign invasions and ceding territory and paying
indemnities, its past military conflicts with the US and several neighboring countries, and a series
of unexpected events such as the collision between a US spy plane and a Chinese jet fighter over
the South China Sea in April 2001, have all contributed to increasing society’s perception of
threats589. In these circumstances, Chinese society is bound to be very sensitive to any new
conflict breaking out in the Taiwan Strait, which means its social cohesion will be largely
enhanced by external threat. In fact, China’s public attitude toward the US and many other great
powers is not moderate, and there is a strong resentment against those injustices caused by the US
and its allies which have damaged Chinese interests. The only exception may be separatist forces
inside the mainland, who regard military conflict between China and an external threat as their
best opportunity to achieve ethnic separation, believing they will not suffer any negative
influence590. However, the words and deeds of these separatist forces are usually not accepted by
most subgroups in the society but actually raise their fears about the potential consequence they
will have to face if those separatists achieve their end. In other words, separatist activities have
reinforced the social cohesion. Meanwhile, although Chinese people have a keen ambition for
national reunification, they also agree that the US and its military alliance with Japan are more
powerful than China. In such a case, they will put aside their disagreements and unite together
when there is a military conflict breaking out in the Taiwan Strait.
Because of the competition between the two countries in economic and political areas, Japanese
society is very hostile to the rising China, recognizing its powerful neighbor as one of Japan’s
major security threats. Although there is a strong voice in Japanese society that disapproves of
abandoning the Peace Constitution and promoting rapid rearmament, most people have never
questioned their national identity. Meanwhile, considering that Japan’s maritime lifeline will be
affected if the mainland tries to achieve unification by force, politicians who support Taiwan’s
independence will easily make the whole society believe it is under the influence of such threat,
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and therefore largely enhance the social cohesion591. However, it is also noteworthy that society’s
perception may be adjusted, because what Beijing really tries to realize is national unification and
capability of better defending China’s coastal security, rather than attacking Japanese territory or
threatening its social stability. This indicates that influence caused by China’s coercive actions on
Japan’s society may be limited, and cross-strait unification will only lead interests of specific
subgroups in Japan’s society, especially those with strong stance on supporting Taiwan’s de jure
independence, to be threatened. In such a case, it is difficult to predict the cohesion of Japan’s
society will be reinforced to what extent. Furthermore, the situation of Japanese society’s
confidence in defeating potential threat from China is also ambiguous, because such confidence is
more or less dependent on the US-Japan alliance rather than Japan’s own strength. This may lead
to excessive confidence of Japanese people, making them believe that the mainland’s military
action will be quickly contained by the US-Japan alliance, and therefore contribute little to
enhance the social cohesion592. However, if Washington’s target differs from that of Tokyo when
dealing with military conflict with the mainland, raising the security pressure facing Japan, the
society’s confidence will be reduced, which may reinforce the social cohesion. In essence,
compared with influence of threat or the identity construction in the society, the US position plays
a more important role in shaping Japan’s social cohesion.
Social cohesion in Taiwan has been weakened but then continuously strengthened in the identity
reconstruction process promoted by political transformation. More precisely, the de-Sinification
movements tried to replace the previous Chinese identity with Taiwanese identity, which effort
weakened Taiwan’s social stability. But with more and more people identifying themselves as
Taiwanese rather than Chinese, social cohesion was raised again. However, it is also noteworthy
that the existence of pan blue camp which upholds the One China principle and the fact that
Taiwan’s society refuses to take risks to declare de jure independence because of its pragmatism
both imply that there remains a little room for Chinese identity. In fact, there have appeared
political forces which not only oppose Taiwan’s independence but even openly support the
cross-strait unification. For example, the Chinese Unionist Party once waved the PRC national
flag in its group activity in Taipei in 2016, surprising the pro-independence forces and the whole
Taiwan society within the context that the DPP has already won the presidential election593. This
kind of behavior has never been observed in the period of political transformation, implying that
social cohesion has not been reinforced by Taiwanese identity to the extent that can provide
sufficient support expected by the pro-independence forces. Meanwhile, Taiwanese identity is also
related to subgroups or individual person’s perception of influence of unification. What the
mainland wishes to realize is territorial integrity, rather than avenging its old enemy in the
previous civil war, which means there will be no massacre in Taiwan’s society even the PLA is
facing strong protest. Thus, the real influence on Taiwan’s people is the change of their identity
and the negation of their regime’s legitimacy. Within the context that most people have accepted
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Taiwanese identity and regard Taiwan as an independent sovereign state, the whole society is
influenced by the threat of unification, and therefore the social cohesion will be further raised by
the mainland’s coercive actions. Like Japan, Taiwan’s society is confident that China’s military
actions will be eventually defeated by the US594. But considering that it is the nearest to the
mainland compared with the other actors, it is impossible for Taiwan to completely avoid damage
caused by military conflict with China, which should also enhance its social cohesion. However,
this confidence is very fragile because of Taiwan’s limited power. Unlike Japan which may be able
to defend its own interest even without US support, Taiwan’s de facto independence will definitely
disappear if there is no US intervention when Beijing decides to take over the island by force. This
means US action to defend Taiwan must be very effective, otherwise the island’s confidence in
defeating external threat will be seriously shrunk even in a low intensity of military conflict, and
the society may gradually recognize the unification as an outcome not extremely unacceptable.
There may be more subgroups taking the same position as Chinese Unionist Party, abandoning
resistance and accepting the Chinese identity. In general, Taiwan’s current social cohesion seems
high but also very dependent on the US behavior in the potential cross-strait military conflict.
Compared with the mainland, which has to deal with separatist problems, and Taiwan, which has
experienced identity reconstruction, the US has a more stable national identity supported by its
society. It is hard to believe that members of those subgroups which protest certain policies of the
US government may give up their national identity. Meanwhile, it may be not easy to analyze
American society’s perception of external threat’s influence, because the country’s fundamental
interests are not under such threat in the Taiwan Issue. Compared with other three actors, the worst
situation that US will face if it does not successfully resolve the Taiwan Issue is not disastrous.
More precisely, if Taiwan falls into the hands of a regime that is hostile to the United States, it
may threaten US security interests and political influence in the Asia-Pacific region, but
Washington has no need to worry about its maritime lifeline, sovereignty and homeland security,
or downgrade of its regime’s political status. In fact, although the mainland’s high level interests,
such as breaking through the First Island Chain, are likely to be achieved if it has realized national
unification with Taiwan, the Chinese Navy still has to face the Second Island Chain and is unable
to pose a direct threat to US homeland security595. In these circumstances, the influence caused by
this external threat in the Taiwan Issue on the US society is significantly less than that caused by
terrorist attacks. Therefore, the mainland’s coercive actions may play a very limited role in
enhancing US social cohesion. Moreover, as the only superpower in the world, the US power is far
stronger than that of the rising China, which also makes US society have sufficient reason to
believe that their country will achieve the final victory in any military conflict with China.
Consequently, the public and social subgroups are unlikely to unite together as they did when
facing a terrorist threat. In other words, unlike Taiwan whose social cohesion may be strengthened
by external threat but is very vulnerable to the changing international situation, the US social
cohesion is too stable to be largely reinforced by Chinese pursuit of national unification.
UnderWhat Circumstances China May Achieve Reunification
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After analyzing situation of elites and society in each actor, it is not difficult to realize that if the
mainland wishes to successfully resolve the Taiwan Issue, safeguarding its fundamental interests
and realizing its high level interests, certain changes need to occur in each actor’s internal factors.
The combination of these changes are the circumstances under which the mainland can achieve
national unification.
Certain Changes that Need to Occur in China, Japan, and Taiwan
It is clear that Chinese political elites have a stable consensus on the Taiwan Issue, especially the
dangers caused by pro-independence movements and the necessary measures to deal with such
dangers. They also have little disagreement on potential price they need to pay for those necessary
measures. Meanwhile, Chinese elites cohesion limits the effect of domestic political competition
on the formulation of China’s Taiwan policy. In fact, the Chinese leadership have a relatively
comprehensive understanding of the Taiwan Issue’s sensitivity and significance, so they will never
compromise with external forces by abandoning China’s pursuit of unification, and there is also
few dispute among them on how to use resources to deal with threats to different interest,
especially when facing provocations made by Taiwan’s pro-independence forces. But under
current situation, the mainland is facing both external and internal challenges to its pursuit. The
external pressure comes from the fact that Beijing has no reliable ally in the Taiwan Issue.
Although the pan blue parties such as the KMT firmly oppose Taiwan’s de jure independence,
they either show no interest in achieving unification or cannot provide efficient support to Beijing.
Considering the fact that the DPP won the 2016 election, the governing ability of the KMT is
questionable, which makes it unlikely that the KMT can improve the cross-strait relations to the
phase of formal political negotiations. Moreover, the US, Japan, and Taiwan have a common
target that is opposing Chinese unification to safeguard their own interests. In other words, Beijing
is in confrontation with all other actors when trying to realize its high level interest. Because it is
not realistic for the mainland to raise its own military strength in a short time to the level that can
defeat the alliance of all other three actors, it may be advisable for Chinese leaders to take
necessary actions to weaken the influence of that alliance. That does not mean to completely split
the alliance, which is almost impossible, but to utilize existing disagreements among those three
actors (because their interests involved are at different level), formulating appropriate policies to
promote certain changes in their internal variables and therefore reducing their coercive behavior
against Beijing’s pursuit, or even gradually prompting them to adjust their position.
Compared with this external challenge which has not created further deterioration since all sides
realized the importance of maintaining peace and stability in the area after the Taiwan Strait Crisis,
domestic political and social pressures facing the Chinese government may be more urgent.
Despite the strong nationalist sentiment which is enhancing the social cohesion and offering a high
degree of social support for the government’s hardline policy, and the CCP’s control of the army
and state owned resources which largely reduce the impact of social restrictions, the regime’s
legitimacy and survival remain as the core concern of Chinese leaders because there are various
problems that can seriously threaten the social stability and even the viability of CCP
administration.
The focus of China’s social stability has evolved in the past 30 years. In the late 1980s and the
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early 1990s, “stability” mainly referred to maintaining the political system and safeguarding the
ruling status of the Chinese Communist Party. In the late 1990s, although the government still
emphasized the political stability, more attention was paid to creating an appropriate environment
for economic development. In the 21st century, with the rapid economic development, there have
been a variety of social tension and conflict which finally led to manifestations of social
discontent. In such a case, the government had to give more weight to maintaining stability in the
whole society, not simply improving political stability. In fact, social instability has threatened
most people's daily lives rather than certain subgroups. There were more and more crimes with
aim to take revenge on the society, while at the same time, the number of mass incidents also rose
sharply to more than 100,000 pieces a year and the participants came from various social strata596.
All these indicate that China's rapid economic development has led to an imbalance of social
interest structure, triggering serious interest conflicts among different social subgroups. Faced
with this situation, the government has to take several measures to improve stability in both
political and social fields, but the result is not satisfactory. On one hand, many local governments
preferred to suppress people’s reasonable demands and discontent, even sacrificing the interests of
vulnerable groups in exchange for short term stability. On the other hand, when the cost of
suppression was too high, officials would tend to use economic means to meet some unreasonable
interests demands. This has led to China's current “rigid stability”597. To achieve this stability, the
government must use its political power to control social organizations and tend to maximize the
short term interest, sometimes ignoring social justice and equity, which therefore continuously
weakens legitimacy of the regime. This forces the government to rely more on coercive measures
when facing social conflicts, and largely raises the cost of maintaining political system. Once this
cost goes beyond a certain level that government cannot easily afford, more and more social
conflicts will become uncontrollable and finally evolve into a social unrest. This indicates that
Chinese government must resolve all those social problems, otherwise it will have to consume
huge social resources to maintain current stability, which not only affects the country's economic
construction, but also leads the CCP's governance capability to be questioned598. It is noteworthy
that Taiwan Issue has almost no influence on these problems, because the instability is caused by
interest conflict. Those reasonable and unreasonable requests usually have nothing to do with
China’s position on the Taiwan Issue, and will not be satisfied by Beijing’s coercive policies
towards Taiwan or other actors. In essence, if these internal difficulties are not properly handled,
they are likely to become a strong constraint on Beijing’s policy making, reducing the resources
that can be allocated to government’s behavior for realizing unification.
In general, for achieving unification, China must maintain its current consensus and cohesion
among elites. Meanwhile, after recognizing potential disagreements among the US, Japan, and
Taiwan, Chinese elites need to formulate appropriate policies to prompt them to react in ways that
Beijing will face less resistance when pursuing unification. But at the same time, Beijing also
needs to ensure that there is no deterioration in social stability caused by serious domestic interest
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conflicts.
Because of the Normal State strategy, Japan’s elites has broad consensus on the threat posed by a
rising China and has little disagreement on how to deal with the Taiwan Issue. Although the
government used ambiguous statement to describe its position, the words and deeds of political
elites on many occasions have showed that Japan’s real target is to obstruct China’s unification
with Taiwan. Meanwhile, Japanese society, which may oppose Constitutional Amendments
promoted by the government, has offered sufficient support to those tough policies against the
external threat, and its cohesion seems to be enhanced by such threat. However, this stable
situation in Japanese elites and society is largely dependent on the US-Japan alliance. According
to previous analysis, the US-Japan alliance provides measures for dealing with the threat and
shares most of the relevant costs, which has not only enhanced the cohesion of the Japanese elites
and society, but also largely eased the potential tension between society and the government. In
these circumstances, Beijing must give more weight to the US-Japan alliance, reevaluating its own
policy making to avoid further stimulating the alliance and therefore reduce the likelihood of
coercive reactions from the alliance. This may imply that Beijing should use a “two pronged”
strategy combining both coercion and exchange. The coercive part is necessary because Japan’s
elites publicly support Taiwan’s independence while regarding Chinese unification as a threat to
Japan’s fundamental interests. In order to contain their behavior that may encourage Taiwan’s
pro-independence forces to overstep China’s red line, Beijing has to make it clear that it will take
non peaceful means to safeguard Chinese sovereignty and territorial integrity if Taipei declares
Taiwan’s de jure independence, reminding Tokyo there will be huge cost if it tries to support
Taiwan’s independence. While on the other hand, Beijing should limit the influence of this
coercive policy on Japan’s society. Unlike politicians who will hardly change their pro-Taiwan
stance, the attitude of society towards the Taiwan Issue, especially China’s military actions to
oppose Taiwan’s independence, is able to be adjusted. This is because Japanese people’s daily
lives will not be directly impacted if Beijing’s action focuses on taking over Taiwan rather than
threatening Tokyo. To let Japan’s society accept this view, China should promote exchanges with
its hostile neighbor. This is not economic cooperation, which has been proved useless for
improving political relations, but more comprehensive contact between people in two societies.
Increasing understanding about real ambition and objective situation of each other may not
completely dissolve contradiction, but can largely moderate nationalist sentiment promoted by
official propaganda. When Japanese people revise their previous oversimplified and inaccurate
perception of China and its pursuit of unification, the society may reexamine the government’s
hardline policy and its influence, adjusting the degree of its support for Tokyo’s involvement in a
future cross-strait military conflict.
It is noteworthy that this “two pronged” strategy should be regarded as the only realistic option for
Beijing because it is unable to change Japanese elites’ position, and any military pressure against
Taiwan will inevitable reinforce Japan’s security cooperation with the US and even elicit strong
counteraction from the US-Japan alliance. Indeed, even this strategy works, Japan’s policy and
behavior will not be changed too much as long as the alliance exists, because it is the US rather
than Japan’s society which bears most cost of intervening in Taiwan Issue. This implies that
Chinese leaders, while adopting this strategy, should reduce resistance from the alliance by taking
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more efforts to influence American elites and society, creating concessions of Washington in
certain aspects of Taiwan Issue. Once there is obvious fluctuation in the alliance, Japan's political
elites and society will face serious challenges to maintain their previous stable position. For the
elites, old measures for dealing with external threats may not work, and facing threats alone means
the degree of threat will become relatively higher. This may lead Japanese elites to rethink how to
deal with the mainland’s pursuit of unification when the entire cost of intervention is borne by
Japan. Moreover, without support from the US-Japan alliance, Japan’s rearmament process will
lose its most significant platform, and therefore become difficult to put into practice599. Within this
context, if Tokyo insists on abandoning its Peace Constitution and sending troops to the Taiwan
Strait to obstruct the mainland’s action of unification, the anti-war sentiment is bound to rise in
society and create stronger constraint on the government’s policy making. Without support from
the United States, Japan will need to mobilize more social resources to conduct intervention,
which will also provoke fierce opposition from the society. If Beijing does limit the intensity of its
conflict with Japan, avoiding to threaten Japan’s territory or its maritime lifeline, it will be
difficult for Japanese society to find a reason to support the government to engage in war for
defending Taiwan. This not only means more constraint on Tokyo’s policy, but also indicates
Japan’s social cohesion will be hardly enhanced by Chinese coercive actions. In such a case, the
policy of blocking Chinese unification through military action may be adjusted.
Taiwan's elite consensus and cohesion are weaker compared to the other three actors, but both the
authorities and society oppose the mainland’s pursuit of unification. This means that situation
faced by the mainland is either the pan blue camp which supports the 1992 consensus but has no
intention to carry out any political negotiation for reunification, or the pan green camp that firmly
promotes Taiwan’s de jure independence. Meanwhile, since more and more people accepted the
Taiwanese identity, the mainland’s pursuit of unification has become increasingly unacceptable in
the view of Taiwan’s society. Within this context, it is obviously unrealistic for Beijing to expect
that Taiwan may change its position by replacing the current Taiwanese identity with the previous
Chinese identity or reaching a new consensus on accepting unification among its elites. In essence,
from Beijing’s perspective, the role played by Taiwan is stable and negative. However, it is the
conviction that the US will defend Taiwan enables the pan green camp to ignore the gap in
military strength between the two sides, and explains why the KMT is confident in maintaining
Taiwan’s current de facto independence. In such a case, it can be easily inferred that situation in
elite consensus and cohesion will be dramatically changed if such conviction is weakened.
Precisely, the previous disagreement among elites about the threat’s degree will disappear because
politicians from both camps will have to admit that Taiwan has no effective means to obstruct the
mainland’s actions. The effect of this new consensus will seriously influence the elite cohesion. If
pan green politicians refuse to compromise while unable to convince the society to spend
enormous resources on a losing game, it seems that their only option will be to find a new ally.
But Japan alone cannot offer strong support to the pro-independence forces if the US has refused
to defend Taiwan. Therefore, the final result of the DPP will be either abandoning
pro-independence position in its party platform, which means its identity will be completely
reconstructed, or leave Taiwan like what pro-independence forces did during Chiang Kai-shek’
period.
599 Calder K E. China and Japan's simmering rivalry[J]. Foreign Aff., 2006, 85: 129.
152
In the meantime, the One China principle will prompt pan blue elites to begin negotiations with
the mainland for a unification model that may not seriously downgrade Taipei’s political status.
Similarly, social cohesion will also experience fluctuation. On one hand, there is no chance to
defeat the external threat, while on the other hand, people will be reluctant to abandon their
identity. This may lead the society to have an ambivalence in its attitude toward unification. In
such a case, the unification model plays a significant role in reducing both pan blue elites and
society’s resistance. If Taiwan is defined as a normal province of the PRC, the society will be very
dissatisfied with the new identity and this may create sufficient room for the pro-independence
forces to continue their separatist movements, damaging the stability of the reunited China600.
Therefore, Beijing needs to ensure that its unification model can be accepted by both pan blue
politicians and the public, implying that Taiwan’s status after unification should be higher than an
ordinary local government. The “one country, two systems” may be a possible solution. Although
the situation in Hong Kong made the model even less attractive in the view of many Taiwanese
people, it should be pointed out that two issues need to be taken into account when examining
whether the model is suitable for Taiwan. First is the premise on which this model can become
realistic in the Taiwan Issue. That is the US gives clear signal that it will not defend Taiwan.
Without US intervention, Taiwan will take a more pragmatic attitude to this model and consider
how to adjust it to better safeguard Taiwan’s own interest. In other words, the current refusal of
“one country, two systems” is not due to any flaw of the model or what is happening in Hong
Kong, but rather Taiwan’s confidence in maintaining its de facto independence. Another issue
should be made clear is the content of this model is quite different from what has been established
in Hong Kong. As mentioned in previous chapters, Beijing promises to give Taiwan a high degree
of autonomy through this model, including administrative, legislative, independent judicial power
as well as power to deal with certain foreign affairs, and Taiwan can even keep its own troops.
This may be regarded by Taiwanese people who worry about Taiwan’s political status after
unification as an acceptable compromise. In general, without intervention from other actors,
Taiwan’s negative role can be completely changed. Its elites may reach a new consensus,
admitting it is impossible to defeat the mainland through mobilizing social resources. On this basis,
if the mainland’s model of unification can reduce both elite and social resistance, the goal of
national reunification is likely to be achieved.
It can be concluded that Taiwan’s position is unlikely to change because its elites and society are
convinced about the US commitment to Taiwan’s security while the reconstructive identity has
created strong resistance against the mainland’s pursuit. Similarly, Japan’s elites also have a broad
consensus and stable cohesion in opposing Chinese unification, while Japanese society’s
constraint on its government has been weakened by the effect of the US-Japan alliance, so changes
favorable to China are also unlikely to automatically occur in Japan. Therefore, whether Japan’s
and Taiwan’s internal factors can be changed to create appropriate circumstances for the
mainland’s unification greatly depends on the US position. If the US gives more weight to
Sino-American relations, recognizing the rising China as an important constructive partner rather
than a strategic challenger or even a security threat to its global hegemony, it will tend to make
600 Yu T. Relations between Taiwan and China after the missile crisis: Toward reconciliation?[J].
Pacific Affairs, 1999: 39-55.
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more compromise in Taiwan Issue. This compromise is not to allow China to take over Taiwan by
force, but gives signals that Washington can tolerate peaceful unification across the strait, which
will be good enough for Beijing’s pursuit because it can lead Japan’s and Taiwan’s internal factors
to experience a series of changes, including new elite consensus, lower cohesion in society, and
higher regime vulnerability. In these circumstances, both actors will become unable to take
effective actions to obstruct China’s national unification. In other words, necessary shift of the US
position should be regarded as the premise on which appropriate changes can happen in Japan’s
and Taiwan’s internal factors. This is why Deng Xiaoping once stated that the Taiwan Issue is
actually “an US issue”601.
601 Jin Xiaochuan. (2005). Influence of US-Taiwan Military Relations on China's Solution of Taiwan
Issue. Taiwan Studies . 4 (4), p62-69.
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Chapter VIII Relations between the US Hegemony and its
Position in Taiwan Issue
The Necessary Changes in US Domestic Factors and Their Premise
It is clear that American political elites have a basic consensus on the Taiwan Issue, that is the
country’s important interests will be seriously damaged if the mainland achieves national
unification. Based on this consensus, the elites do not differ much on how to respond to this threat
and what price the US may need to pay. In fact, this consensus is so stable that American elite
cohesion on the Taiwan Issue has almost never declined. Politicians have remained the same view
on forming alliances and using scarce resources to cope with the threat, even there is intensive
political competition among them. Meanwhile, although the US government's legitimacy has not
been questioned by society, Washington's hardline policies toward the mainland which may cause
serious military conflict can hardly receive strong social support because of the heavy burden that
will be placed on the whole society. It is noteworthy that target of “No Use of Force” has implied
that elites are not overly confident about whether the government can resist increasing pressures
from society if the country becomes involved in a serious military conflict in the Taiwan Strait.
This indicates that the US government’s target in the Taiwan Issue may be not completely
consistent with the attitude of US society. The reason is that the US territory is very unlikely to be
directly threatened by China, and thus Chinese unification will not be perceived by society as a
threat that can affect most people. Furthermore, the US military power has allowed its people to
believe their country will be able to win any military conflict. In these circumstances, US social
cohesion will not be largely enhanced by the mainland’s pursuit of unification.
Obviously, as long as China does not take irrational actions to threaten the territory of the United
States, American society will provide limited support or even constraint to its government's tough
policy in the Taiwan Issue. However, the premise of this constraint is the outbreak of a military
conflict between the US and mainland China, which is not the situation expected by Beijing,
because in such a case there will be no appropriate changes happening in domestic factors of
Japan and Taiwan. What Beijing needs is that the US adjusts its position on the Taiwan Issue and
therefore influences Japan’s and Taiwan’s policy making. This depends on whether the US elites
will change their assumptions that the mainland is hostile to the US and Chinese unification will
enable Beijing to threaten US interests in the region. Before verifying these two assumptions, it is
noteworthy that even though the mainland achieves the unification and breaks through the First
Island Chain, Chinese Navy still has to face the Second Island Chain and is unable to pose any
direct threat to the US homeland security. This means those US interests which will be under
threat after Chinese unification are not at the fundamental level. More precisely, security of
military base and allies and its leadership in regional political and economic areas are closely
related to the US hegemony. In such a case, the assumption that these interests will be threatened
by cross-strait unification is to a large extent equivalent to the assumption that US hegemony will
be challenged by a rising China. In other words, whether US elites may adjust their position is
dependent on whether the country’s dominating status in regional and global affairs as a
hegemonic power can be challenged by an unified China.
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Power Transition Theory and Its Limitations
Most American politicians and scholars who are questioning China's peaceful rise and worried
about the outbreak of severe conflict between China and the US usually make their argument
based on the Power Transition Theory, believing that US hegemony in the Asia-Pacific region is
being gradually weakened by China. According to that theory, the international system is like a
pyramid in which one country locates in the spire while most countries are in the bottom602. The
country at the highest level that has the greatest power is the leader of the system, and below the
leader there are countries having big power, middle power, and small power. From Organski’s
perspective, when the leader has a power far greater than any other countries, peace will be
effectively maintained in the system603. This position sounds like Gilpin’s Hegemonic Stability
Theory, although Organski and his followers believed that the threat towards the hegemonic
system is not caused by the rising marginal cost for hegemonic power to provide public products,
but from the power transition between the leader and the big power, which is generated by the
latter’s rapid growing strength based on industrialization process604. When a country has a strength
close to the leader and starts to struggle with the leader and its allies for the leadership position,
the war will break out605. Of course, the power of the big countries approach or surpass that of the
leader is not bound to cause the war, because if the country with growing strength is satisfied with
the current international system, which indicates that it is a “status quo country”, the result of
power transition is likely to be peaceful. In other words, only when the country with sufficient
strength to challenge the leader is dissatisfied with the current system, which implies that it is a
“revisionist country”, the process of power transition will be accompanied with military
conflict607.
Undoubtedly, in the view of those politicians and scholars who want to maintain the US hegemony
and feel uneasy about the rise of China, the Power Transition Theory has offered a significant
explanation for the future development of Sino-American relations and a guide to action for the
US government. According to the theory, it seems that the rising China is a typical challenger.
China has large population, and its government can effectively resist social constraint and has
maintained a rapid economic growth after the reform and opening. Meanwhile, there were several
confrontations between China and western capitalist countries until 1980s when Beijing always
refuses to give up its communist ideology as the US has wished. Consequently, it is not surprising
that China today is still regarded by some western politicians as a revisionist country that is
dissatisfied with the status quo of the international system. In such a case, it seems there is a high
possibility that military conflict may break out between a rising China and the United States, and
thus the US government needs to take necessary measures to contain this challenger. Specifically,
Washington should prevent China from enhancing its ability to capture the regional hegemony or
take hostile actions against the US and its allies608. This idea leads to a series of coercive policies
against China in the Asia-Pacific region, such as holding regular military exercises with Japan,
South Korea, the Philippines, and other US allies, and repeatedly emphasizing the US
602 Organski A F K. World Politics. Alfred A[J]. 1968, 364.
603 Organski A F K, Kugler J. The war ledger[M]. University of Chicago Press, 1981, 19.
604 Organski A F K. World politics[M]. Knopf, 1958, Ch1.
605 Organski A F K. World Politics. Alfred A[J]. 1968, 364.
607 Organski A F K, Kugler J. The war ledger[M]. University of Chicago Press, 1981, 39.
608 KORKISCH F W. Quadrennial Defense Review Report 2006[J], 30.
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commitment to security of its allies, to constrain China's behavior of destabilizing the US-led
Asia-Pacific system and therefore maintain US advantage in the region. Within this context,
Beijing’s pursuit of national unification is obviously unacceptable.
However, the future Sino-US relations in the Asia-Pacific region may be not that pessimistic,
because the Power Transition Theory itself is questionable. According to Organski’s theory, the
growth of state power is mainly promoted by its internal industrialization, and is also affected by
the population and government’s efficiency. This makes it very difficult to understand what does
the challenger want to obtain through its conflict with the leader when all those factors promoting
the growth of power cannot be plundered from other countries. Someone may argue that the
challenger tends to wage war against the leader is not to plunder power resources but to change
rules of the current system and therefore makes its own strength grow faster. But this argument
may contradict the Power Transition Theory itself. According to the concept of the “Phoenix
Factor”, the process of industrialization can be delayed but cannot be completely prevented,
clearly indicating that the state will eventually regain its strength even it has been defeated in a
warfare609. In these circumstances, the revisionist country is supposed to patiently wait until its
strength approaches or surpasses that of the leader, rather than clash with the leader. More
precisely, if the process of power transition based on the internal industrialization is irreversible,
the challenger that is experiencing the growth of strength has no reason to be dissatisfied with the
status quo, because its power will surpass that of the leader eventually. On the other hand, in the
face of a rising power, it is the leader that is likely to be discontent with the existing system and
hope to consolidate its status by changing the system, taking initiative to provoke conflict with the
rising power610. This means that the conflict is usually not caused by the ambition of a rising
power, but rather the leader’s unreasonable attachment with its hegemony. Therefore, those tough
measures adopted by the US to contain China’s rise are not as reasonable as the theory has
implied.
Characteristics of the US Hegemony
There are four elements that should be taken into account when analyzing a hegemony: the
strength of the hegemonic power, its willingness to achieve hegemony, the legitimacy of the
hegemonic system, and the strategy for maintaining this hegemony.
First, strength is the foundation of a hegemony. A hegemonic power must have sufficient strength
to provide some key services in the global system to establish and maintain its hegemony611. This
means that hegemonic power’s military, political, economic, and cultural strength should be
sufficient to let the country play a dominant role in making and modifying the international system.
These strengths can be divided into the one in the security field and the one in the field of
production, trade and finance. The former mainly refers to military strength, while the latter can be
regarded as economic strength. Military strength provides a guarantee of US overseas expansion,
ensuring the country can control those major strategic parts of the world, and also reducing US
609 Tammen R, Kugler J, Lemke D, et al. Power transitions[J]. Strategies for the 21st Century, 2000,
31-32.
610 Chan S. Exploring puzzles in power-transition theory: Implications for Sino-American relations[J].
Security Studies, 2004, 13(3): 103-141.
611 Modelski G. Long cycles in world politics[M]. Springer, 1987, 14.
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allies’ defense spending, which prompts them to follow the US strategy in the region. But the
powerful military strength may not be the most important feature of US hegemony. As a country
which has a true global hegemony, it is the economic strength that enables the US to establish the
dollar hegemonic system covering most countries in the post Cold War era, which has not been
shaken even after the global financial crisis. The economic strength is mainly reflected in the US
competitive advantage in the global economy. It is noteworthy that this strength is the capability to
gain profit in international economic exchanges rather than the amount of wealth accumulated in
the country. For example, through providing liquidity assistance to other countries’ central banks,
making the Federal Reserve perform the role of lender of last resort in the international financial
market, and using quantitative easing policies, the US has not only created favorable conditions
for the recovery of its domestic economy, but also transferred the effect of crisis to other countries,
ensuring that US dollar’s status will not be challenged612. In a word, the US establishes and
maintains its hegemonic system by using its military strength, and the core of this system is the
dollar hegemony, which enables the US to obtain huge benefits through expanding its hegemonic
system. This is the biggest difference between the US and past hegemonic power: the US does not
need to establish colonies, which implies that unlike the zero-sum game between hegemonic
power and big power in Power Transition Theory, the US hegemonic system is more inclusive,
encouraging other countries to join it as long as the status of US dollar is not challenged.
Furthermore, the United States has a strong will to dominate world affairs. As early as the first
half of the 20th century, the US had a strong desire to pursue external influence, not only
integrating Latin America into its own sphere of influence, but also actively participating in
European affairs, and it finally achieved hegemonic status after World War II. During the period of
the Cold War, this will was strengthened when facing the powerful rival. Based on Spykman's
Rimland Theory, the United States utilized regional conflicts in the European and Asian countries
to build alliances against the threat from the Soviet Union, which doubtlessly increased its
influence in those areas613. After the Cold War, the will of dominating world affairs has
transformed into worries about the hegemony’s decline, which can be found in a series of policies
for containing US potential competitors, such as the “rebalancing toward Asia-Pacific region”614.
Then US National Security Advisor Tom Donilon stated frankly that the US success in the 21st
century would be closely linked to its success in the Asia-Pacific region, implying that stability of
US hegemony is linked to the rise of China615. Consequently, this strong will to maintain its
hegemony has prompted the US to increase its military deployment and strengthen its alliances in
the Asia-Pacific region, which are obviously targeted at China616.
Legitimacy of hegemony depends on the mutual understanding between the hegemonic power and
612 Goldberg L S. Is the international role of the dollar changing?[J]. Current Issues in Economics
and Finance, 2010, 16(1).
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other countries, referring to whether the US is supported by most countries within the hegemonic
system. This indicates that apart from military and economic strength, culture, ideas, and
ideologies are also very important because a stable hegemony should be based on consent or
agreement rather than simply coercive oppression617. The most important concept related to the
legitimacy of hegemony is soft power, which is the ability that hegemonic power to spread its own
values in other countries618. If soft power is strong, the hegemonic power’s behavior will be
regarded as legitimate and face less resistance. For example, US rebalancing strategy does not
meet fierce opposition from most countries in the Asia-Pacific region, although there are
differences in the degree of acceptance among different countries. The strategy is highly evaluated
and welcomed by Japan who believes that the US military presence is indispensable for regional
peace and stability. Of course, this attitude is due to Japan’s need to promote its Normal State
strategy by deepening the US-Japan alliance. Similarly, South Korea also holds a positive attitude
to the US actions of strengthening its regional hegemony, because threat from the North Korea and
pressures from rising China prompts Seoul to seek more support from its powerful ally. But the
Korean government understands the significance of cooperating with China in dealing with
regional affairs, while the society’s hostile sentiment towards China is not too strong, so the
country’s support for US strategy of containing China may be weaker than Japan. Compared with
these US Asian allies, the ASEAN countries seem to be relatively prudent and pragmatic. They
want to deepen economic cooperation with China, while simultaneously trying to avoid to be too
dependent on China. It is noteworthy that except for the countries that have territorial disputes
with China, most ASEAN members are worried that their effort to establish a new regional order
based on the current framework for multilateral cooperation will be damaged by US rebalancing
strategy, so they seek to find a balance between the US and China rather than completely
following the US policy which may lead them to become marginalized in regional affairs619.
Therefore, the fact that US strategy does not provoke any strong opposition from most countries in
the Asia-Pacific region indicates that US hegemony’s legitimacy has not faced any serious
challenge, but whether the US soft power is strong enough to let most countries firmly support its
policy of containing China still needs to be tested.
Like most normal countries, hegemonic power needs to utilize various power resources to achieve
its target such as maintaining its hegemony, which means it should formulate appropriate strategy.
Although the United States is the only superpower with unprecedented global hegemony, there are
still targets it cannot achieve by its own strength, while too strong unilateralism in the external
behaviors can damage its soft power, weakening the legitimacy of its hegemony. Thus, one
strategy adopted by the US is allowing other countries in the hegemonic system to share some
power that will not threaten the US status and asking them to reciprocate by sharing a certain
degree of international responsibility. In the security field, the United States usually encourages its
allies to develop their military capabilities and thus Washington can receive their support when
taking military actions to defend its global hegemony. One example is the US policy of deepening
the US-Japan alliance and allowing Japan to obtain greater military strength, which may create a
617 Heywood A. Political ideas and concepts: An introduction[M]. London: Macmillan, 1994,
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“normal” Japan to effectively balance the influence of rising China. In the economic field, the
power sharing is not limited to the US allies, because US does not need to maintain its hegemony
by inhibiting economic development of other countries. Theoretically, when a country benefits
from US hegemonic system, it is very unlikely to challenge the US status or question the system’s
legitimacy. But one reality that should not be ignored is that Washington tends to force the country
to share more responsibility for developing global economy if the country has maintained a rapid
economic growth.
Role of China in the US Hegemonic System
In the past 20 years, there were significant changes in China’s status in the Asia-Pacific region.
Before 1989, China did not win diplomatic recognition from many of its neighboring countries
such as Singapore and South Korea. But now Beijing has established formal diplomatic relations
with most Asian countries, and built a strategic cooperative partnership with South Korea and
comprehensive strategic cooperative partnerships with Vietnam and Thailand. Moreover, with its
rapidly growing economic strength, China has greatly promoted its economic exchanges with
countries in the Asia-Pacific region. In 1989, China's GDP was only about one-sixteenth of the US
GDP, but it has become more than half of US GDP by 2012, making China the world's second
largest economy620. Within this context, Chinese trade and mutual investment with East Asian
countries are continually increased, and China has already become the largest trading partner of
Japan, South Korea, and the ASEAN621. By contrast, the development of US influence in the
Asia-Pacific region was stagnated during the period of the George W. Bush administration,
because the US was focusing on the Middle East and waging two anti-terrorist wars, which made
Washington have insufficient power resources to intervene in Asian affairs. But in the view of US
elites, decline of US influence is the result of China’s growing power and increasing confidence,
which has made Chinese government become more assertive when dealing with regional affairs,
competing with the US for regional dominance622. However, China’s power is not enough to
challenge the US hegemony. One proof is that despite being the world's second largest economy,
its rising GDP does not enable China to shake the dollar hegemony. In fact, the US government
has been pressuring China to appreciate the renminbi (RMB, China’s official currency) and
requires China to implement a more flexible exchange rate mechanism, while Beijing’s response is
very moderate because it has no leverage to effectively cope with this pressure623. Furthermore,
China's modernization is based on the stability of its internal and external environment, implying
that its rapid economic growth will suffer serious damage if it gets involved in a confrontation
with the US for regional dominance. Without economic growth, there will be no “Chin’s rise”, and
the Chinese government is likely to face domestic challenges to its legitimacy and has to pay more
attention to maintain social stability. More importantly, the gap between two countries’ military
strength is even larger. In 2013, the US military spending was almost six times that of China, and
such a huge gap cannot be easily bridged by China’s economic growth624. Meanwhile, in terms of
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arms quality, China’s stealth bombers, warships, amphibious landing ships, or nuclear weapons all
lag behind the US army. In a word, China's economic strength is not a threat to the hegemony of
the US dollar, and its relative weak military capabilities has determined it is impossible for China
to win any military conflict with the US. In these circumstances, the so called Chinese assertive
diplomacy may be the result of misunderstanding China’s concerns about its vital interests.
Moreover, China is not a revisionist country in the US hegemonic system. According to Chinese
external behaviors in the past 30 years, it is clear that Beijing hopes to better integrate into rather
than to challenge or reject the existing system. In fact, China’s rising economic strength can be
regarded as the evidence of its effective integration into the international economy, because a
country which completely refuses the US-led global economic system is unable to largely benefit
from the process of globalization. Meanwhile, China is also contributing to maintaining this
international system. For example, when the DPRK nuclear issue threatened peace and stability in
Northeast Asia, damaging the regional order dominated by the US, China preferred to host the
six-party talks, taking an active role in resolving the conflict and easing the tension. In addition,
China has also participated in the United Nations’ peacekeeping operations and a number of
non-governmental international organizations. Therefore, it should be regarded as an important
participant and defender of the existing international order625.
No one will deny that China's rise has to a certain extent influenced the power structure of the
Asia-Pacific region, but the US elites and scholars may have overlooked the fact that China takes
a moderate attitude towards the US hegemony rather than directly opposing the status quo. In fact,
the US dominance is mainly in the security area based on alliances it has established, while China
has no intention to build an alternative Asia-Pacific security system. On one hand, China’s past
ideological output and its current territorial disputes have made East Asian countries to be
suspicious of security cooperation with China, while on the other hand, China does not have
sufficient strength to provide East Asian countries with public products in the security area. It is
also noteworthy that the US military presence in the region and the security order it has built is
beneficial to China. For example, this military presence leads to a sense of security among Asian
countries, reducing their anxiety about China’s rise and thereby enabling them to promote political
and economic cooperation with China. Within this context, the ideal situation of the Asia-Pacific
region may be that the United States dominates regional security, maintaining peace and stability
in the area, while China plays the role of economic engine, not only promoting regional economic
development, but also raising the cost of regional military conflict through strengthening
economic ties among most Asian countries, and therefore prompting them to use peaceful means
to resolve their disputes. This is the appropriate way to allow China to perform a greater role and
share more responsibility in the US hegemonic system, because it will not challenge the US
leadership position while satisfying China’s interest pursuit. In other words, it is a win-win
situation.
However, the strong will of maintaining its hegemony prompts the US to refuse this moderate
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resolution but tend to balance the power of the Asia-Pacific region, preventing China from
obtaining the ability to dominate regional affairs or pose threats to US interests626. A possible
reason for this hostile attitude is that US elites may have overestimated their country’s strength,
believing that the nation can realize interests at a level which is too high, and therefore formulate
an inappropriate strategy. This kind of overestimation can be traced back to the end of the Cold
War627. The collapse of the Soviet Union made most US elites and scholars overly confident,
leading them to put forward a series of specious theories such as “the end of history” and failed to
realize that the fall of its rival was mainly caused by the effects of that country’s own internal
factors rather than the US overwhelming strength. In such a case, the end of the Cold War does not
mean that the US alone has the ability to solve all the global problems, which has been already
proved by the result of the George W. Bush administration’s unilateralism. Neither the nuclear
issues in Iran and the DPRK nor the long-running Palestine-Israel conflict was completely
resolved by the US alone, while those hardline unilateral actions have provoked growing anti-US
sentiment in many parts of the world, weakening the US soft power.
Faced by the tendency of multipolarity, the United States should be aware that its ability to
dominate international affairs is not as strong as it estimated, and it is advisable to allow other
countries to express their opinions when establishing and revising international order. This is not a
theory or wishful thinking but reality. The emergence of G6, G7, and G20 has indicated that the
US has difficulty in managing significant regional affairs alone, and therefore has to cooperate
with regional powers. While on the other hand, the emergence of these “G” groups also means that
these regional powers are not discontent with the US hegemonic system, and they wish to
cooperate more closely with the US to cope with those global and regional challenges. More
precisely, the US elites should realize that the real threat towards its hegemony is not the emerging
powers that benefit from and try to maintain the international order, but rather those serious
problems caused by terrorism, drug cartels, pirates, and transnational criminal organizations, as
well as weapons proliferation, global environmental issues, and the global economic crisis. These
threats are usually from non-state actors and non-traditional security fields, and the US cannot
effectively control or deal with them because they are scattered throughout the world and the US
is unable to maintain powerful presence in every significant part of the world. In these
circumstances, maintaining the international order requires regional powers to assume more
responsibilities, and thus US should allow these countries to share more power within the system
as long as they will not threaten the US hegemony. This means that US elites should reevaluate
their perception of relative power, abandoning those targets related to some high level interests
that the US cannot achieve, so the country can strike a balance between maintaining its hegemony
and cooperating with regional powers.
Influence of Chinese National Unification on the US Hegemony
The ambition to promote its hegemony is so strong that American elites have formulated
inappropriate strategies which give too much weight to containing emerging powers like China
rather than dealing with issues that have posed real threats to US hegemony. In particular,
626 Brzeziński, Zbigniew Kazimierz (2007). The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy and Its
Geostrategic Imperatives . Shanghai: Shanghai People's Publishing House. p21-32.
627 Walt S. Democracy, Freedom, and Apple Pie Aren’ta Foreign Policy[J]. Foreign Policy, 2014, 1.
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Washington believes that China is a hostile regime which will use Taiwan to damage US security
and political interests in Asia if it achieves unification. But according to the fact that China’s rise
does not cause the decline of US hegemony, and China has neither sufficient power to challenge
the US hegemony nor the intention to change the hegemonic system, but rather benefits from and
tries to better integrate into that system, it is clear that China should not be simply regarded as a
hostile regime.
The real impact of Chinese unification on the United States is the latter’s influence in the
Asia-Pacific region will be weakened. The fact it is unable to “protect” Taiwan will lead the US to
gradually lose the trust of other allies, increasing these countries’ sense of insecurity. Once these
US allies are unsure about how many public products that the US can provide in the security and
political areas, they will become more and more independent in their foreign policy making rather
than closely following the US strategy when dealing with regional affairs. This implies that the US
hegemony’s legitimacy in the Asia-Pacific region will be questioned, which may have serious
effects on regional security. Despite Beijing’s statements that the Taiwan Issue is China’s internal
affair, China’s neighboring countries, especially those having territorial disputes with China may
feel they are in a position similar to Taiwan’s. If Taiwan is ultimately controlled by the mainland,
these countries will become increasingly concerned whether (or perhaps when) Beijing will take
similar measures to force them to make concessions, and may tend to unite with each other to
balance China’s threat in territorial disputes628. The worst case will be a serious military conflict
between China and these countries’ alliance, which is not consistent with the US strategy because
this situation actually indicates that Washington has lost its control of regional affairs and is
unable to maintain its hegemony. In a word, Chinese unification may create a negative impact on
the legitimacy of US hegemony in the region and damage high level US interests.
But it is also noteworthy that the worst case may not appear as Beijing is unlikely to use its tough
measures in the Taiwan Issue to resolve territorial disputes with its neighboring countries. Within
the context that China has no intention to provide public products in the security area while East
Asian countries are worried about China's rising strength, security cooperation between China and
its neighboring countries is doubtlessly limited and cannot help them to resolve territorial disputes.
Furthermore, Taiwan’s geographical location will make China become more confident in dealing
with these disputes if it has achieved unification. Therefore, the relevant countries’ anxiety is
understandable. However, it should be noted that these territorial disputes are different from the
Taiwan Issue, because they are usually related to economic interests or political influence rather
than fundamental interests. This does not mean that China will completely relinquish its claims to
the rich sea resources, but implies that Beijing is more likely to reach compromises with its
neighboring governments through its policy of “putting aside disputes and making joint
exploitation”629. And finally, as mentioned in previous analysis, Beijing is supposed to formulate
appropriate policies to pressure Taipei to accept unification while not aggravating Japan or US,
which means Chinese leaders will try to avoid triggering off foreign opposition. For this reason, it
is very likely that Beijing will also use moderate policies to deal with these territorial disputes,
628 Pang Weidong. (2013). Strategic Cooperation of Vietnam and Indea and Its Impact on
China. Journal of Southeast Asian Studies. 3 (3), p50-56.
629 Gao Z. The South China sea: From conflict to cooperation?[J]. Ocean Development &
International Law, 1994, 25(3): 345-359.
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because the most important task for Chinese elites during that period is successfully achieving
unification and maintaining the stability of a reunited China, rather than seeking to increase its
political influence.
The US high level interests such as its political influence will be still damaged even this worst
case does not happen, but Washington may accept this consequence if it prefers to resolve regional
and global affairs which pose real threat to its hegemonic system. In other words, American elites
need to make a judgment about whether the threat from China’s rise is related to interests at higher
levels compared to threats from those non-state actors. If the answer is positive, the US is
supposed to allow China to share more power and cooperate with China in resolving regional and
global issues so it can safeguard those interests which are under real threat. But if Washington still
believes it has sufficient power to cope with all those worldwide challenges and that the most
urgent target is containing rising China, there will be more conflicts between the two countries in
regional and global affairs, and the tension across the Taiwan Strait can be raised again. In fact,
according to US officials’ current hardline position, it seems there is little possibility that
Washington will adopt a strategy of retrenchment in the Asia-Pacific region630.
However, compared with these oral statements from politicians, historical reality may offer a more
persuasive answer. Before China’s rise, there were many times that scholars argued that US
hegemony was on decline, especially during the period of Korean War and when Japan and
Europe were maintaining rapid economic growth in the 1980s631. Among them, the situation faced
by the US hegemony in the late 1960s is very similar to the current challenge to Washington in the
post financial crisis era. For both, the US experienced warfare that damaged its economic and
political interests and did not end in a complete victory for the US. Meanwhile, Washington had to
face serious domestic economic and social problems as well as significant changes in the
international structure, which prompted the US to adjust its strategy to maintain its hegemony. It is
noteworthy that strategic adjustment in the 1960s has been proved to be successful, because the
US finally resolved most domestic and international problems, becoming the only super power in
the post Cold War era. Thus, by comparing with this successful experience, it is possible to predict
the effects of US current strategy.
The strategic adjustment adopted by the US government in the late 1960s included ending the
Vietnam War, improving the country’s image damaged by this warfare, and normalizing Sino-US
relations. Based on these developments, the US government then focused on domestic social and
economic reform, reshaping the US society by promoting pluralism and enhancing social
cohesion632. The social stability enabled the government to reform the economy through reducing
taxes and adopting a tight monetary policy, which finally realized a rapid economic growth with
630 Secretary of Defense Ash Carter. (2016). Remarks by Secretary Carter and Q&A at the
Shangri-La Dialogue, Singapore. Available:
http://www.defense.gov/News/News-Transcripts/Transcript-View/Article/791472/remarks-by-secret
ary-carter-and-qa-at-the-shangri-la-dialogue-singapore. Last accessed 7th June 2016.
631 Liu Jianhua and Deng Biao. (2010). The US Hegemony: Decline or Continuance. Pacific
Journal. 18 (1), p26-35.
632 Hing B O. To be an American: Cultural pluralism and the rhetoric of assimilation[M]. NYU Press,
2000.
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low inflation633. The result of all these measures was the restoration and expansion of US power,
successfully maintaining its hegemony until the 21st century. Similarly, after the 2008 financial
crisis, the US government also implemented a series of internal and external strategic adjustments.
First of all, the government effectively curbed the spread of crisis by strengthening financial
regulation, and gradually retreated from anti-terrorism war by lowering the priority of
anti-terrorism issue in the US strategy. Simultaneously, facing those problems caused by the
subprime crisis, the Obama administration formulated several policies to contain the hollowing
out of industry and to create more job opportunities in order to reduce the intensity of social
conflicts634. Although these adjustments after the financial crisis have made many achievements,
their final effects are still uncertain because the current situation is more complicated than that in
the 1960s. Major challenges facing the US in the 1960s were social discontent provoked by the
Vietnam War and the external threat created by Soviet expansion. This explains why then US
government was able to largely improve its internal and external environment in a short period
through ending the warfare and promoting normalization of the Sino-US relationship, which
provided necessary foundations for subsequent social and economic reform. By contrast, within
the context of multipolarity and the rise of emerging powers, there are an increasing number of
global challenges in the modern world which has made the situation far more complex than the
confrontation between two superpowers in a bipolar structure. More importantly, it is US internal
economic crisis rather than external threat that led to the current problem, which implies American
elites may not be able to improve the situation in a short period by ending the war but should pay
more attention to its domestic situation. Without successful social and economic reform, the US
social cohesion may further decline and therefore hardly provides sufficient support for tough
foreign policy.
It is noteworthy that in the 1960s, the most important part of US strategic adjustment was to
improve Sino-US relations, which not only reduced the consumption of national resources in its
hardline policy against China, but also made US obtain a better international image compared with
the Soviet Union, enhancing its soft power. Obviously, this retrenchment enabled the US
government to give more weight to its domestic reform, strengthening the national identity and
reducing the regime vulnerability. In other words, then US elites had an accurate perception of
relative power and preferred to protect the country’s fundamental interests through sharing power
with China rather than overestimating the country’s own strength and trying to realize high level
interests by unilateral actions. By contrast, whilst extricating itself from anti-terrorism war, the US
officials did not adopt a strategy of retrenchment but simply transferred their attention from the
Middle East to the Asia-Pacific region, implementing the rebalancing strategy towards China and
attempting to maintain its hegemonic system by hardline policies635.
For the US, the anti-terrorism war has led to growing tensions between US and the Islamic world,
and therefore created negative impact on the legitimacy of its hegemony, while financial crisis
633 Havrilesky T. Monetary policy signaling from the administration to the Federal Reserve[M]//The
Pressures on American Monetary Policy. Springer US, 1993: 117-154.
634 Goldberg G S, Rosenthal M G. The Jobs Crisis: How to Solve It and Begin to Fix Our Broken
Economy[J]. New Politics, 2011, 13(2): 60.
635 Ratner E. Rebalancing to Asia with an insecure China[J]. The Washington Quarterly, 2013,
36(2): 21-38.
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weakened its economic strength, shaking the dominant role of US dollar in the international
financial order. Within this context, Washington still preferred the strategy option of expansion,
stabilizing the US military presence in other regions and maintaining security commitment to
other countries, in order to keep its leadership position in regional and global affairs. But
intervening in other regions’ economic and security issues means the rising cost of US hegemony.
First of all, intervention requires US government to spend huge resources in its overseas actions,
which implies resources that can be allocated to those more pressing domestic problems such as
economic recession will be decreased. Within the context of increasing fiscal deficit, this strategy
of expansion will doubtlessly impose a heavy burden on the US government, blocking the
formulation and implementation of certain policies which may be necessary for dealing with US
own internal difficulties. Meanwhile, there is another cost which is even more serious. Although
the reality shows that US intervention in regional and global affairs has not created any anti-US
alliance which tries to balance US, all these coercive behaviors based on US commitment to its
allies’ security will raise the likelihood that US is involved into a direct military conflict with other
great powers. This means, if US adopts and insists the strategy of expansion, it may face the risk
of pursuing an interest at too high level that its power is not sufficient to achieve. In order to
prevent that situation from taking place, the US should ensure its allies will not take any audacious
behavior that will further raise the tension in the region when US is taking coercive actions to
contain their common enemy. In other words, when implementing this expansion strategy, the US
still has to figure out which level’s interest is appropriate to pursue, defining the limit of its power,
because only under the premise that neither US allies nor its potential enemies make dangerous
policy to threaten regional security, creating a stable international environment and therefore
promoting global economic development, the US can benefit from such strategy.
If the US government recognizes it does not have sufficient power to realize the interest at the
highest level in its foreign policies, the strategy will be adjusted through redistributing the
resources. Precisely, more resources will be transferred from issues related to that highest level
interest to other issues which involve relative low level interests, in order to reduce the cost and
dangers of external behavior. This is retrenchment, which is usually refused by most great powers,
unless they are facing certain situations. First of all, the great power or the hegemonic power
realizes its military action cannot achieve the end, so it stops to expand its military presence in
other region even when it is facing serious international challenge. For example, in the face of the
Soviet expansionism, the US had to adopt retrenchment, ending its previous expansion in
Southeast Asia when the cost of the Vietnam War was becoming too high to be accepted.
Furthermore, adopting retrenchment brings no harm to the country’s fundamental interests. Indeed,
retrenchment means to give up some interests at too high level, while other interests especially
fundamental interests should not be influenced, because giving up high level interest implies more
resources will be transferred to issues related to fundamental interests. When US extricated itself
from the morass of the Vietnam War, giving up certain high level interests such as influence in
Southeast Asia, its fundamental interests such as homeland security was not under any damage
caused by that strategy adjustment. Nevertheless, retrenchment may lead allies to lose their trust
on the hegemonic while the potential enemies will be encouraged to take more aggressive actions,
and thus regional peace and stability will be damaged when both the hegemonic power’s allies and
enemies prefer to develop their military capabilities. That indicates the regional security issues is
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gradually out of the hegemonic power’s control. In such a case, if a hegemonic power adopts
retrenchment, there should be other problems which are more pressing and more significant
compared with temporarily losing its dominant role in other region’s security affairs. For US, the
racial conflict in 1960s which led to the Civil Right Movement, and the oil crisis which caused the
economic recession, both forced American elites to pay more attention to domestic difficulties.
Last but not least, the rising power will play an important role in retrenchment. Elites often worry
that adopting retrenchment will generate power transfer, making the rising power replace the
previous dominant hegemonic power. However, giving up certain high level interests does not
mean the hegemony is suffering serious decline and will have to be replaced by a rising power. It
only means the hegemonic power has figured out which level’s interest it should safeguard and
which level’s interest it should give up, while the latter is usually related to which level’s interest it
should allow other country to realize. So there is no replacement for hegemonic power’s dominant
role but a compromise between hegemonic power and rising power. According to Sino-American
normalization, the compromise brought US huge economic and other interests which should not
be ignored, such as increasing trading volume between the two countries and their effective
cooperation against the Soviet expansionism. In other words, an appropriate compromise with a
rising power will serve many significant interests of the hegemonic power.
In summary, when the hegemonic power is facing external challenges which cannot be effectively
resolved by military action and other difficulties which are even more pressing, it may consider to
adopt retrenchment if such adjustment will not damage its other interests but only leads to an
appropriate compromise with other great power, which will be beneficial to the hegemonic power
itself.
For the US, in order to maintain its leadership position in regional security and even economic
issues, then Obama administration made the Asia Pacific re-balance strategy. This strategy is
composed of two parts: military structure and economic agreement. The first step is stabilizing US
military presence in the region, strengthening alliance with Japan while improving security
cooperation with other partners, and then there would be measures for establishing new
international trade system. This actually means to end the situation in Asia Pacific region that
regional security is dominated by the US while economic development is mainly promoted by
China, using security issues to raise cohesion in regional countries and therefore reducing their
economic dependence on China, in order to let both security and economic issues to be dominated
by the US. For that reason, Washington sent US troops to Australia, provided military advisers to
the Philippines, and allowed Japan to raise its military strength by removing restrictions of its
Peace Constitution, while at the same time, promoted the TPP negotiation which excluded China
outside.
But the real effect of this re-balance strategy was questioned. There was growing threat from
terrorism. No matter how much efforts US has taken, the reality was the expansion of the Islamic
State led the security situation in both the Middle East and South Asia to be deteriorated.
Meanwhile, when political elites criticized China’s rise or the DPRK nuclear tests, the Secretary of
Defense made it clear that Russia was still regarded as the principle security threat to the US636.
636 Tyler Durden. (2017). Gen. Mattis: "Russia Is The Principal Threat To US Security". Available:
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This implied the US should sent more troops to Europe and Iraq to respond to those challenges
from Russia and terrorists. However, the confrontation between Russia and the west is very
unlikely to be resolved by a direct military conflict between US and Russia. The crisis in Crimea
proved that Washington and its allies still preferred to use other measures especially economic
sanction to deal with this security issue related to Russia. And the anti-terrorism war did not bring
peace and stability to Middle East countries but raised tension between the US and many Islamic
nations. In such a case, a coercive military action may not be the most appropriate option for US
to respond to those international challenges.
Even for those hardline politicians who tended to use effective and firm security policies to
contain those potential challengers such as China, they still had to admit that US military strength
was relatively decreased. The US military budget had been reducing for a period because of
economic recession and government fiscal deficit, while then Obama administration’s stimulus
policy and health care reform both required the government to raised its expenditure, so the money
was transferred from certain areas such as military budget to support government policy. Although
the number of military budget was gradually rising again when US economy was recovered, this
decline had already created negative impact on US military strength. The most significant
consequence was the reduction of military forces and therefore led US officials admitted that the
country has lost the capability of winning two major military conflicts at the same time and
declared that the current strategy was winning one military conflict while containing an invasion
in another area. This relatively decline of economic and military strength explained why US
seemed to become more dependent on its allies when implementing its regional strategy.
Moreover, the US society did not share the coercive opinion of elites, opposing the government to
take overseas military actions because there were more pressing domestic issues such as health
care reform, economic recession, the rise of unemployment rate, and political polarization.
According to US public opinion, the only external behavior the society would support is military
actions against Islamic State, because terrorism can affect most parts of the society. By contrast,
other external issues usually had very limited impact on American people’s daily lives. In such a
case, taking military action against potential challenger such as China may even elicit social
discontent because that means the government revenue which should be used to better deal
domestic difficulties, maintaining social stability and improving economic growth, will be reduced.
Furthermore, some domestic problems even directly influenced the expansion. For example, the
TPP negotiation, which was an significant part of the re-balance strategy, was abandoned by the
Republican government, and non one can deny the weak elite cohesion caused by political
polarization played a major role in this policy adjustment.
Within this context that coercive behavior may not be able to resolve external challenges and so
many domestic difficulties need to be appropriately dealt with, and considering the fact that
certain compromise with China such as reducing US intervention in the Taiwan Issue or even
allowing the mainland to promote national unification will not damage fundamental interests of
US but improve Sino-American cooperation in Asian and world affairs, there is the possibility that
http://www.zerohedge.com/news/2017-01-12/gen-mattis-russia-principal-threat-us-security. Last
accessed 18th June 2017.
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US government may consider about adjusting its strategy from a too coercive expansion to a more
pragmatic retrenchment.
Conclusion
The analysis of this study has revealed the complexity of the Taiwan Issue, demonstrating that the
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issue’s development is not entirely determined by the two sides across the strait because the US or
Japan’s behavior can also seriously influence the situation. In other words, no actor alone can
completely control the Taiwan Issue.
The mainland hopes to safeguard its homeland security, sovereignty, and territorial integrity, so it
firmly opposes Taiwan’s independence. While on the other hand, considering that an unified China
can become a great maritime power and enable Beijing to exercise more influence on the regional
and global affairs, Chinese leaders will never abandon their pursuit of realizing national
unification. But maintaining its current de facto independence is the bottom line of Taiwan, and on
this basis, the pan green camp is seeking to realize Taiwan’s de jure independence. The reason that
Taiwan is able to reject Beijing’s pursuit of unification and even dares to challenge China’s
fundamental interests is its target has been supported by the United States and Japan. The US
believes if Taiwan is controlled by a regime hostile to US, its political and even security interests
in the Asia-Pacific region will be under threat. Therefore, obstructing the reunification is the
bottom line of Washington in the Taiwan Issue. But the US also refuses to involve in a direct
military conflict with China for defending Taiwan, so it formulates two more targets of “No Use of
Force” and “No Independence”, attempting to maintain the status quo in the Taiwan Strait. It is
noteworthy that the ultimate consequence of Taiwan Issue expected by the US is Taiwan’s de jure
independence, because it will largely decrease China’s influence on the regional affairs and
therefore enhances US hegemony. Similarly, Japan is also unwilling to see that mainland China
can achieve reunification because Tokyo’s elites believe their country’s fundamental interests will
be under serious threat in the process of cross-strait unification. Meanwhile, in order to realize its
Normal State strategy, Japan will tend to support Taiwan’s de jure independence and even attempts
to reincorporate the island into Japan's sphere of influence, significantly weakening China's
political and economic influence and therefore bringing Japan the leadership position in regional
affairs. In a word, the US, Japan, and Taiwan are all opposing the mainland’s pursuit of unification
when Washington and Tokyo give implicit and explicit support to Taiwan’s de jure independence.
Through analyzing the policy evolution of each actor, this study has made up deficiencies in most
researches on the Taiwan Issue. First of all, this study has made it clear that it is unrealistic to put
hope on developing cross-strait relations for realizing unification. A few scholars were too
optimistic about the development of cross-strait relations, and even attempted to analyze how
would US adjust its strategy in the Asia-Pacific region if Taiwan changes its position and accepts
unification637. But the reality is, US own interests are involved in the Taiwan Issue and will be
impacted by unification, which makes it very unlikely that Washington will take no action even
Taipei accepts Beijing’s claim. Apart from that, without appropriate changes in US and Japan’s
internal factors, Taiwan almost has no reason to give up its current de facto independence. The
political transformation has significantly changed Taiwan’s society, leading more and more people
to identify themselves as Taiwanese rather than Chinese and therefore resist Chinese unification.
This resistance, according to the analysis of this study, will not be easily moderated by the
growing cross-strait economic exchanges. Consequently, it is difficult to believe that Taiwan’s
pro-independence forces which seem to have sufficient social support will relinquish their pursuit
637 Tucker N B. If Taiwan chooses unification, should the United States care?[J]. Washington
Quarterly, 2002, 25(3): 15-28.
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of realizing Taiwan’s de jure independence. More importantly, within the context that Taiwan’s
allies continue to provide political and military support and make commitment to the island’s
security, the pro-independence forces can only become increasingly confident in dealing with
cross-strait affairs. Therefore, the conclusion that the mainland can gradually achieve unification
by promoting cross-strait relations and the conclusion provided by research with the hypothesis
that Taiwan may actively change its position when its allies still support its current political
independence are not persuasive at all.
Secondly, this study has analyzed Japan’s true position on the Taiwan Issue. Few scholars in
mainland China or the United States has linked Japan with the Taiwan Issue in their researches,
even Taiwan was mentioned in their analysis of the US-Japan alliance. From their point of view,
Japan only plays a subsidiary role in the US strategy, and it has little willingness to intervene in
the Taiwan Issue but will have to be involved in the US military actions against the mainland if a
cross-strait conflict breaks out. This implies that Japan may not prefer to obstruct Chinese
unification if Tokyo can completely decide its own foreign policy making. However, through
analyzing a series of policies made by Tokyo in the economic, political, and security areas for
realizing Japan’s Normal State strategy, and the conflict between this strategy and China’s rise,
this study has proven that Japan has strong ambition to contain its powerful neighbor’s further
development in order to obtain the leadership position in the regional affairs and become more
influential in the international arena. And Taiwan has played a very significant role in these
conflicts. For example, unification can affect Japan’s maritime lifeline, while supporting Taiwan’s
independence can be used to contain China’s rise and increase Japan’s regional influence. In these
circumstances, the mainland should not ignore the possibility that Japan may act alone to
intervene in the Taiwan Issue. This means Beijing must take into account of Japan’s concerns
about its fundamental interests, formulating appropriate policies to minimize the impact of
Chinese unification on Japan’s society.
Thirdly, after comprehensively analyzing most significant factors that can affect Chinese
unification, this study has also paid necessary attention to the question that whether the possibility
of achieving cross-strait unification exists. Scholars who focus on cross-strait relations usually
regard the development of such relations as the premise for the mainland to achieve unification.
Other scholars who give more weight to the US influence on the Taiwan Strait even avoid this
question in their research. More precisely, although they admit that the US is obstructing Chinese
unification, Chinese scholars rarely analyze whether the mainland will be able to resolve the US
intervention, while most scholars from the US and Taiwan refuse to assume that Beijing can
achieve unification because of their political stance. In fact, most of these studies tend to provide a
specific plan for the authorities to adjust their relevant policies to adapt to the changing situation,
rather than finding out the way of resolving the Taiwan Issue. In these circumstances, the
conclusion about conditions of achieving unification will become a simple slogan to endorse the
government’s policy adjustment if the unification cannot be proved to be possible.
In summary, this study negates some inaccurate arguments such as opposing Taiwan’s
pro-independence forces can realize reunification or Japan’s impact on the Taiwan Issue is
confined to the action of US-Japan alliance, while at the same time, does not focus on how to use
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a strategy to let the US make compromise or simply emphasize the US economic and military
power, avoiding to offer an oversimplified or even misleading conclusion. Furthermore, this study
reveals the unique role of US in the Taiwan Issue by analyzing its effects on Japan’s and Taiwan’s
internal factors, and also analyze whether there is a possibility that US may lead to appropriate
changes in those internal factors, making the conclusion about unification conditions more
comprehensive and persuasive.
The Taiwan Issue is complicated because each actor’s interests involved in the issue are not at the
same level, and it is for the same reason that this issue may be resolved peacefully. For the US,
only its high level interests such as political influence and security of its military bases and allies
in the Asia-Pacific region will be affected by the unification, which implies that there is room for
Washington to compromise with Beijing. The analysis of the relationship between the US
hegemony and China’s rise has demonstrated that such a compromise may be a wiser option
compared with US current rebalancing strategy. It is noteworthy that this study does not simply
provide an optimistic conclusion about the future development of the Taiwan Issue, but points out
that the US may gradually reach such compromise with China only when American leaders realize
their current strategy can hardly resolve those challenges facing the US hegemony. When the US
adopts retrenchment and pays more attention to its own domestic problems, appropriate
circumstances for mainland China to achieve unification may appear:
The mainland maintains its elite consensus on pursuing unification, enhances its elite and social
cohesion, and takes effective measures to maintain the social stability, reducing the vulnerability
of the regime;
There will be changes in Japan’s elite consensus on intervening in the Taiwan Issue because no
ally will share the dangers and costs of obstructing Chinese unification. Meanwhile, the social
cohesion cannot be largely enhanced, especially when the government has to extract more human
and material resources from the society to deal with a threat that has little influence on the whole
society. As long as Beijing can limit the impact of its action on Japanese fundamental interests,
Japanese elites may tend to reach a new consensus, reducing or even suspending their support for
Taiwan’s pro-independence forces;
Compared to Japan, Taiwan’s strength is much weaker and its policy is bound to be significantly
changed if the US adjusts its position. Considering that Taiwan is unable to defeat the PLA and
there will be no genocide after reunification, the pan blue camp is likely to start negotiations with
the mainland while the society may reconsider the Chinese identity. All Beijing needs to do is to
improve its current unification model to be accepted by the pan blue politicians and most
Taiwanese people.
It is noteworthy that before US adopts that retrenchment strategy, it is meaningless for the
mainland to consider about providing any attractive model of national unification. The reason is
the two sides still cannot clearly define their political relations when they have different opinion
about One China’s sovereignty. For example, Taiwan authorities often used a concept called
‘governing authority’ (zhi quan), which means the power the authorities have to deal with its
domestic and diplomatic issues, such as administrative or legislative power. When Taipei
repeatedly emphasized that it has such governing authority, it actually emphasized the reality that
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Taiwan and other islands like Jinmen and Penghu are under Taipei’s control. This reality cannot be
denied by Beijing, but the problem is this concept is related to China’s sovereignty. Precisely, this
governing authority is not the high degree autonomy promised by Beijing in its One country, Two
systems theory, even though the content of them are nearly identical: for both, Taipei has the
administrative, legislative, and independent judicial power as well as power to deal with certain
foreign affairs, and even the right to keep its own troops. When two sides agree that Taipei enjoys
this power, they do have a dispute about where this power comes from. According to Taipei, its
governing authority is authorized by the ROC sovereignty, while Beijing insists the high degree
autonomy is offered by the central government to the special administrative region. That is why
Beijing’s theory cannot satisfy Taipei when the latter insists its current authority comes from the
ROC sovereignty rather than any other central government, and Beijing refuses to accepts such
concept of governing authority, because if it admits Taipei has such authority, it also admits the
existence and status of the ROC, and that will create two Chinas.
Apparently, when two sides have dispute about One China’s sovereignty, failing to achieve any
compromise about which side is the central government of this One China, it is almost impossible
for them to define their political relations. In 2000, Beijing rephrased its One China principle,
declaring that there is only one China in the world, both Taiwan and the mainland are parts of
China. It made it clear that Taipei has an equal status with Beijing in the cross-strait negotiations.
However, it did not answer what relation is between the two sides before unification, and tried to
avoid to clearly answer what relations will be between the two sides after unification. Indeed, if
the relation between the two sides is neither two central governments nor the central government
and a local government, it is quite difficult to understand what it is. In such a case, any attempt for
providing an unification model that can be accepted by both sides under current situation is a bit
unrealistic.
In fact, in the view of the mainland, achieving national unification means ending the confrontation
between the two sides. Considering that Beijing has promised in its One country, Two systems
theory that Taiwan’s capitalism will coexist with the mainland’s socialism after unification, ending
confrontation does not mean to end the difference between two sides’ political systems.
Furthermore, the two sides have maintained a long term peace and stability after the third Taiwan
Strait Crisis without promoting cross-strait relations toward unification, ending confrontation is
not as simple as easing military tension between the two sides. In such a case, ending
confrontation actually implies ending dispute between the two sides about One China’s
sovereignty, reaching a consensus about which side is the central government. Thus, providing an
unification model which can be accepted by both sides, which means clearly defining cross-strait
political relations, is almost equal to achieving national unification. In other words, it should be
regarded as the consequence rather than a condition for realizing unification.
Only when the US adopts the retrenchment, Taiwan’s elites and society will recognize that the
premise for refusing national unification has disappeared because the island has to use its own
power to compare with the power of mainland China, and therefore adjust the policy based on the
new reality, starting a formal political negotiation with Beijing about unification. Basically, Taipei
is very likely to make concession to Beijing about how to define One China’s sovereignty, giving
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up its previous insistence on unilaterally emphasizing the ROC sovereignty. Within such context,
in order to reduce unnecessary opposition, Beijing also needs to take effort to make its unification
model more attractive, avoiding a too coercive stance such as forcing Taiwan to admit that One
China means the PRC which may elicit social discontent in Taiwan.
Of course, if Taiwan takes the initiative to promote unification, it will have more advantage in
formal political negotiation with the mainland about what the form a re-united China should be.
However, within the context that the DPP has regained power, this is almost impossible to appear
in the foreseeable future. The pro-independence forces still refuse to accept the 1992 consensus,
denying the One China principle, which has already influenced cross-strait dialogues. There is
little question that any provocation made by the pro-independence forces that may overstep
Beijing’s bottom line is bound to elicit strong reaction from the mainland, even leading military
tensions to be raised again in the area, especially when the US rebalancing strategy puts increasing
pressures on China in regional security affairs. It is noteworthy that the Tsai Ing-wen
administration’s current seemingly moderate policy does not meet the demand of the pan green
camp’s hardliners, while inappropriate words and deeds of the US elected President may further
encourage Taipei to take audacious actions to largely promote Taiwan’s de jure independence. In
these circumstances, the possibility that a dangerous military conflict breaks out in the Taiwan
Strait cannot be ruled out.
To promote peace and stability in the area, great powers should have accurate perceptions of
relative power and formulate appropriate policies, choosing interest at the right level to guide their
external behaviors. But before significant compromise can be reached, Beijing and all other three
actors need to carefully cope with their interactions, working for the best and preparing for the
worst, because anyone’s misjudgment may lead to severe consequence that will seriously damage
interests of all actors.
